Wake-up call

Like the crudely assembled 'Dirty Bombs', the principles of carrier/delivery capability of the much-bandied drones or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have evolved. The asymmetric nature of modern warfare and terrorism has been transformed with the advent of disruptive and readily available technology that can elude existing defense systems. The vulnerability of the advanced 'shield systems' sprung forth when the ragtag Houthi Yemeni militia made a mockery of the multi-billion worth American Patriot missile-defence system, that worked reasonably well against the conventional Scud missiles (though it occasionally misfired and once even made a U-turn and plunged into the ground), but failed miserably to intercept the more rudimentary drones deployed by the Houthis.

On September 14, 2019, Houthis fired multiple drones onto the world's largest oilfields at Abqaiq, deep in the Saudi Arabian deserts – these fields account for about five per cent of the global oil production. Consequently, the global crude oil prices surged by 20 per cent, and the accompanying losses ran into tens of billions of dollars. That this high-security facility was protected by the state-of-the-art Skyguard short-range defense battery Crotale launchers and the Patriot missile system, counted for nothing as these advanced weapon systems failed to detect the low flying drones (conventional radar systems are more adept at catching 'high flying targets'), as also the factor of projectiles zooming in from multiple directions, which could have confused, jammed and overwhelmed the Saudi air defense systems. These attacks nailed two lessons for posterity: firstly, the inadequacy of modern weaponry to definitely counter the threat from this specific contraption and, secondly, the necessity of disproportionate investments and policy guardrails by the defender, as opposed to the relatively cheaper investment required by the attacker (it is estimated that the drones in the Saudi attack could have cost as low as one lakh rupees, each). With such low investments, the Houthis were able to hit targets 1,200 kilometers away from their controlled territory. The UAV-X drone used is said to have a range of up to 1,500 kilometers, theoretically putting major Saudi assets and others like the under-construction Emirati nuclear plant in the region, well within the range. Saudi Arabia then had the third biggest defense budget in the world, yet it was exposed to the perils of asymmetric warfare and tactics.

The low-intensity explosions at the highly guarded Air Force facility on the common Jammu airport, caused reportedly by the use of either UAVs or basic drones (UAVs have three key additional features of the global navigation satellite system, intelligent flight planning and post-processing applications) is an augury of the metastasized threat perceptions. Importantly, no debris of any drone was found from the blast spots, suggesting that the drones may have escaped after dropping the payload. Given that the Line-of-Control (LOC) with Jammu is approximately 14 kilometers away from the Jammu airport, the drone which typically requires a leveled field or building rooftop to achieve flight could have been launched from either across the LOC or even within, given its inherent reach. There have been over 300 spotting and intrusions of 'unfriendly' UAVs/drones along the LOC (for aggressive surveillance, dropping weapons, drugs etc.) over the past few years. This was, however, the first of its kind to drop the payload of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and reach 14 kilometers into the hinterland. Instinctively, the format lends itself to the portents of Fidayeen attacks (suicide attack), albeit, with the added advantages of wreaking havoc with no human casualty to the attacker, and of lowering the risk of identification of the source of launch.

The author, in an article 'Prepare for drone terrorism' (Deccan Herald, Oct 16, 2019), had noted the development of the robust drone manufacturing ecosystem in Pakistan which has successfully indigenised Chinese and Italian technologies to make several variants. The natural Pakistani tendency to 'support' elements inimical to Indian interests can facilitate the dangerous sharing of the dual-usage technology and its handling, besides overlooking its launching facilities along the LOC to maintain the lever of deniability. However, this specific contraption of two 1.5 kg IEDs which missed the ostensible target of the helicopter hangar by a few meters does not suggest the professional handling of the same. Perhaps used as a format 'trial balloon' or more likely as a symbolic attack to pass multiple messages pursuant to the ensuing undercurrents besetting the fragile Indo-Pak ceasefire signed on Feb 25, 2021, this attack signifies a new threatening reality that has arrived.

The much-in-news Israeli 'Iron Dome' multi-mission system capable of intercepting and neutralising rockets, UAV's and other aerial projectiles is also only 90 per cent effective – still allowing for that crucial 10 per cent to slip through, as it did in the recent Israeli-Palestinian attacks. But, as is the wont of the continuous race to beat the 'shield' systems, organisations like the Palestinian Hamas are already developing mitigating and 'breaking' tactics and decoys. Understandably, India has shown keen interest in procuring the Israeli anti-drone SMASH 2000 Plus system on priority, as also in fast-tracking the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)-led indigenous 'anti-drone system'. Guarding the 3,200-kilometer border with Pakistan will require holistic solutions beyond weapon technology itself, as it will entail a foolproof policy framework to tightly regulate its utility in the civilian realm, manufacturing, import, etc., all under hawk-eye considerations. Like for personal weapons, a database entailing the availability, registration, and necessity for the procurement of the device, as also, for the suppliers and repairers of the same, must be established on a priority basis. Above all, like in any counterinsurgency success, there is no replacement for 'Humint' (Human intelligence) to report any untoward movement of drones – the sensitivity of recognition and reporting of drones by locals, in the same urgency as reporting suspicious human movement, is critical. This is a security challenge that threatens the best security regimes in the world and India needs to contemporize its existing National Drone policy, investments, and security posturing to remain ahead of the curve, as the Jammu attack is a cold wake-up call.

The writer is the former Lt Governor of Andaman and Nicobar Islands & Puducherry. Views expressed are personal