Persistent failure

With the proposed amendments to rule 6 (1) of IAS Cadre Rules 1951, floated by the Central government, one more controversy looms large over the already fragile Center-state relationships. Presently, the rule provides for deputation of officers of All India Services from their state cadre to the Central government, other state governments or a company, body etc., subject to the consent of the both governments and the officer concerned. The final decision rests with the Central government in case of any disagreement in the process. The proposed amendment to the above rule firstly dispenses with the need for tripartite agreement and secondly mandates a compulsory portion of the strength of the state cadre to be earmarked for Central deputation. It reads: "Provided that each State Government shall make available for deputation to the Central Government, such number of eligible officers of various levels to the extent of the Central Deputation Reserve prescribed under Regulations referred to in Rule 4 (1), adjusted proportionately by the number of officers available with the State Government concerned vis-à-vis the total authorized strength of the State cadre at a given point of time. The actual number of officers to be deputed to the Central Government shall be decided by the Central Government in consultation with the State Government concerned."

No doubt, there could be pressing grounds behind the proposal but the compulsory deputation reserve in state cadres and the Centre's power of unilateral decision-making will not only take away the freedom of the states in managing their own cadres but will also adversely affect their governance. In the long run, it can also become a potential weapon in the hands of the Centre to control the state governments. The heat is felt more by those states where the dispensations are led by different parties than the one at the Centre. The reactions of some states are nothing short of a war cry, as they fear that unfair interference by the Central government in the structure and functioning of bureaucracy in states can jeopardize the federal structure and defeat the very Constitutional schema of the nation. The apprehensions are not entirely unfounded in the backdrop of relatively strained Centre-state relations over the past few years. The current controversy only represents a tip of the iceberg, pointing to a much deeper crisis latent in the management scenario of All India Services.

All India Services are constituted as common to the Union and the states by Article 312 of the Constitution. The Central government is solely authorised by section 3 of the All-India Services Act 1951, to regulate recruitment and lay down the service conditions of these services in consultation with states. It needs no telling, that the intent of the law is to make sure that the entire country is governed as one nation under one Constitution, and to achieve this goal, common civil services of all-India character are sine qua non. But unfortunately, the Central government seems to have long forgotten its own responsibility of strictly enforcing the Cadre Rules 1954; Cadre Fixation (regulations) 1954, IAS Pay Rules etc enacted by itself.

Frankly, the term 'All India Services' at times sounds a misnomer because, unlike in Central services, officers of AIS actually work under the control of state governments. The appointing authority — the Central government — hardly interferes in the cadre management of states. All decisions under the Cadre Rules, Cadre fixation Regulations, Pay Rules, with regard to postings, promotions, deputations, pay etc. are approved by state political executives. Political factors and vested interests often influence the decisions, subverting the force of rules. For example, Rule 4 of Cadre Rules provides for creation of only limited additional posts (ex-cadre posts) equivalent to sanctioned cadre posts subject to 'responsibilities of a like nature', and under Rule 8, officers cannot hold ex-cadre posts more than the fixed number without approval from the Central government. But in reality, almost all state governments in the name of 'administrative convenience' have created a large number of ex-cadre posts beyond permitted limits and also continue those for years without approval of the Central government. Likewise, according to Rule 9, non-IAS officers cannot be posted on IAS cadre posts without the approval of the Central government. But today, in almost all states, several IAS Cadre Posts are filled with non-IAS officers even when a sufficient number of IAS officers are available. Moreover, contrary to the rule, posts are often upgraded or downgraded in rank and status only to accommodate 'suitable' officers or dispense with the unwanted. States, irrespective of ruling parties, have systematically mismanaged cadres, resulting in weakening of the institutions and demoralisation of the officers. Successive Central governments have never bothered to intervene to set things right. There are plenty of cases where the courts had to interfere to grant relief to officers.

Historically, the tenor of Center-state relations depended, more often than not, on political factors rather than principles or rules; with the same ruling party at both the Centre and states it was political loyalty that ensured cordiality, and when they were different parties, political correctness became a necessity to buy peace. Strangely, issues of bureaucracy too have become a part of Centre-state relations when they are actually supposed to be dealt with in accordance with established rules and healthy practices. No controversy surfaced with regard to deputation of officers until the 80's as the majority of governments both at the Centre and states belonged to one single party, no matter whether rules were followed or not. With the advent of coalitions in the 90's and emergence of more and more regional parties in states, bureaucracy got polarised on geographical lines as each state wanted to make 'best' use of civil servants to suit its party agenda. Clash of interest was camouflaged by inventing interpretations of rules in favour of political decisions on postings and deputations and, ridiculously, even to relieve officers (or not to relieve). Embarrassing incidents occurred in many states in the past regarding deputation and relieving of officers that pushed the Center-state relations on to a precarious edge. Sadly, bureaucracy has become a battleground for political cold war.

Hopefully, the proposed amendments will incorporate the views of all the states before it's tabled. However, management of All India Services will always remain in imbroglio unless we ensure the rule of law with objectivity and transparency. A need for instant proposal wouldn't have arisen had the Central government been prudent and pragmatic in handling its own system of 'empanelment'. Secondly, had there been an effective interfacing with the states in cadre management, issues could have been handled with due diligence under the guidance and supervision of the Centre. All India Services are the lifeline of Constitutional governance in the country and as such they must be protected from politicisation. There is no need for inventing out-of-the-box solutions to fix things. All we need is to enforce strictly the existing Acts and rules without fear or favor. Both the Central and state governments must, in the interest of public good, work in tandem with the Constitution as the guiding force.

The writer is a former Addl. Chief Secretary of Chhattisgarh. Views expressed are personal