A precarious tangle

Repeated terror assaults by Baloch insurgent outfits are on the rise. Security and intelligence experts assert that a new wave of high-impact terror attacks in Balochistan commenced towards the end of January this year, carried out by Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) and its affiliates on an Army check post in the Dasht area of Kech District. Ten soldiers were killed. Since the start of this year, different Baloch outfits have launched at least 17 attacks, including 10 against the security forces. They took 51 lives and injured 97. These circumstances have put security forces and intelligence agencies on high alert, prompting them to enhance surveillance. It seems that the proscribed Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and its lethal guerrilla cell — Majeed Brigade — carried out their eight attacks this year, including major fidayeen-style attacks in Balochistan's Nushki, Panjgur and Sibi districts. Multiple Baloch insurgent outfits are also active in the province, including the BLA, the Baloch Republican Army (BRA), the Baloch Republican Guard (BRG), the United Baloch Army (UBA), BLF and the Baloch Raji Aajoi Saangar (BRAS) — which is an umbrella grouping of Baloch insurgent organisations. While most of the attacks by these groups have taken place inside the province, the new Baloch insurgent group, Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA), detonated a terrorist blast in Lahore.

Again, in February this year, the Majeed Brigade carried out two major gun-and-bomb suicide attacks on Army camps in Panjgur and Nushki districts. Several hundred soldiers are usually stationed at these camps. Militants not only infiltrated into the bastion but also kept the security forces engaged for three days. In March so far, three terrorist attacks struck Sibi. First, a suicide bomber blew himself — killing six Army officials. The Islamic State's Khorasan chapter (IS-K) claimed the attack. A week later, BLA militants targeted a military convoy on its way to Sibi with a roadside IED in the Sangam area of the district. Four armed personnel lost their lives. The banned Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) also claimed an attack that took the lives of two policemen in Quetta in late February. These attacks convey that increasing insecurity in Balochistan is encouraging violent sectarian groups to intensify their terror-linked violent activities.

Meanwhile, many analysts relate the apparent surge in terror attacks to the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan. However, it is difficult to establish a clear link. Also, leaders of many insurgent groups are still hiding in Afghanistan where the Taliban are reluctant to act against them. There have been doubts about the Baloch insurgents developing operational linkages with the banned TTP, as the insurgents adhere to secular nationalist ideologies. Though Baloch insurgents in Afghanistan are worried about their future and a few have escaped to Iran, or returned to Balochistan after receiving death threats from their adversaries, the Taliban regime will also consider its own Baloch population while taking a decision on the insurgents. This is indeed frustrating for Pakistan which had wrongly expected that the Taliban takeover would help fix the Baloch insurgency.

This apart, the overall regional environment may have prompted the Baloch militants, but those coming back from Afghanistan have also contributed to the restructuring of the insurgent groups. Crucially, the groups operating in Balochistan have been making efforts to develop operational alliances. For instance, in January, the UBA and a faction of the BRA joined hands to form the BNA. The spokesperson of the newly established group, Mureed Baloch, disclosed that the purpose of their unification is to strengthen the Baloch resistance movement. The Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA) has also joined BRAS.

The BNA has already claimed three terror attacks, including one in Lahore and another in Panjgur. The main BRA group, led by Brahamdagh Bugti, has condemned the Lahore attack, suggesting it wants to distance itself from the BNA. Actually, a faction of the BRA, led by Gulzar Imam, is part of the BNA (he had formed his faction in 2018 after being expelled from the parent BRA). He hails from the southern Panjgur district and his faction has more influence in the Makran region where the BLF is also very strong. The other group in the newly formed BNA is the United Baloch Army (UBA), a breakaway faction of the BLA led by Mureed Baloch.

The emergence of different factions and alliances reflects a major shift in the pattern of insurgency. First, as per the established customs, the Baloch nationalist struggle, both political and militant, was led by the tribal elite or elders, but the BLF, BRAS and now the BNA are largely led by middle-class and educated Baloch youth. Second, this phenomenon could also be a reflection of growing dissidence among insurgent leaders. Interestingly, the new ranks of Baloch insurgents are educated and politically radical, and are trying to transform the insurgency into guerrilla warfare. Contrary to their previous leadership, which was not averse to reconciling with the government whenever it sought to secure tribal and family interests, the new leadership has few compulsions on this score, as most of them come from humble backgrounds. This makes the counter-insurgency challenge a different ball game altogether.

The surge in terrorist attacks can also be interpreted in many ways. First, the Baloch insurgents view these attacks as a mark of success that has brought them into the international spotlight. This has also lifted their spirits up in unleashing high-impact attacks on security forces. Second, according to some local accounts, the attacks could help Baloch insurgent groups inspire and recruit more youth. Third, nationalist political parties see these attacks as an opportunity to become more relevant as stakeholders in the peaceful resolution of the Baloch conflict.

Very importantly, authoritative sources feel that reviewing their strategies and countering the nationalist insurgency through the use of religion and religiously motivated outfits will prove counterproductive. It will not only aggravate anger among the Baloch youth, but it will also create a congenial environment for militant operations by the TTP, the IS-K and other sectarian outfits. The Afghan Taliban are a major source of inspiration for all these outfits. According to Mohammed Amir Rana, a Pakistani security analyst watching the developments in Balochistan, "What Balochistan needs is a long-term political strategy, as well as a gradual reduction in muscular demonstrations''. It is, therefore, preposterous to always blame interested quarters for fomenting trouble and violence in Balochistan, ignoring Pakistan's own structural and operational weaknesses

The writer is a retired IPS officer, a security analyst, and the former National Security Advisor to the PM of Mauritius. Views expressed are personal