The moment of truth

The local officials and the Tibetan leaders used to come and talk about Gyanak. 'Gya' means foreign, 'Nak' means black, the black foreigner. But an Indian was 'Gyakar' which meant the White Indian, not that we are white-coloured people, but they gave their own sort of colour scheme—those who they called the crystal white-hearted, clear-hearted people, were the good people; and to them, the Chinese were the dark-hearted people.

— Major S.M. Krishnatry, Indian Trade Agent in Gyantse, referring to Tibet before the entry of Chinese troops in 1950

India's Tibet policy post-independence, was spelt out in a note by K.M Panikkar, at that time in between his ambassadorial assignments in Nanjing and Beijing. Panikkar was dismissive about views held by some in the Foreign Office that Tibet be maintained as a buffer state, saying this was completely unrealistic. India had upheld the theory of 'Chinese suzerainty' and the attempts of 'Anglo-Indian diplomatists to make the acceptance of Chinese suzerainty conditional on the assurance that the autonomy of Tibet will be guaranteed to us was never accepted by China even in the days of her extreme weakness'. It was the Chinese position, consistently maintained, that Tibet enjoyed autonomy as an internal relationship with China, he said. Beyond 'trade rights and recognized boundary', India's interests in Tibet were but 'shadowy', Panikkar opined. Any military intervention in Tibet to safeguard the Tibetans was out of question. Panikkar's recommendation to the Prime Minister was that the wisest policy would be give such assistance 'as we can' to the Tibetans but to remain 'strictly neutral' when 'the situation develops' on the grounds that it was an internal affair of China. He also discounted action to safeguard Tibetan interests through the United Nations. He saw the Russians as vetoing any move to help Tibet in the Security Council. As far as the General Assembly was concerned, again, India's position was difficult as the case of Hyderabad was technically on the agenda and India could 'not object seriously to a Suzerain power stepping into an autonomous unit to enforce its authority'. By 1950-51, in the wake of recognition of the People's Republic and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing, Panikkar was telling the British Ambassador there that the Indian attitude to Tibet was that 'apart from cultural and economic establishment of relations, India is not politically interested in Tibet'. It was obvious that the Government of India did not want the development of their relations with China to be adversely affected by the developments in Tibet if they could help it. Reporting from Beijing, the British were of the view that there was 'no likelihood of active intervention by India with the Chinese government in Tibetan affairs'.

The view that there was nothing India could do to 'save' Tibet, was endorsed by the Foreign Secretary K.P.S. Menon. He disagreed, however, with Panikkar's premise that India had never regarded Tibet 'as an independent country' saying that India had inherited the commitments of the British government, specifically quoting at this juncture from the Eden Memorandum of 1943 that Chinese suzerainty in Tibet could only be accepted on the understanding that Tibet was regarded as autonomous. According to Menon, to treat Tibet as an 'internal affair' of China was out of the question. Buttressing this argument, the Political Officer in Sikkim, Harishwar Dayal in a telegram to Delhi in the same month, claimed that the Government of India had not and exercising their 'right' to have direct dealings with Tibet and even refusing visas to Chinese travellers to Tibet whose entry was not agreed to by the Tibetan Government.

Communicating a summary of Ambassador Panikkar's views on Tibet to the Political Officer in Sikkim and Lhasa on 11 November 1949, the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi was sure that by May or June 1950, the 'Communists would intervene in Tibet.' The inaccessibility of Tibet was a myth, it was stated. If the Chinese regime decided to 'liberate' Tibet nothing would stop them, barring 'miracles or serious international complications'. The idea of maintaining Tibet as a buffer state was completely unrealistic. A buffer state could exist only if such a state were independent. The telegram from Delhi went on to state that it 'has never been our point of view that Tibet is an independent country; we have in fact upheld the theory of Chinese suzerainty'. And on a note of surrender, 'If China decides to make her suzerainty effective, we have hardly any right to intervene so long as our Treaty interests are safeguarded'. Those 'interests', India was defining now as trade rights and a recognized boundary. Through careful negotiations it was necessary to defend these trading rights 'though we must be prepared to face the extinction of our political influence'. India intended to remain strictly neutral. 'The establishment of normal diplomatic relations with China is the only way in which we can hope to influence the course of events at that stage'.

Meanwhile, Sumul Sinha the Political Officer in Lhasa was communicating a line very different from Panikkar's in Beijing. The Foreign Bureau of the Tibetans in Lhasa was anxious to negotiate a new treaty with India, he told Delhi. The desire to negotiate a new treaty was to obtain from the Government of India that the latter regarded 'Tibet as an independent country and NOT (repeat NOT) merely an autonomous region'. The Bureau felt this would strengthen Tibet's position in the world. Similar declarations would be sought from the governments of the U.K and the U.S., it was conveyed. The Tibetans sought modern arms and ammunition with machinery for manufacture of ammunition, and training of troops, Sinha said, and they wanted a visit by a 'Senior Indian Military Officer' to advise them. According to him, diplomatic negotiations on Tibet after recognition of the new government in China 'would be our best line'. Sinha was convinced that Tibet had served as an effective buffer over the last forty years, its commercial value to India was insignificant and in fact the Government of India's policy to Tibet so far had been based entirely on political grounds. The 1914 Simla Convention remained the basis for the determination of relations with Tibet; under it, recognition of Chinese suzerainty was conditional on Chinese acceptance of Tibetan autonomy and of the China–Tibet boundary. The Government of India had not acknowledged Chinese suzerainty over Tibet since it ended in 1911. India had in fact, since 1911, asserted and exercised her right to have direct dealings with Tibet. Significantly, and this would have implications later for the Indo-Tibetan boundary as defined by the McMahon Line, the rights as well as obligations concerning Tibet, were based on the 1914 Convention, 'and we cannot claim the one while repudiating the other'. The boundary between India and Tibet was laid down in 1914 and Sinha warned that 'if the Convention is disregarded, we shall expose ourselves to renewed Chinese claims to Assam tribal area.'

(Excerpted with permission from Nirupama Rao's The Fractured Himalaya; published by Penguin)