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Opinion

Vested interest at play

Reflecting its stake in regional stability, China seeks to facilitate Rohingya repatriation from Bangladesh to Myanmar’s Rakhine province, pushing to end the contentious deadlock

China has come up with a fresh idea to kickstart an organised movement of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to Myanmar. Progress on this critical part of the proposed resolution of the Rohingya repatriation issue has remained stalled for months, despite ongoing parleys involving India, China and Bangladesh.

China proposes to use elementary communication technology to assess the situation on the ground in real-time in the Rakhine province of Myanmar, the Rohingya homeland. Song Tao, Minister for International Development and Member, Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party (CPC) has suggested that mobile phones be used to enable an uninterrupted conversation between the Rohingyas stranded in Bangladesh with their kinsmen still living in Myanmar. A positive interaction could well pave the way for an eventual Rohingya return to their homes.

Tao's apparently simply structured idea follows a recent memorandum signed by the CPC and the ruling Awami League in Bangladesh to expedite a permanent settlement of the Rohingya issue. As reported in Dhaka-based media, Rohingya volunteers carrying mobiles from the special camps in Bangladesh will go to Myanmar to enable them to study existing conditions first hand. Naypyitaw authorities will guarantee their safe passage and other facilities.

From the Rakhine province or other areas in Myanmar, volunteers will talk to their families in Bangladesh and give them a detailed account of their experience. Families will also have a mobile phone, a receiving set courtesy of Beijing, to enable easy communication. Myanmar authorities claim to have made some arrangements to accommodate returning Rohingyas, setting up alternate sites for their resettlement. The objective is to keep them as far apart as possible from local Buddhists and non-Muslims.

But there are also allegations that the so-called new measures would only result in the creation of more Muslim dominated ghettos. Despite repeated attempts and assurances of help from Bangladesh authorities and international relief agencies, no Rohingya has agreed to return home so far. At present 11,00,000 Rohingyas have been put up in special camps in Bangladesh, victims of several ethnic cleansing operations by the army and Buddhists during the past decade.

The Chinese feel that if their proposal is accepted, it will enable Rohingyas to confirm whether the promises made by Myanmar are true. Positive feedback sent from Myanmar could well pave the way for an eventual Rohingya return, ending the contentious deadlock. Dhaka-based Chinese diplomats have reiterated their resolve to help Bangladesh and Myanmar improve their bilateral relations. China wields major influence over Naypyitaw, not only because of its massive economic investments but also for its consistent support to Myanmar even during the sanctions it faced in the long spell of army rule.

This is the third major initiative from Beijing in recent times to bring Dhaka and Naypyitaw closer on the Rohingya issue. Observers sense that the Chinese have stronger reasons than India to ensure an early settlement between its smaller South Asian neighbours. In addition to major investments made by China during the past decades, the Rakhine province happens to be a strategically important location in the one belt one road (OBOR) connectivity scheme.

India too has a special interest in fostering closer economic ties with Myanmar, in view of its huge energy and other resources. It is helping Myanmar build the modern Sittwe port as well as building up its road and rail infrastructure, its IT, education and medical sectors. The Sittwe port which will be linked with Kolkata is an important point in India's own 'Look East' and 'Act East' programmes. Both projects remained stalled owing to the problems between Bangladesh and Myanmar over the Rohingya issue.

A brief overview of proposals made by the two bigger regional powers also confirms China's greater strategic interest and outreach, in comparison to India vis-à-vis Myanmar. During the army rule there, it regarded the country, if not as an outright colony but at least as its undisputed territory of influence. The return of democracy to Myanmar somewhat eased China's earlier hold on the local economy but it still remains the biggest investor there.

On its part, India had proposed the signing of a regional MoU to ensure the economic development and opening up of the resource-rich Arakan (renamed Rakhine by the hardliner Burmese leaders and the army) area. The objective was to catalyse development to keep the population engaged and to begin a new chapter of development in the region. However, it could not be followed up as the critical element of the problem, which was the return of displaced Rohingyas from Myanmar to their homeland, remained unachieved thanks to the endless problems arising between Myanmar and Bangladesh.

In contrast, China has been more proactive in its quest to become the honest but effective intermediary between the two countries, a fact which pleases Bangladeshi hardliners critical of India's role. It also dampens the hopes of the new pro-democracy elements in Myanmar which support the ongoing agitation in Hong Kong and admire Western ways. But Chinese diplomacy regained lost ground as two of the three points of an earlier proposal from Beijing have been implemented.

Beijing had proposed an immediate ceasefire in the Rakhine province, which has happened. Next was the scheduling of bilateral talks between Dhaka and Naypyitaw, which also followed, eventually paving the way for an agreement in 2017.

However, its proposed local poverty alleviation plan for Rakhine areas could not be implemented. It would have been a nice fit with China's overall strategy, given its big lead over others in terms of investments made in the country as well as in terms of regional strategic domination.

The 2017 agreement between Bangladesh and Myanmar to settle their (mostly unpleasant) unfinished business was also a step forward. Problems arose over the slow progress in Myanmar over the repatriation and resettlement proposals, to which was it forced to reluctantly concede under increasing international pressure and diplomatic isolation. Bangladesh insisted that the Rohingya Muslims must return home voluntarily and not under duress. In view of their traumatic experience at Rakhine, few Rohingyas are willing to return. Their numbers in Bangladesh have increased in phases, as they escaped following repeated mass attacks carried out by the army and paratroopers which did not spare women or even children. There were also isolated instances of armed Rohingya radical elements attacking army units, in the never-ending spell of violence.

Naypyitaw authorities claim that there has been no targeting or ethnic cleaning of Rohingyas following the ceasefire and there is no reason to coddle the returnees for whose settlement special areas have been earmarked. It is another matter that most of these areas are reportedly far away from the habitual settlements of Rohingyas, allegedly marked out in rough terrain, miles from nowhere in particular!

Views expressed are strictly personal

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