Resilience in fragile times

After the dramatic ouster of Bangladesh’s Prime minister Sheikh Hasina from office on August 5, Indo- Bangladesh relation has reached its nadir. Apparently, no visible initiative is being taken by either side to improve the situation. Visa services between two countries have been withheld and normal trade between border posts has not been functioning properly. However, it is reported that trade between India and Bangladesh through Petrapole land border in West Bengal resumed on August 8 morning amid tight security.

Various reports suggest that anti-India feeling among citizens is very high and an ‘India out campaign’ has gathered momentum. Recent floods in Southern Bangladesh have, again, triggered the most sensitive issue of improper management of water between the two countries.

Thanks to Hasina’s good relations and red-carpet welcome to Indian capital, Indian firms have invested in various sectors such as edible oil, power, first moving edible oil, infrastructure, FMCG, pharmaceuticals etc. Protecting these investments during this turmoil is a major concern for Indian firms. It is reported that five Indian power companies that supply electricity to Bangladesh face over USD 1 billion payment outage. About USD 800 million of this is due to Adani Power, which supplies electricity from its 1.6 GW coal-fired plant in Godda, Jharkhand, through a dedicated transmission corridor.

Uncertainty over infrastructure projects

The Indian government-backed EXIM Bank, which is the foremost lender for India-assisted infrastructure projects in nearby and foreign countries, had an exposure of about USD 7.9 billion to Bangladesh as of July 2023. A few major projects, as identified by ET Infra.com, where India’s stakes are high include:

• Development and upgradation of Mongla Port: This port, the second largest in Bangladesh, is crucial for enhancing the region’s trade, commerce, and connectivity potential among the BBIN (Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal) countries. The port will also serve the Indo-Bangladesh Protocol Route, which connects India’s National Waterway 1 and 2, providing effective river connectivity between the northeast states and the rest of India, bypassing the narrow Siliguri Corridor. It will also act as a major transshipment hub.
• Matarbari Deep-Sea Port: Funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and scheduled to be operational by 2027, this port is expected to emerge as a pivotal hub for Bangladesh. It is also anticipated to facilitate the linkage of industrial value chains with Northeast India.
• Northeast Road Network Connectivity Improvement Project: This JICA-funded project aims to connect the road networks of Northeast India with Bangladesh. It is part of a larger initiative to create industrial value chains in the Bay of Bengal region and will be connected with the Matarbari Port when it becomes operational by 2027.
• Akhaura-Agartala Cross-Border Rail Link: Opened in November, this link currently provides the shortest rail route between Northeast states and West Bengal. Additionally, the Khulna-Mongla Port Rail Line Project is expected to boost trade and connectivity between the important growth centres of Khulna and Mongla Port in Bangladesh, linking India, Nepal, and Bhutan with a Bay of Bengal seaport and boosting trade between Bangladesh and neighbouring countries.
• Indo-Bangladesh Protocol Route: This route connects the waterways of Northeast India with ports in Kolkata via Bangladesh. Efforts have been made from both sides to increase cargo transport via these waterways and to link ports in Bangladesh, such as Mongla and Chattogram.

Setback in trade

Bangladesh is India’s biggest trading partner in the subcontinent, and India is the second-largest export partner, accounting for 12 per cent of the total exports to Bangladesh. The total trade turnover in FY23 touched USD 14.22 billion.

In FY 23, India’s exports to Bangladesh stood at USD 12.20 billion and India’s imports from Bangladesh stood at USD 2.02 billion. Thus, India enjoyed over USD 10 billion trade surplus with Bangladesh.

In addition to merchandise trade, India exports medical services and attracts upper middle class Bangladeshis to Kolkata for treatment and tourism. This thriving market is also badly affected post the August 5 incident.

This piece will primarily focus on two important issues which can impact eastern and north-eastern India if the present crisis and chaos continues in Bangladesh:

(i) Security; and

(ii) Connectivity of the land-locked north-eastern states.

Needless to mention that eastern and north-eastern India, especially West Bengal, share the largest land border with Bangladesh. Bangladesh and India share a 4,096-kilometre-long international border, the fifth-longest land border in the world, including 262 km (163 mi) in Assam, 856 km (532 mi) in Tripura, 318 km (198 mi) in Mizoram, 443 km (275 mi) in Meghalaya, and 2,217 km (1,378 mi) in West Bengal.

Security threat

A politically unstable Bangladesh will pose serious security threats to India. It is reported that the caretaker government of Bangladesh has freed hundreds of deadly terrorists—the latest being Jashimuddin Rahmani, the chief of the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), an al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist outfit. On August 26, Rahmani, a convict in the hacking death of a blogger, was released on parole from prison. ABT is an affiliate of a terror outfit, namely, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), which is banned in India. India Today reported that the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) has partnered with ABT to carry out terrorist attacks in India's northeastern states.

It may be recalled that Hasina's regime had cracked down on anti-India forces in Bangladesh, which had found the country a safe haven during the earlier Bangladesh Nationalist Party-Jamaat-e-Islami regime from 2001 to 2006. With her exit from power, some jailed leaders of terrorist groups were freed by an armed mob attack on a high-security prison in Sherpur (northern Bangladesh, bordering Meghalaya) on August 6. More than 500 inmates escaped, including Ikramul Haque alias Abu Talha, the India operations head of ABT.

It is very likely that, taking advantage of the political turmoil in Bangladesh, terrorist groups will shift their base from the Western front to the Eastern Front of India.

The second major threat is the existence of over a million Rohingya refugees in various camps in Bangladesh. Rehabilitation of these refugees is the need of the hour. Unless a viable solution is found, the situation may go out of control and young Rohingyas may resort to arms and join the Arakan Rohingya Arakan Army (ARSA). Although, till now, in the growing conflict between Myanmar military and Myanmar’s ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), ARSA has been following a strategy of wait and watch, allowing other ethnic armed organisations to fight this battle for them, it is feared that their silence could also mean their consolidation. In the unstable political environments of both Bangladesh and Myanmar, Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh camps are at a crossroads.

In August 2017, the Myanmar military launched a brutal crackdown on Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State. Hundreds of thousands fled and are now living in refugee camps in Bangladesh. Currently, over one million Rohingyas have been sheltering in dire conditions in camps since fleeing. The United Nations has described the genocide as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” across the border in Myanmar. In 2018, Sheikh Hasina sought help from India in sending Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar. India failed to assist her government. During her last visit to China a few days before losing power, she again requested Chinese President Xi Jinping for help. Both leaders agreed that a quick solution to the Rohingya crisis was needed so that the displaced people could return to their homeland soon.

The influx of refugees has put an enormous strain on Bangladesh’s social and political systems. The refugees are mostly housed in makeshift camps in Bhasan Char and Cox's Bazar. It is reported that in the camps, where work is officially limited to ‘cash for work’ programmes sponsored by UN agencies, many young Rohingya men have been recruited into local gangs or ARSA and have become involved in smuggling Burmese-produced narcotics into Bangladesh. The condition of the helpless refugees is likely to deteriorate further.

The third threat to India is the intense civil war between the Bamar-dominated Myanmar military and indigenous ethnic groups in Myanmar. Rakhine State, which shares an international border with Bangladesh where Rohingyas have lived for centuries, is under the control of the Arakan Army (AA)—a militant group of ethnic Arakanese who are mostly Buddhist. It is reported that after restarting its fight for Rakhine State in late 2023, the Arakan Army is in the process of carving out a proto-state of over a million people on the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. The Arakan Army has created the largest area in Myanmar under the control of a non-state armed group—in terms of both size and population—and is now on the verge of securing almost all of Rakhine.

On October 27, 2023, the Arakan Army joined two other ethnic armed groups—the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, collectively known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance—in launching a lightning campaign in northern Shan State, on the Chinese border. The offensive quickly secured several major border crossings and revealed that the military was weaker than many—including the ethnic armed groups themselves—had believed. China brokered a ceasefire covering northern Shan State on January 11, 2024, which largely brought the fighting there to a halt, but clashes in Rakhine have continued.

With most of Rakhine now under its control, the Arakan Army stands on the verge of fulfilling what its supporters call the “Arakan Dream”—a self-governing Arakan region—that it began promising almost a decade ago. The sovereignty was lost when the Bamar kingdom conquered the Arakanese capital of Mrauk-U in the late 18th century, nominally bringing Rakhine under the central state’s control for the first time.

Now, the fate of the Rohingya may be in the Arakan Army’s hands, with China potentially playing an important mediatory role. It may be recalled that the AA was established in April 2009 in the border area between Myanmar and China. It was overwhelmingly supported by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which trained AA’s first recruits in Kachin State. It is believed that China has been a predominant geopolitical player in the current civil war in Myanmar. Historically, Beijing has been the most important and closest ally of Naypyidaw, supplying major military equipment and being the most significant economic partner. However, China also maintains a close relationship with various Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) in Myanmar. Analysts argue that increasing Chinese influence in western Myanmar necessitates stronger Bangladesh-India ties.

Although the Rohingya harbour significant mistrust towards the AA, mainly due to the Muslim-Buddhist religious divide in Rakhine State, the peaceful coexistence of Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka may serve as an example for community leaders. Despite decades of genocide against Sri Lankan Tamil minorities by the majority Sinhalese community, if the two communities can now coexist peacefully, Rohingya Muslims and Arakanese Buddhists may also resolve their long-standing ethnic conflict.

Needless to say, China will have total control over Rakhine, which is geo-strategically important as the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) reaches the shores of the Bay of Bengal through Rakhine State. The CMEC can be easily extended to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Analysts argue that the Padma Bridge and other infrastructure projects related to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Bangladesh have pushed landlocked Northeast India to the back seat. After the completion of the Chittagong-Cox’s Bazar section of the Bangladesh rail link, the rail route of the Padma Bridge will be integrated with the Trans-Asian Rail Route to connect China with Myanmar. The proposed route will connect India through the Petrapole (West Bengal) border and will join the Benapole-Jessore-Narail-Bhanga-Mawa via Narayanganj-Dhaka-Tongi-Akhaura-Chattogram-Dohazari to the Gundam border in Myanmar.

Increasing dependence on the Siliguri Corridor

India planned to develop an alternative network of railway tracks through Bangladesh to connect the Northeast with the rest of the country, reducing reliance on the existing route through the Siliguri Corridor, commonly known as the ‘Chicken's Neck’—a 22-km-wide strip bordered by Nepal to the north and Bangladesh to the south. Moreover, the plan to connect Mizoram through the Kaladan River using the Sittwe port in Rakhine is also under deep water. The landlocked ‘Seven Sisters’ depend almost entirely on the narrow Siliguri Corridor. Any disruption of the Chicken's Neck will sever the Northeast from the rest of India. Former Chief of Eastern Command, Lt General RP Kalita (Retd), rightly stated that India has historical and cultural ties with Bangladesh, and any development in Bangladesh will affect Northeast India.

Observations

India badly needs Bangladesh’s friendship for the overall development of its northeastern states. The future of landlocked Northeast India is linked to India’s friendly relations with Bangladesh. Also, an alternative to the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor is only possible through Bangladesh.

To improve Indo-Bangladesh relations, India should urgently adopt appropriate policies to restore the lost friendship. To achieve this, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) must restrain their ministers, ultra-nationalist television anchors, and, most importantly, the troll brigade from making any adverse comments about Bangladesh and its citizens.

At this critical moment, political stability in West Bengal is crucial for India’s integrity. Any attempt by anti-national forces to politically destabilise West Bengal would be horrendous.

Views expressed are personal