Scholarly insights into intersecting realities

The book titled ‘Foreign Aid as Constraint in Decision Making: A study of American Aid to Egypt and Israel’, 2023, Kalpaz Publication, New Delhi, authored by Dr Jyoti Kumar, is a study of fairly long span which shaped different contours of the geo-politics of West Asia. The parallels of oil politics are also referred to in the book that has the ambit of international relations of the region. Starting with the factual analysis of the shift in conflictual policies of the two belligerent nations, Israel and Egypt, under the mediation of American influence, in different phases of cold war and post-cold war scenario, have been analysed in terms of regional power politics. The author has also given little background of the history of America’s foreign aid, which could be traced back from the period of the first World War itself. To cover the war cost and the capital outflow, Britain was borrowing heavily from the USA owing to an unfavourable balance of payment position. This had a far bigger implication in setting the role of the United States in world affairs as a player using foreign aid as an instrument for the position of hegemon.

While dealing with the context of the concept and the theoretical framework of the broader outline of the economics of foreign aid, efforts have been put up to locate how American aid followed a different dynamic from its typical pattern for economic progress of the recipient countries like Egypt and Israel. It has given strategic geocentric reasons in terms of imposing influence in decision-making of the recipient nations. In the West Asia and North African region, the perspective of American aid emerged as a game changer, especially in bringing a paradigm change in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Egyptian policy towards Israel took a new turn after the consolidation of power by Gamel Abdel Nasser in 1954-55, wherein the US remained largely a distant player looking beyond the British and French hegemony in the region. Till 1955, considering the pattern of aid to Egypt and Israel, during the formative period of both the countries, the role of the Suez Canal became most critical.

Arab-Israeli relations continued to deteriorate after 1956. Furthermore, the bilateral relations integrated into the Cold War rivalry and the support of the super powers to regional powers started to float in. Further to this, American relation was guided by the subsequent wars that took place in West Asia, wherein Egypt represented as the staunch leader of Arab nations and Israel the main contender. While Israel was facing the problem of reconstructing its economy along with war torn military positions, Egypt also faced the problem of economic reconstruction due to a series of wars inflicted on it. After the death of the most strident Arab leader, Gamel Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat’s pragmatic policy and his peace proposals with Israel shaped the contour of geopolitics in which self-interest of the individual country became far more important than the pan movement conundrum. The post-Nasser era of Egypt right after 1971 and 1974, with the superpowers in the Cold War politics, brought a big change from belligerency to collaboration. After the end of Cold War, international politics surged in new dichotomy of the hegemony that, some times, diluted certain posturing but gave rise to regional aspirations with a variety of conglomeration and pattern wherein the dynamics of foreign aid became merely tool in the form of conflict and cooperation between nationalities and the superpowers. In the Aswan Dam affair, America along with Britain and the World Bank rejected the loan to Egypt; but the USSR took it forward. Illustrations like Jordan water disputes, and linking aid with settlement of Arab-Israeli dispute in the context of Johnston Plan are referred to as interesting developments. The Aswan Dam loan agreement was an attempt to woo Egypt for the West against the Communist bloc. The post-1954 Suez Canal base agreement is also elaborated with a few interesting insights of the operating agency.

The growing dependence of Egypt upon the USSR and Eastern bloc, and its impact upon its economic, foreign, political and military policies made the region into a fault line of belligerency. In Israel’s case, the establishment of Western links remained a far reaching influencer. The impact of the October War, and first and second disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel as a result of the subsequent developments in which Henry Kissinger played a crucial role have been analysed. In this process, the role of the USSR was also diffused and a new era of American relations in the region added new dynamics when Israel became completely dependent on American aid, and Egypt followed the bandwagon post many developments in economic and military aid programmes.

Subsequently, there has been a shift of stance in donor-recipient relationship in a unipolar context i.e., post-1974 period in Egyptian case. Contrary to the pre-1974 Cold War and bipolar context, Egypt began to isolate itself from the USSR from 1974 onwards and came closer to the West. The implication of this change, i.e., the transition from bipolar to unipolar world, despite the continuing Cold War, had set a new paradigm of cooperation. There occurred basic changes in the policy of Egypt, illustrated by the infitah and the democratic liberalization policies of the state. In foreign policy, both Egypt and Israel showed a desire to seek peace under the US patronage. Egypt and Israel received aid from the same pole i.e., West, and thus there prevailed a quasi-unipolar situation even before the 1988 Détente. Further to this, the US aid to Egypt and Israel (1975-2011) and a series of developments led to disengagement programmes to Camp David Agreement and formative stage of US Aid to Egypt wherein Israel was actually an early starter. Bilateral cooperation between Egypt and Israel has also added fresh dynamics in the region. The US holds a great influence as a partner in the peace between two nations. The US and its Western allies also have favourable terms of trade with both Egypt and Israel; both the US allies remained close strategic partners and not liability. In the course of progressive US aid to Israel, the pattern has remained the same but the sphere of the US influence as broker of Arab peace in the region has shown a remarkable degree of change on the human rights parameter and democratic values.

The post-1974 period brought a number of conflictual situations for Israel which may be termed more as adverse impacts than positive outcomes. Israel lost the diplomatic edge of Cold War rivalry. USA policy aimed at a more even balance, thus a lot of pressures were put on Israel to negotiate with the Arabs. Economic aid and arms transfers were used to leverage this connection. Israel and donor relationship underwent changes in the light of perceptual image which led the attitudinal change in the US administration towards Israel wherein a comprehensive settlement, and not the dictated solution, to the Palestinian problem was desired. The scalability of the US aid to Egypt and Israel kept on changing beyond the measures of any other regions’ foreign aid programme of the United States. Foreign aid as constraint on decision making seems truer after 1990-91 in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the USSR. This is also true in the case of the Kuwaiti crisis when Israel acted as a constraint on US policy. Now intra-Islamic Cold War is rapidly prevailing in this region. The US needs to cultivate not only Saudi Arabia but also Egypt. A lot of pressure on Israel is also being put by the US and the Western European countries to bring about a situation to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to achieve a comprehensive peace in this region.

Limits of pressure by donors are thus analysed for shaping the future dimension of the role mediator. The search of options in the case of Egypt i.e., Arab-Islamic aid, European and Russian aids also became important highlights. In Israel, European aid, and self-reliance schemes are some alternative features. Israel is seen as a nuclear power which uses it more as a deterrence and lever for foreign aid. Though the strategic importance of Israel has decreased, it is not ruled out in the wake of the rising threat of Islamic fundamentalism. Israel offers lots of logistic accessibility and secret information of this region. Thus, the importance of Israel has not diminished. The framework of peace treaty is extensively used for further peace initiatives in the region in the light of the gulf crisis and growing scale of terrorist disturbances and the regional imbalance of power besides Arab Spring in Egypt. US aid remained the driver of the cycle of economic growth and peace initiative in the region, wherein Egypt and Israel are setting examples of increasing the fold of allied nations in West Asia. The book is an interesting read which captures different factors, especially the dominant power blocks, the influence of neighbours for larger support of identity, posturing of offence and defence of fractured identity and fragmented mandate on aspiring leadership. The change in policy added a new dimension in intra-regional politics as well. It has shown in the pattern of relationship between regional powers and great powers, especially the United States which became largely the donor state in the region. The pattern of the US aid as an instrument of decision making played a major role in building a strategic relation beyond the typical USAID programme conducted for any other part of the world.

It has become a very topical reference book on the geopolitical dynamics of the current crisis. With deep insights, it may be utilised to understand the perspective of this complex issue. In fact it is a very complex subject which has been written with a multi-dimensional perspective — economics of foreign aid, military industrial complex and, foremost, Petroleum economics. Each page’s content states something, which has contentious information with geopolitical complexity. It is purely academic and relevant for students of international relations.

Views expressed are personal