Perspective on recent history
6 Nov 2012 11:11 PM GMT
It was some time in 1970 when the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited the National Defence Academy (NDA) at Khadakwasla near Pune. Some of us, then cadets under training there, got to see her up close. My mates were attending the early morning physical training period in separate squads at the gymnasium, where we saw her walking past us with as military a gait as the commandant and officers escorting her and viewing all the activity with quite the quick observant eye of a field commander. Thereafter, she impressed us with her speech in the cadets’ mess during the guest lunch in her honour. Her speeches during the 1971 India-Pakistan war were most inspiring and worth a second hearing.
Years later, after her assassination, during an interaction with former Chief of Air Staff, the Air Chief Marshal (then squadron leader), who had often piloted the VIP squadron helicopter transporting Gandhi, I recall him recounting how particular she used to be about the general welfare and billeting arrangements for the air-crew while on tours.
Gandhi’s first instance of assertiveness on national security was when the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began upping the ante on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) at Nathu La, in Sikkim in 1967 – five years after the Chinese aggression. Brig M M S Bakshi, who commanded the brigade at Nathu La then, related the incident to this writer.While the Indian army had strict orders about opening of fire, Brig Bakshi explained, ‘Local commanders were authorised to open fire with small arms only in self-defence. As for heavier weapons, such as artillery, even high-ranking field commanders had not been delegated the authority to employ such weapons. It transpired that this authority was vested only to the prime minister. Such a control has some logic of limiting a local incident from escalating into a clash of serious proportions in normal times.’Although border-fencing had been agreed to at the level of the two armies’ formation commanders, to avoid frequent bickering which the politically-motivated PLA soldiers resorted to, they continued to do so when fencing work began. Eventually, the situation reached a boiling point. Brig Bakshi continued, ‘they (PLA) opened up with all the weapons they had, including their mortars and even artillery. Our troops were taken by surprise in the open and many fell in cold blood. The commanding officer of the battalion was severely wounded by a burst of machinegun in his stomach and had to be evacuated. There was utter panic and confusion when two more officers – a captain and a major – were killed as they led their troops in the open.’ Deciding that an artillery response must be given, Bakshi requested for it.He described, ‘it was astonishing that even the army chief was helpless without the express permission from the PM who was in the Parliament at that time and could not be disturbed’. Eventually, when approached, Gandhi gave the go-ahead instantly. On getting the permission to use artillery, we went in with a vengeance and gave them as well as we got. The firefight went on for five days in all its fury. Mercifully, neither side made any effort to make an incursion into the other side’s territory and both sides began to realise the futility of this misadventure. We started getting orders to de-escalate, but before that our medium guns destroyed a convoy of trucks bringing Chinese reinforcements moving up the road through Chumbi Valley to reach the Pass.’
In one fell stroke, Gandhi undid the humiliation by China which her father was responsible for and sent a message to the Chinese that they could forget about repeating 1962. On 8 April 1975, Sikkim was annexed to India.
It was delightful to hear late Field Marshal (FM) Manekshaw, better known as Sam, recall his discussion with Gandhi, when he was the army chief in 1971. In early 1971, when the problem of the great influx of East Pakistani refugees entering India was being discussed in a Cabinet meeting, Gandhi asked for Sam, the then army chief to be present. When asked by her as to what he had done about this influx he had replied that he was doing nothing about it as doing anything about it would amount to an act of war. At the end of the meeting, when she asked him to stay on, he admitted during some interviews with the media that he had prepared himself to tender his resignation. However, when she resumed the discussion with him in private, he gave her all the reasons why he felt India why he felt India should not go to war at that point of time. She then asked him to suggest the date and in sign language conveyed that he should pen it down on a piece of paper. He wrote on 4 December 1971. If the war began on 3 December, it was thanks to Pakistan. It was Gandhi’s decision, for the first time since Independence and in the third war with Pakistan, that it was properly planned and the Indian Navy was used. The end result was Pakistan getting dismembered within 13 days and Bangladesh getting liberated.
In 1984, Gandhi ordered the army to fight its way into the Golden Temple.
Anil Bhat is a defence and strategic analyst
Years later, after her assassination, during an interaction with former Chief of Air Staff, the Air Chief Marshal (then squadron leader), who had often piloted the VIP squadron helicopter transporting Gandhi, I recall him recounting how particular she used to be about the general welfare and billeting arrangements for the air-crew while on tours.
Gandhi’s first instance of assertiveness on national security was when the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began upping the ante on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) at Nathu La, in Sikkim in 1967 – five years after the Chinese aggression. Brig M M S Bakshi, who commanded the brigade at Nathu La then, related the incident to this writer.While the Indian army had strict orders about opening of fire, Brig Bakshi explained, ‘Local commanders were authorised to open fire with small arms only in self-defence. As for heavier weapons, such as artillery, even high-ranking field commanders had not been delegated the authority to employ such weapons. It transpired that this authority was vested only to the prime minister. Such a control has some logic of limiting a local incident from escalating into a clash of serious proportions in normal times.’Although border-fencing had been agreed to at the level of the two armies’ formation commanders, to avoid frequent bickering which the politically-motivated PLA soldiers resorted to, they continued to do so when fencing work began. Eventually, the situation reached a boiling point. Brig Bakshi continued, ‘they (PLA) opened up with all the weapons they had, including their mortars and even artillery. Our troops were taken by surprise in the open and many fell in cold blood. The commanding officer of the battalion was severely wounded by a burst of machinegun in his stomach and had to be evacuated. There was utter panic and confusion when two more officers – a captain and a major – were killed as they led their troops in the open.’ Deciding that an artillery response must be given, Bakshi requested for it.He described, ‘it was astonishing that even the army chief was helpless without the express permission from the PM who was in the Parliament at that time and could not be disturbed’. Eventually, when approached, Gandhi gave the go-ahead instantly. On getting the permission to use artillery, we went in with a vengeance and gave them as well as we got. The firefight went on for five days in all its fury. Mercifully, neither side made any effort to make an incursion into the other side’s territory and both sides began to realise the futility of this misadventure. We started getting orders to de-escalate, but before that our medium guns destroyed a convoy of trucks bringing Chinese reinforcements moving up the road through Chumbi Valley to reach the Pass.’
In one fell stroke, Gandhi undid the humiliation by China which her father was responsible for and sent a message to the Chinese that they could forget about repeating 1962. On 8 April 1975, Sikkim was annexed to India.
It was delightful to hear late Field Marshal (FM) Manekshaw, better known as Sam, recall his discussion with Gandhi, when he was the army chief in 1971. In early 1971, when the problem of the great influx of East Pakistani refugees entering India was being discussed in a Cabinet meeting, Gandhi asked for Sam, the then army chief to be present. When asked by her as to what he had done about this influx he had replied that he was doing nothing about it as doing anything about it would amount to an act of war. At the end of the meeting, when she asked him to stay on, he admitted during some interviews with the media that he had prepared himself to tender his resignation. However, when she resumed the discussion with him in private, he gave her all the reasons why he felt India why he felt India should not go to war at that point of time. She then asked him to suggest the date and in sign language conveyed that he should pen it down on a piece of paper. He wrote on 4 December 1971. If the war began on 3 December, it was thanks to Pakistan. It was Gandhi’s decision, for the first time since Independence and in the third war with Pakistan, that it was properly planned and the Indian Navy was used. The end result was Pakistan getting dismembered within 13 days and Bangladesh getting liberated.
In 1984, Gandhi ordered the army to fight its way into the Golden Temple.
Anil Bhat is a defence and strategic analyst
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