Violence Shadows Dhaka’s Future

It has now been more than a year since the interim government assumed power following Sheikh Hasina’s exit as Prime Minister, but the law and order situation in the country has shown no improvement. On the contrary, there has been a noticeable decline in the state of affairs across almost all spheres of activity. Hardly a couple of days ago, the head of Gono Odhikar Parishad (GOP), Nurul Haq Nur, was injured in an assault. This triggered a series of retaliatory attacks on Jatiya Party (JP) offices across Bangladesh, including in Dhaka, Rajshahi, Khulna, Tangail, Mymensingh, Thakurgaon, and Gaibandha, causing destruction of their buildings. Law and order agencies remained mute spectators. While GOP activists intensified their demand for the arrest of JP workers allegedly responsible for the attack on Nur, the JP leadership stepped up its appeal to the authorities to ban the GOP and even sought their disenfranchisement from contesting the elections.

It may be recalled that the GOP was officially launched on Tuesday, 26 October 2021, as a political party. It was founded under the leadership of economist Dr. Reza Kibria and former Dhaka University Central Students’ Union (DUCSU) Vice President Nurul Haq Nur, with four core principles: democracy, justice, rights, and national interest. The party’s headquarters is located in Dhaka. On 2 September 2024, the GOP was officially registered with the Election Commission. By the date of its registration, it may be deduced that the party was formed within a month of Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, implying that its birth was already waiting in the wings. In other words, its emergence looks far from a coincidence.

Reverting to violence, police intervened to control the warring mobs by resorting to baton charges, and even the Army was put on alert. Interestingly, a local government adviser, Asif Mahmud Shojib Bhuyain, visited the injured Nur and later, while speaking to the media outside the emergency department of Dhaka Medical College Hospital, alleged that in the past, the JP repeatedly legitimised the fascist policies of the Awami League (AL). He further claimed that, on India’s prescription, they created an artificial parliament and showcased a fake democracy in Bangladesh. This statement clearly shows how, for any act of violence, even senior government functionaries conveniently blame India. Asif Mahmud alleged that some forces are unwilling to reach any political or democratic settlement that excludes the AL, even under the guise of inclusive elections. On the possibility of banning JP, he said the government has not yet made an official decision. Regarding the allegations made by the GOP against the army, he said the government is considering the formation of a strong investigation committee. This was not just an attack on an ordinary political activist—it was an attack on the top leader of a political party, something not seen even during the AL’s rule.

Meanwhile, on August 31, JP dismissed growing calls for a ban, stating that it has never engaged in terrorism and therefore faces no legal grounds for prohibition under the Anti-Terrorism Act. The party said the conspiracy to ban it will be foiled. JP further argued that such a demand was completely unreasonable and urged the government not to take what it called a wrong decision based on a false premise.

On the same day, Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus met representatives of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), and the National Citizen Party (NCP), and reiterated that there was no alternative to elections. If anyone thought otherwise, he warned, it would be disastrous for the nation. He reaffirmed his commitment to holding the 13th national election in the first half of February next year. Yunus gave the assurance during separate meetings with BNP, JeI, and NCP. However, both Jamaat and NCP pressed for prioritising the implementation of the July Charter over the polls and demanded a ban on JP activities, accusing it of abetting the AL government in legitimising disputed elections. The BNP, however, insisted the election must be held within the announced timeframe, with no scope for deferral.

Jamaat leaders expressed disappointment over the announcement of the election work plan before implementing the July Charter, saying this could derail reforms. They urged the government to take a tough stance against JP, speed up reforms, and make trials for crimes against humanity during the July uprising more transparent. Sources disclosed that Jamaat also pressed for a constituent assembly election to introduce Proportional Representation (PR), noting that 26 of the 31 parties in the Consensus Commission Dialogue had supported the system. They argued that such an election was needed to gauge public opinion. Jamaat further alleged that “foreign and domestic forces” were pushing a “blueprint” election, pointing to the unprecedented announcement of the election timeframe in London after talks with one party [a few months back, Tarique Rahman had met Jamaat leaders in London].

Academically, it may appear both pertinent and important to examine why JP has become the primary target of the GOP and its affiliates in the run-up to the February 2026 elections. Knowledgeable circles, including well-known analyst Masood Kamal, suggest that these parties fear that in the absence of AL contesting the polls, pro-Hasina and pro-AL voters may cast their ballots in favour of JP, thus jeopardising their own chances of victory or exposing them to a poor electoral performance. Hence, they are desperate to get JP deregistered. And to gather public sympathy, these parties—including Advisor Asif Mahmud—are portraying India as being behind these machinations, accusing it of prescribing support for a “fascist” and “pro-India” party like JP to counter the GOP and its allies. Under these circumstances, the ongoing violence may escalate into even uglier proportions in the foreseeable future, making the electoral scene violent and murkier. Alarmed by the series of violent confrontations, the Army Chief met Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus and the President on September 1. While the details of the meeting are not available at the time of writing, they may become clear when officially released.

In another, unrelated development linked to violence, Chittagong University in the port city witnessed violent clashes between civilians and students, leading to hundreds of injuries and the imposition of prohibitory orders. It is assessed that in the coming months, organised violence in different parts of Bangladesh remains a strong possibility, perhaps forcing the authorities to intervene more effectively. If not, serious questions may arise about the credibility of the February elections.

Views expressed are personal