Rising crescendo

In the aftermath of the Taliban triumph in Afghanistan, nearly 45 days ago, one thing that is perhaps glaringly missed is the latent simmering in some South-East Asian countries. It is imperative to take stock of these underground happenings, especially in the Islamic majority provinces of Southern Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines etc., as they merit a close watch to get a holistic idea about the larger and long-term effects of a regressive political dispensation like the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The southern tracts of Thailand — particularly the places like Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala and other adjoining places bordering Malaysia — have always been in adverse light due to sporadic cases of hate and violence targeting Thai security forces and, in the not-so-distant past, violence was even seen on a larger scale with a considerable number of casualties. In the past, Al Qaeda and ISIS had exploited the protracted complexity across the Muslim world to pursue their agendas — including in areas that are under the sovereignty of competent states but where the federal authority was weak and less assertive. During the peak of ISIS dominance, transnational jihadism in South East Asia had been described by some analysts as a "bottom-up" phenomenon with pre-existing militant groups (for instance in Indonesia and the Philippines) proclaiming allegiance to ISIS. In these countries — along with Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore — individuals and small groups, unconnected with any terrorist network, also seemed inclined to join ISIS, or act in its name. With the recent resurgence of the Taliban, these forces appear to be buoyant and extraordinarily emboldened in support of the Taliban.

In the meantime, the priority for the Thailand government and Malay-Muslim militants should be to end the conflict that has cost almost 7,000 lives since 2004. The longer the conflict continues, the greater the risk of increased polarization, intensified insurgency that could spread outside the deep south, as well as miscalculations that transnational jihadists could exploit. The exodus of ISIS fighters from the Middle East, the propaganda victory of pro-ISIS fighters in the Philippine cities of Marawi, Mindanao, and calls from ISIS and Al-Qaeda to avenge the Rohingyas who represent a potential volatile convergence for the region. It is therefore interesting to watch the trend post the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan. Also, it is noteworthy that ISIS and Al-Qaeda have sometimes succeeded in affiliating with nationalist armed groups pursuing local agendas and have exploited conflict for their own ends, even within the peripheries of capable states.

Under the prevailing scenario, Malaysia calls for more vigil in light of the recent Taliban-related developments. Indian fugitive, Zakir Naik, continues to enjoy the patronage of Malaysia and is capable of exploiting the Taliban takeover to the advantage of radical Muslims in SouthEast Asia. Furthermore, soon after the Taliban assumed power in Kabul, leaders from the Malaysian Islamic Party, or PAS, congratulated the Taliban for taking control of Afghanistan. Such statements were considered to be very damaging and encouraged the Islamic zealots who have been calling for enforcement of Islamic law in the whole of Malaysia. Also, the Malaysia counterterrorism officials said that the return of the Taliban opened up an opportunity for terror groups to once again congregate in Afghanistan. This appears to be a serious warning.

As regards the Philippines, places like Mindanao, Basilan and Jolo are already struck by Islamic terror with intermittent cases of killings, taking of hostages and related violence at regular intervals. These groups too are thought to be reeling under the spell of Taliban victory and are expected to gain further ferocity to step up their violence, based on religious extremism.

However, in South East Asia, Indonesia remains the most prominent hub of threat because of two principal reasons: (a) On October 12, 2002, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) – the Southeast Asian branch of Al-Qaeda (the terrorist group behind the attacks in the United States) – set off a series of bombs killing 202 people from more than 20 countries in the deadliest terrorist attack in Indonesian history. JI was virtually unheard of before the Bali bombings, but its notoriety spread rapidly. It had cells in locations including Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines, with the latter two countries bearing the brunt of its attacks. (b) There have been a large number of radicalized pro-ISIS Muslims who were indoctrinated by online ISIS propaganda from 2010 onwards, and many such elements had gone to Syria and fought alongside the ISIS cadres in pursuit of a hate agenda. Such indicators are bound to further radicalize elements in Indonesia. Also, the Taliban's return to power after the end of the 20-year war with the US has boosted the morale of militants in Southeast Asia, inspiring some to make plans to go to the country and undertake military and other training, though experts say this is a difficult prospect for now amid pandemic-related travel restrictions. It is perhaps germane here to mention that those Indonesians who had joined ISIS were among the 5,000 prisoners freed by the Taliban soon after the takeover.

In sum, the global fraternity is entrusted with the onerous task of addressing the threats emanating from the Taliban's ascent, as Indonesia, Malaysia and the southern Philippines are seen as being most affected by the Taliban's victory. On receipt of a larger picture of concern in South East Asia, it can be appropriately dealt with alongside the concerns of India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

The writer is a retired IPS officer, a security analyst and a former National Security Advisor to the PM of Mauritius. Views expressed are personal