Moment of Reckoning

Deterrence’s effectiveness depends not only on military capability but on the credibility of intent; the adversary must believe that the state will act, and that such action will impose real and tangible costs. As Thomas Schelling observed in The Strategy of Conflict, deterrence rests on the manipulation of risk. The threat of retaliation need not be certain, but it must be believable. This credibility, however, is not static. It must be reinforced through action, clarity, and above all, the demonstrable capability of the state to follow through on what it signals. Deterrence is thus both psychological and institutional.

Deterrence rests on the assumption of rational actors and clear lines of accountability. But when violence is outsourced to proxies and the state functions as a silent enabler, that logic collapses. Introducing non-state actors allows the sponsoring state to invoke plausible deniability, making deterrence harder to calibrate and easier to subvert. The United States, despite its global power, has found that even two decades of its war on terror have not produced lasting deterrence against dispersed, ideologically motivated actors. Israel, too, with all its military superiority and intelligence prowess, has struggled to deter Hamas

This makes deterrence fluid and unstable. Attribution is ambiguous, escalation is asymmetric, and conventional rules of engagement become insufficient. Therefore, the deterrent posture must evolve into a mode of strategic improvisation, where punishment is not only proportionate but communicative, intended to shape behaviour through uncertainty

Also, it is naïve to believe that even the most forceful response can permanently prevent future attacks. Deterrence, instead, becomes a way of holding chaos at bay, of imposing enough cost to disrupt the adversary’s rhythm and forcing hesitation into their calculus.

India’s evolving approach towards dealing with terrorism marks precisely this shift, from strategic restraint to calibrated assertion. It is now ensuring that deterrence is not passively inherited but actively performed and continuously reinforced. The latest trigger for this was the attack on the innocent tourist in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir.

On April 22, 2025, terrorists carried out a cold-blooded massacre in Pahalgam, Kashmir, killing 26 people and injuring many more. The attack’s cruelty was amplified by the deliberate targeting of individuals based on religion. Victims were asked whether they were Muslim, and when they denied, they were shot at point-blank range. A newlywed Indian Navy officer Lieutenant Vinay Narwal was killed in front of his wife after being asked about his faith. Some survivors also reported that the attackers used circumcision as a grotesque “faith test.” The Resistance Front (TRF), widely believed to be a front for Pakistan-backed Lashkar-e-Taiba, initially claimed responsibility twice before retracting.

Despite mounting evidence, including the use of Pakistani weapons and logistical signatures of TRF, Pakistan resisted international efforts to name and shame the group. At the United Nations Security Council, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, lobbied to exclude TRF's name from the official condemnation statement to dilute the language of the resolution. It was an attempt to shield the perpetrators and avoid international scrutiny.

Unsurprisingly, it fits a long-standing pattern of state complicity and denial. The world has seen this before. In 2008, Pakistani nationals carried out the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, killing 175 people and injuring over 300. And in perhaps the most telling example of state protectionism, Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of 9/11, was found living undisturbed just a few hundred yards from Pakistan’s premier military academy in Abbottabad. The refusal to name TRF today is part of the same old playbook. Protect proxies, distort accountability, and pretend innocence while the blood of innocents is spilled.

As a result, India launched Operation Sindoor on May 7, marking a decisive shift from strategic restraint to assertive deterrence. The Indian Air Force carried out 24 precision airstrikes on nine identified terrorist camps across Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, based on compelling intelligence that included satellite imagery, intercepted communications, and HUMINT. India eliminated several terrorists and destroyed critical infrastructure linked to groups like TRF, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Significantly, these strikes were confined to terror-linked infrastructure, reflecting India's resolve without triggering civilian casualties.

In retaliation, Pakistan launched a massive counter-offensive codenamed "Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos." On the nights of May 7 and 8, 2025, Pakistan deployed an unprecedented swarm of 300 to 400 Turkish-made drones, including YIHA-III loitering munitions, aiming to strike Indian military installations across the northern and western borders. These drones targeted 36 sites, encompassing both civilian and military infrastructure. India's robust air defence systems and the Integrated Counter-UAS Grid, effectively neutralised the majority of these drones, preventing damage. This led India to retaliate. There is now clear and credible evidence of the impact of these airstrikes on military installations across Pakistan.

There are five key implications which emanate from Operation Sindoor. First, India has abandoned strategic restraint when the blood of innocent civilians is shed. No more dossiers. No more waiting for global sympathy.

Second, terror groups and their state sponsors are now one and the same. The fiction that Pakistan’s terror proxies operate independently has expired. If Pakistan continues to host and protect them, it must also own the consequences.

Third, the age of international moral policing is over. The UN couldn’t even name TRF in its condemnation. The so-called superpowers stayed silent. India no longer expects support, it acts alone.

Fourth, escalation control is now in India’s hands. Pakistan’s old playbook, “if you hit our terrorists, we’ll escalate”, has failed. India hit back, Pakistan retaliated, and India hit harder.

Fifth, the nuclear bluff can no longer shield terrorists. For too long, Pakistan’s nuclear posture was used as a strategic smokescreen, harbouring terrorists while daring India to respond, betting on global fear of escalation.

India will no longer tolerate foreign soil being used to shed the blood of its citizens, silently or otherwise. Those who provide shelter, support, or smokescreen to terrorists must now reckon with the certainty of consequence.

The writer writes on Geopolitical and Macroeconomic Issues. Views expressed are personal