Federal Fault Lines

The architectural framework of Indian law enforcement is currently undergoing a shift. Unlike the United States, where the distinction between federal and state crimes is hardcoded into the constitutional fabric, India has long navigated a more fluid middle ground. For decades, we operated without a formal concept of federal crimes; it was only with the birth of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in 2008 that a de jure federal police force emerged. However, the Supreme Court’s declaration on January 20, 2026, has disrupted the long-standing status quo. By ruling that State Anti-Corruption Departments can investigate Central Government employees within their borders, the Court has effectively dismantled the de facto “federal” status of corruption cases involving Central staff, a domain previously reserved for the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

This judicial turn brings the debate over Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act back into the spotlight. This 2018 amendment served as a “safety valve,” ensuring that public servants were not victimised for bona fide policy decisions unless an independent authority agreed there was a case to answer. The split verdict delivered on January 13, 2026, by a two-judge bench highlights the fragility of this protection. One judge struck the amendment down as unconstitutional, viewing it as a shield for the corrupt, while the other shifted the sanctioning power to the Lokpal and Lokayuktas. As we await the tie-breaking view of a third judge, the core question remains: how can we investigate corruption without paralysing the executive? The Government should not be the last word in a fable regarding its own conduct; hence, the move toward an independent ombudsman is a necessary evolution.

The answer to building state-federal harmony may lie in the history of the CBI’s Punjab Cell (1984) and the Special Task Force (1993). The NIA’s success was built on the cultural capital earned by these specialised units. While the CBI’s anti-corruption arm — the Special Police Establishment — often struggled with the perception of being an intrusive federal hand, the Punjab Cell operated on a different plane of professional ethics. Following Operation Blue Star, the Cell faced immense pressure from the Army and the Defence Ministry to prosecute all 1,500 detainees from the Golden Temple complex as terrorists. Instead, the Cell exercised remarkable restraint, charging only the 211 individuals with verifiable terrorist links while identifying the rest as innocent pilgrims who had entered the complex for the Guru Arjun Dev Martyrdom Day celebrations. This act of integrity earned the approbation of the public and state authorities, proving that the federal police could be a fair arbiter.

This trust-building continued through a unique operational “Jugalbandi.” The Punjab Cell initiated bi-weekly intelligence conferences, inviting the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and RAW to share data with affected states. We did not just chase criminals; we categorised suspects alphabetically and worked to rehabilitate those on the fringe. By utilising “spotters” — former associates who were weaned away from violence — we solved the Manchanda and Longowal assassinations and dismantled the gang responsible for the daring Rs 7 crore Ludhiana PNB robbery. This was not federal overreach; it was a collaborative success that drew written compliments from the redoubtable DGP K.P.S. Gill.

Similarly, the STF’s handling of the 1993 Mumbai blasts showcased a rare commitment to fairness. By seeking the discharge of 28 individuals wrongly accused by local police and refusing to apply the charge of “waging war against the State” — as it did not meet the Supreme Court’s legal threshold — the STF proved that a federal agency could prioritise the rule of law over political expediency. As we stand at this crossroads in 2026, the necessity for a clear distinction between federal and state jurisdictions remains pressing. Responsibility must be shared, not usurped. I find myself siding with the judicial view that favours the Lokpal and Lokayukta as the arbiters of Section 17A. By removing the decision from the Government and placing it in the hands of an independent body, we can protect honest decision-makers from the trauma of trial while ensuring that federal and state agencies work hand in hand to safeguard the republic.

Views expressed are personal. The writer served in the CBI from 1963 to 1996