Economics Of A War

Nothing sharpens military judgement like the crucible of operations. Operation Sindoor, launched in response to the Pahalgam terror strike, demonstrated that India can act decisively, with political will and with coordinated application of force across the three Services. Our armed forces and Government deserve the nation’s pride for that resolve and the results achieved.

Yet the euphoria of success should not blunt constructive introspection. Wars and punitive operations teach harsh lessons about the optimisation of means: which platform is the right one for a given target, and at what cost? Operation Sindoor presents us with precisely that moment for sober, professional self-examination, not to detract from the achievement, but to make the next action swifter, cheaper and even more effective.

Firepower, not prestige, must drive choice of weapon

A fundamental truth of modern warfare is simple: outside final ground-holding actions, wars are decided by the weight, accuracy and timeliness of firepower. That firepower may be delivered from the air, from the sea, or from land-based launchers. Each has strengths and limitations. Aircraft bring flexibility, loiter time, human judgment and the ability to discriminate in complex environments. Missiles bring speed, standoff, precision and reduced risk to personnel. The right choice depends on the target, the operational context and the economics of force employment.

Operation Sindoor showcased world-class air power — the Indian Air Force employed precision-guided munitions, cruise missiles and loitering munitions to achieve effects with minimal collateral damage. Those actions were necessary and professionally executed. But the operational debate that follows is not about faulting air power; it is about asking whether some targets could equally well, and more cost-effectively, have been engaged by land-based missile systems, thereby conserving scarce air assets and widening strategic options.

Money talks: the arithmetic of choice

Cost is not the only consideration in war, but it matters. When the unit cost and replacement/operational costs of crewed aircraft are compared with modern missile systems, the arithmetic is striking. A BrahMos cruise missile is reported in the public domain at an estimated Rs 18-22 crore per unit; a Prithvi around Rs 4-7 crore; Agni variants vary by range and technology. By contrast, advanced combat aircraft involve capital costs running into hundreds of crores apiece (and replacement or write-off of a platform is a strategic and financial blow far beyond the price tag).

Put bluntly, for large classes of fixed or semi-fixed terrorist infrastructure, the option to employ ground-based strike systems, BrahMos, tactical rockets, even ballistic platforms within the appropriate legal and strategic framework, offers the possibility of equivalent battlefield effect at lower operational risk and, often, lower cost. That is an argument for optimisation, not an argument against air power.

Missiles are not a panacea- integration is

Missiles have become tremendously capable: precision guidance, standoff ranges, supersonic or hypersonic speeds, and reduced collateral effects. But they are not a universal solution. Aircraft retain unique advantages: longer on-station time, adaptability when human judgement matters, ISR integration and the ability to shape effects in dynamic battlespaces. The correct approach is integration: marry the reach and rapidity of missiles with the discretion and adaptability of air assets, underpinned by a joint fire-planning ethos that puts best effect and cost-efficiency before service pride.

Theatreisation and joint fire-planning: the institutional response

Operation Sindoor underscores the need for true jointness - not merely as a doctrinal slogan but as routine practice in planning, target-synthesis, and weapon assignment. Fire planning must be a shared art: inputs from Army artillery and missiles, Air Force strike planners, Navy standoff options, and national-level political guidance must be fused early. Theatreisation, properly implemented, offers an organisational framework to do exactly that - to eliminate duplication, avoid siloed thinking and ensure “best weapon for best target” becomes standard practice.

Senior leaders must guard against turf friction. Optimisation often requires difficult choices: a launcher rather than a sortie, a missile salvo rather than an aircraft package. Institutional resistance - especially by those wedded to legacy ways of doing war - is the single most avoidable enemy of cost-effective conflict.

War-testing indigenous capability

If there is an additional strategic dividend from operations, it is the ability to validate indigenous systems under real conditions. Testing and evolving “Made-in-India” systems — ranging from loitering munitions to BrahMos variants — on operationally meaningful tasks provides data on range, accuracy, lethality, guidance robustness and collateral-damage profiles. War is the sternest, but most informative, test-bed for systems and doctrines. We must seize that opportunity, under the necessary legal and policy constraints, to mature domestic systems and demonstrate their credibility.

A practical way forward

Three practical, interlocking steps should be a priority:

1.Institutionalise joint fire-planning: Make the Joint Theatre the default domicile for planning and weapon assignment for operations that cross service boundaries.

2. Make cost-effectiveness an explicit planning parameter: Operational plans must routinely include a cost-effectiveness axis - comparing platform options in terms of effect, risk, time-to-effect and economic cost.

3.War-evaluate indigenous systems: Where feasible and prudent, build planned operational experiments into exercises and limited operations to validate and refine home-grown weaponry and tactics.

Conclusion — humility with confidence

Operation Sindoor proved we can plan and act with resolve. The next phase of professional work is to ensure we do so with the greatest possible economy of effort and highest return on effect. That happens when air, land and sea options are truly considered together; when missiles are treated as strategic and tactical enablers rather than an afterthought; and when “Made in India” systems are given operational opportunities to prove their mettle.

Victory in one operation must lead to institutional learning for the next. If we are to fight smart, preserve national treasure and maximise strategic deterrence, then “best weapon for the best target” must cease to be a phrase and become a habit. Only then will India’s military prowess be matched by its efficiency — and our deterrence by credibility.

Views expressed are personal. The writer has served in the Indian Army and has taken part in the 1971 Kargil War and Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka in 1987