China’s Blocks, Russia’s Blame

Speaking at a conference on Security and Cooperation in Eurasia in the city of Perm in the Ural Mountains on May 29, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reaffirmed Russia’s interest in reviving the Russia-China Troika (RIC). Lavrov said: “I would like to confirm our genuine interest in the earliest resumption of the work within the format of the troika -- Russia, India, China -- which was established many years ago on the initiative of (ex-Russian prime minister) Yevgeny Primakov, and which has organised meetings more than 20 times at the ministerial level since then, not only at the level of foreign policy chiefs but also the heads of other economic, trade and financial agencies of the three countries.” He also said, “Now that, as I understand, an understanding has been reached between India and China on how to calm the situation on the border, it seems to me that the time has come to revive this RIC troika”.

While Lavrov has called for the revival of RIC, this may be easier said than done. Given the ongoing disputes and geopolitical dynamics, India would perhaps be unwilling to fully embrace such a close trilateral alliance with China. Contrary to what Lavrov said, border tensions between India and China continue to persist. While diplomatic efforts and troop disengagements have occurred, a full resolution remains elusive, and the potential for further clashes persists. The situation at the India-China border continues to be tense despite recent disengagement agreements. Increased infrastructure development and troop deployments along the border by China in recent years have exacerbated tensions. As General Upendra Dwivedi, the Indian Army Chief said earlier this year, India will not reduce the number of its troops deployed along the LAC with China anytime soon, asserting there is still “a degree of standoff” persisting between the rival armies and the two countries need to rebuild trust to de-escalate overall tensions. The 2020 Galwan Valley clashes and ongoing border disputes have continued to strain the relationship between India and China. Gen. Dwivedi’s statement makes it quite clear that there is a lack of trust for China. This lack of trust will hinder the prospects of reviving the RIC.

The India-China territorial dispute stems from differing interpretations of the border, with China disputing India’s claims over regions like Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. China has issued maps showing Aksai Chin — an area of India’s state of Kashmir mostly controlled by China since the 1962 war— and the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh within Chinese territory.

As recently as May 14 this year, China has reasserted its territorial claims in Arunachal Pradesh. Despite professed claims about efforts to improve diplomatic ties with India, the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs published its latest names for places in Arunachal Pradesh, which China calls Zangnan and says is part of the Tibetan autonomous region. The renaming of 27 places covered an array of geographical features: 15 mountains, five residential areas, four mountain passes, two rivers and one lake. India rejected the new Chinese names for places in Arunachal Pradesh as a “preposterous” attempt to alter the “undeniable” reality that the state “was, is, and will” always be an integral part of India.

China routinely issues new names for locations in Arunachal Pradesh—a move India dismisses as fabricated and strategically aimed at asserting false territorial claims. India reaffirms Arunachal’s integral status and counters such tactics through infrastructure upgrades, military readiness, and global partnerships. Geopolitically, the China-Pakistan axis poses a strategic threat to India. China’s support for Pakistan—especially in military and regional disputes—deepens mistrust. It supplies nearly 81% of Pakistan’s arms, including jets, missiles, drones, and warships. After the Pahalgam terror attack, China reportedly delivered PL-15 missiles to Pakistan, one of which was later found undetonated in Punjab—further linking Beijing to Islamabad’s aggression.

China’s backing of Pakistan-based terrorists heightens India’s concerns. Beijing blocked India’s UNSC bid to designate five key terrorists—linked to attacks like 26/11, Pulwama, and Pathankot—as global threats. It also vetoed sanctions on The Resistance Front, accused in the recent Pahalgam attack. Meanwhile, Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov accused the US and QUAD of pushing India into militarisation under the guise of trade. He claimed the West’s “Indo-Pacific” strategy aims to pit India against China. However, India maintains a balanced multi-alignment policy—engaging with QUAD for maritime security while also supporting forums like BRICS.

India is importing essential defence equipment as well as maintaining its close ties to Russia even while it has entered into a strategic partnership with the US to balance China. No doubt, India’s relationship with the United States has deepened in recent years, driven by shared concerns over China’s growing assertiveness in the region. However, India has been careful to avoid becoming a US ally; New Delhi has maintained an independent foreign policy and has refused to participate in any military alliance directed against China.

India’s membership of Quad does not pose any threat to Russia. India has developed an independent foreign policy, carefully balancing relations with Western nations and Russia while simultaneously expanding its regional influence in the Indo-Pacific. India’s foreign policy is based on strategic autonomy. India’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine war substantiates this. India has not sided with the West and has chosen a course of neutrality in the war in Ukraine. It has neither condemned nor blamed Russia for the war. India abstained on all UN resolutions pertaining to Ukraine which demanded a Russian withdrawal or condemned Russia for the war with Ukraine. The fact that Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the USA in September last year to meet former U.S. President Joe Biden and next month he went to Russia to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasises India’s strategic autonomy.

In conclusion, Lavrov’s call to revive the RIC is to reassert Russia’s importance as a power centre on the global platform. India is already walking the diplomatic tightrope by being a member of Quad on one hand and of BRICS on the other. The state of the India-China relationship is not yet such that we should let ourselves be drawn into a closer embrace of our northern neighbour whose policies are harmful to us beyond doubt. Perhaps we could privately share our views with the Russian leadership, explaining our concerns and telling them that for the moment, we see BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation(SCO) as providing enough scope for trilateral cooperation between Russia, India and China.

The writer is a retired Indian diplomat and had previously served as Consul General in New York. Views expressed are personal