Centralised Command

In a blistering frontal attack on India and Afghanistan, Pakistan’s new Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), Asim Munir, in his maiden address, warned India of deadly retaliation while also conveying a message to the Taliban, asserting that Pakistan’s invincibility is protected by “faith-filled warriors.” It may be reiterated that Field Marshal Asim Munir very recently assumed absolute powers by appointing himself as the CDF, obtaining the assent of the political leadership as well, thus usurping absolute powers. For this, Pakistan underwent a major constitutional amendment establishing a Defence Forces Headquarters to integrate the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Displaying his belligerent rhetoric and aggressive hegemonistic designs, he went on to threaten India that this time, in case of a military conflict, Pakistan’s response would be even swifter and more severe than on previous occasions. He also insinuated through his message to the Taliban that it has no choice but to choose between Fitna Al Khawarij (a term used for the outlawed Pakistani Taliban) and Pakistan. Munir also claimed that Pakistan is a “peace-loving” country. However, no one will be allowed to threaten Pakistan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, or test its resolve. He meant to remind his constituency that the concept of Pakistan is unbeatable and the firm resolve of a united nation protects it. CDF Asim Munir was formally appointed the country’s first CDF on December 4, marking what many experts described as the most significant overhaul of Pakistan’s military command structure since the 1970s.

The overhaul took place under the 27th Amendment of the Constitution, which created a single office with centralised operational, administrative, and strategic authority. It must be underlined that the updated Article 243 on military powers states that the President, on the advice of the Prime Minister, will appoint the Army Chief, who will simultaneously serve as the CDF. The amendment also eliminated the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), effectively dismantling the tri-service coordination system established in 1976 and shifting joint command responsibilities to the new CDF.

Moreover, to align the military’s legal framework with these constitutional changes, the government subsequently also amended the Pakistan Army Act (PAA) of 1952, following the passage of the 27th Amendment. Field Marshal Munir was appointed Army Chief on November 29, 2022, becoming the 17th Army man to lead the Pakistan Army.

It is also pertinent to mention here that in November 2024, the government had amended the Pakistan Army Act (PAA), increasing the tenures of the chiefs of the three armed services from three to five years, while keeping the CJCSC’s tenure to three years. These amendments also permitted the service chiefs to be reappointed or to have their tenures extended for up to five years, rather than the previous limit of three. Now, the updated PAA provisions allow the President, acting on the Prime Minister’s advice, to reappoint the COAS-cum-CDF for an additional five years or extend his term by up to five years. This creates the legal possibility for him to remain in office until December 2035.

Upon his controversial appointment, Munir was also given the guard of honour in the presence of Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Naveed Ashraf and Chief of the Air Staff of Pakistan Air Force Zaheer Ahmad Babar. The ceremony also included the presentation of awards to those from the Pakistan Navy and Pakistan Air Force who were part of the May skirmish (Operation Sindoor) to recognise their acts of “valour” during the war.

Later, speaking to the tri-forces at the GHQ, Munir hailed the move as “historic” and said that the establishment of the Defence Forces Headquarters is now an essential step towards this change, adding that each service will maintain its individuality for its operational readiness.

Meanwhile, the Pakistani media has reacted to this CDF-linked development. According to Dr Raashid Wali Janjua, the well-known columnist, the 27th Constitutional Amendment has introduced the appointment of the CDF in Pakistan, which is the subject of several discussions on mainstream as well as social media. The uninformed speculation and debate, unsupported by logic and reason, lead towards confusion, which needs to be removed through dispassionate analysis of the need for this important seat in Pakistan’s Higher Defence Organisation (HDO).

Further, according to Dr Wali, this being the age of net-centric and multi-domain warfare, where air, land, sea, space, and electromagnetic domains would fight as a network to dominate the famous decision loop, i.e., “Observe, Orient, Decide, Act” (OODA), through super-quick intelligence gathering and concomitant decision-making, no single service, i.e., Army, Air Force, or Navy, can cast a lone furrow and hope to succeed. Pakistan, like India, had inherited a colonial organisational structure that kept the military organisation highly centralised, yet siloed through separate commands in the three services. In other words, this experienced writer has apparently negated the CDF move, giving cogent arguments.

Earlier in Pakistan, the ostensible objective of HDO reorganisation was to promote jointness and operational synergy between the three services, but the actual motive imputed to Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s HDO reform was to gain greater control over military affairs through a strong Joint Staff Headquarters (JS HQ). He, however, could not create a potent JS HQ, and the appointment of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) remained a ceremonial sinecure for an underemployed four-star general. Though progressively, military budgeting, tri-service coordination in higher military planning, medical and engineering services, and strategic planning division affairs were assigned to the JS HQ, the organisation remained powerless and ineffective in bringing the desired operational synergy between the three services.

The result of the above inchoate state of the HDO was a wasteful duplication of several functions, which, in the absence of an effective Ministry of Defence and JS HQ, led to profligate waste of resources and lack of desired operational synergy in times of war. The problems were visible during the Kargil conflict, where the Army started an operation without due coordination with the other two services, leading to a lack of preparedness of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) for offensive operations during the conflict. This perception seems worth taking note of.

The future wars, as per Dr Wali, would be fought between networks of sensors, shooters, and decision-makers (command posts), enabled through multiple domains of space, air, land, sea, and cyberspace. The mechanised forces like armour on ground and the air platforms, would be operating in unmanned mode through UCAVs, drones, and UGVs, with gilt-edged opportunities provided by AI-assisted weapon platforms and command posts requiring split-second decisions by the strategic military leadership.

Munir is reeling under a huge sense of superiority due to his self-engineered assumption of absolute powers and becoming the CDF. His December 8 address, strongly signalling India and Afghanistan in the same vein and in a threatening tenor, resonates with his previous utterances at Islamabad on April 16, Karachi on June 18, and at Tampa, Florida, US, on August 9. He is upbeat about being a megalomaniac without objectively assessing lessons from history—that all previous military dictators of Pakistan dreamt of harming India through rhetoric and military misadventures, but these never worked and invariably defeated the fantasies of the military leaders. And Munir is no exception. Getting former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Chief Faiz Hameed sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment on multiple “charges” could be a result of vendetta or service rivalry, but ignoring the possible dissent brewing in the cantonment may prove costly in the long run. The CDF cannot ignore this, though his new term is expected to last for another 10 years.

Views expressed are personal. The writer is a retired IPS officer, Adviser NatStrat, and a former National Security Advisor in Mauritius