Caught in a (pretty) pickle

The Russian invasion of Ukraine seems poised to ensure some very compelling outcomes, outcomes that became clearer within 72 hours of the invasion. The conflict will be prolonged, a large number of Ukrainians will die, and their country shattered. Russia will eventually lose, with many Russians returning home in body bags. Ukraine will evolve to become Vladimir Putin’s Afghanistan. This a consequential step for Putin, as this invasion could mark the beginning of the end of his dictatorship. The real questions are (1) what precipitated this crisis? (2) What prompted Putin to undertake this risky invasion now, and (3) where will we go from here?

This invasion was not surprising. Rather, it was very predictable. America is not an innocent bystander, and one can reasonably argue that American and by default NATO’s Ukraine policy is the primary source of this conflict. America and its Western allies have been trying to peel Ukraine from Russia’s orbit and subsume it within the western sphere of influence. In 2008, at the Bucharest summit, NATO welcomed Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO and agreed that these two countries would eventually become members of NATO. This is tantamount to the Russian declaration that Mexico will join the Warsaw pact. Nobody would expect the USA to sit idle and allow that to happen. Russia did not either. In 2008 Russia attacked Georgia, as a way of asserting its sphere of influence. Russia is doing to Ukraine now exactly what it did to Georgia in 2008.

Recent American policy towards Russia has been guided by contempt, condescension, disregard, indifference, and outright insult. It started with Reagan and continued up until the Obama Presidency. President Reagan defined the Soviet Union as an “Evil Empire”, insisting that a policy of containing the Soviets was not an option. Reagan championed the historic buildup of American defence, an arms race that many experts argued that the Soviets could not sustain, resulting in the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The collapse of the Soviet Union was seen as a victory for Reagan and his hardline approach toward the Soviets. The fact that the Soviets had an inefficient economic system, an over-bloated under-performing public sector, and an unsustainable defence budget to fund its aggressions, especially in Afghanistan, did not seem as a contributing factor in the demise of the Soviet Union.

Defining Russia as evil, took the focus away from communism. To a vast majority of Americans, the fall of the Soviet Union simply meant Americans had won and the Russians had lost. Good had prevailed over evil. It was not a failure of communism or a triumph of capitalism. Russia failed and suddenly the country of Tolstoy, Tchaikovsky, Chekov, and Trotsky had no glory left. Russia was irredeemable, and facilitating a Russian seamless transition towards a market economy and liberal democracy, was not considered a serious policy option. American political leaders adopted unilateral policy options with total disregard for what the Russians wanted. They did not recognize that Russia had any legitimate role in preserving a balanced global power politics.

The expansion of NATO is a case in point. President Clinton endorsed the expansion of NATO over Russian objections, and over reservations of numerous Soviet experts. It should be noted that the expansion of NATO is in direct conflict with the “Monroe Doctrine”, a US foreign policy doctrine, that holds any intervention in the political affairs of the Americas by foreign powers as a hostile act against the United States. When the Soviets began to install nuclear missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy noted that “It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response”. Somehow Russia was deemed as not worthy of such a show of deference. Obama called Russia a “regional power”, and John McCain, a senator and a Presidential candidate termed Russia a “gas station, masquerading as a country”.

Fast forward to today, and according to Mary Sarotte, a professor at John Hopkins University, “The open-door policy is the one that maximizes friction with Russia, which has culminated in the crisis we have now” It is clear that not letting the Russians have any stake in its own future, and the humiliation it had to endure despite having the largest arsenal of nuclear warheads, enraged Putin enormously. While Russian aspirations were being disregarded, former Soviet allies and former states within the dissolved Soviet Union were being offered NATO membership. Russia found itself surrounded by countries with free-market Capitalism, coupled with security guarantees from NATO. Russia felt a genuine security threat, and its evolution as a belligerent state can be explained as a response to this threat.

But what prompted Putin to invade Ukraine now? Putin simply did what he thought was in the strategic interest of Russia. It was not an irrational move, but rather a strategic one, to take advantage of Western discontent, and make Russia relevant again. Putin invaded Ukraine before it joined NATO and before Ukraine could access article 5 protection given to all NATO member countries. Putin also sensed a crack in a western liberal democracy with Brexit and the election of Donald Trump. The opposition to international trade and immigration in the western world gave Putin a real opportunity for realignment. Economic integration in Europe and North America, including numerous trade deals that coincided with high domestic unemployment and skewed income distribution resulted in fissures within liberal democracies that emboldened Putin. From Reagan to Obama, American deindustrialization was seen as a direct outcome of this global economic integration. The founding pillars of liberal democracies, trade and immigration came under seething attack, and Putin did not miss this change.

He used social media to fan these sparks of discontent to help Trump win in the US. This disdain for trade and immigration, and the consequent rise of nationalism took different forms in different countries, but all helped to question the legitimacy of liberal democracies. It created a realignment of political forces, with erstwhile conservatives and Russia hawks openly siding with Putin. Putin now has the support of red China and red America. Radio Beijing and Fox news have aligned in favour of Putin. Putin felt that there was no more a propitious time to invade Ukraine.

Putin’s calculation although strategic was perhaps flawed. Kyiv is not Grozny or Aleppo. He seriously underestimated how swift the reaction from Europe and the US would be if he invaded a country considered “Essentially European”. The spectre of white refugees, mainly women and children, fleeing Ukraine created a far more visceral displeasing narrative compared to refugees fleeing Grozny and Aleppo. The American reaction was swift. Biden had little political resistance in mobilizing stringent sanctions against Russia. The reality of Europeans being killed by Russian missiles, and European right to self-determination being under attack, outweighed the nationalistic impulse in both Europe and the United States. We definitely did not see such swift reactions when millions were slaughtered in Syria, Georgia, and Grozny.

Responses from both governments and corporations have been swift and consequential. The Russian economy has taken an enormous hit. The stock market in Russia has been closed since the invasion. Rubble has plummeted and Russia defaulted on its international debt obligations. Showered with help from the US and Europe, Ukrainian resistance has been effective. Russia’s military has seriously underperformed. Although Russia might gain military control over some strategic cities in Ukraine, it will have trouble governing Ukraine. Russia simply lacks the financial resources (Russia’s GDP is about the size of the GDP of Mexico) needed to sustain such a prolonged confrontation. Russia will bleed resources. Russia was already declining economic power, and now will be further weakened. Putin will not survive such a prolonged war with no strategic victory in sight. The question is not if he will go, but how soon will he go?

The weakening of Russia is not necessarily a winning strategy for the United States. A weakened nuclear Russia could become more desperate. Russia needs more monitoring, not less. In this age of nuclear proliferation, Russia needs to be a responsible player. That becomes difficult when Russia feels distressed. Also, Russia will be further immersed in the Chinese orbit to remain relevant. That would be a strategic loss for the United States. Economic ground realities would dictate that American foreign policy pivot more towards Asia. America needs a weakened but reforming Russia to counter China’s emerging threat, not push Russia into the arms of China. After all, what strategic interest does the US have in Ukraine? None whatsoever, besides the chance to needle Russia. Losing Russia to China is a very hefty price to pay for such a chance. The only silver lining that could emerge from this conflict is possibly China will reevaluate its Taiwan policy. Taiwan may simply not be worth it, given the potential economic loss it would entail. But on the other hand, can Taiwan count on America and Europe for a similar swift response when the fleeing refugees are not European? That is still an unresolved question.

The writer is Dean at the School of Business, Seton Hill University, Greensburg, Pennsylvania, USA. Views expressed are personal