A tightrope walk

2025 is a pivotal year for Africa as the continent seeks to amplify its voice on the global stage. Buoyed by South Africa’s G20 Presidency and the second year of the African Union’s (AU) permanent membership in the group, African nations are attempting to revitalise their global partnerships. From an escalating climate crisis, conflicts, global economic instability, to new political leadership in both the AU and the United States and the demand to accelerate the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the challenges faced are many. These factors will eventually determine if African nations are able to coordinate policy actors to address their unique challenges while leveraging its vast potential.

United States and Africa ties under Trump 2.0

In his first term, President Donald Trump adopted an isolationist strategy and a “America-first” foreign policy. His administration cut down funding for developmental programmes which previously benefitted African nations. Neither did he visit any African country, nor did his administration host any US-Africa summit. President Joe Biden’s 2022 Africa strategy attempted to renew and revitalise US engagement with the continent. But while high on rhetoric, the strategy fell short on implementation. Trump’s administration is likely to emphasise on reducing development assistance in favour of expanding US-Africa business ties.

The renewal of the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA), Development Finance Commission (DFC), Prosper Africa, and the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) must be prioritised. Trump’s recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the territory of Western Sahara in 2020 could possibly make the Maghreb country a decisive player in the Abraham Accords. Republicans have also advocated for the recognition of Somaliland as an independent state to strengthen US’ strategic influence in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. Trump’s proposed strict immigration policy could also possibly affect US-Africa diaspora connections negatively.

The fate of uncertain large-scale projects like the Lobito corridor, which is touted to be US’ alternative to China’s BRI, needs to be monitored in addition to the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, a G7 initiative. Additionally, African countries continue to pay disproportionately high costs of climate adaptation despite contributing less towards the climate crisis. If Trump again withdraws from the Paris agreement like he did in his first term, African countries could end up having to keep paying steep costs. Furthermore, President Trump is likely to lean on several special envoys in Africa to elevate US diplomacy and articulate its priorities in challenging areas like the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and the Great Lakes region.

China-Africa ties

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi kickstarted China’s Africa diplomatic calendar with a visit to Chad, the Republic of Congo, Namibia and Nigeria from 5 to 11 January 2025. The visit follows the ninth FOCAC summit in September 2024 and reinforces China’s desire to implement the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027). China is attempting to enlist African support to advance alternative global norms through initiatives like Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI). The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) political influence activities in the continent have to a large extent been successful in bringing key African elites into its network of friends and creating narratives favourable to China and the CCP. This exercise is important as the West is currently going through a crisis of credibility in Africa. Driven by the demand for gold and agricultural products, China’s “trade imports from Africa grew to USD 116.8 billion in 2024.” Improved logistics and the China-Africa Economic and Trade Deep Cooperation Pioneer Zone, in China’s Hunan province could help reduce costs and increase African exports to China.

For African countries, gaining market access and achieving balanced trade and value addition are priorities for its relation with China in 2025. However, non-tariff barriers in China like uneven quotas, administrative hurdles and complex customs procedures continue to remain in place. At the last FOCAC, China also pledged to complete 30 cross-border infrastructure projects in Africa by 2027. However, there is no clarity on how these projects would be selected or prioritised. Although there is no dearth of Chinese policy documents or strategies to engage with Africa, there are no corresponding written strategies from the African side. Moreover, the question of China’s role in Africa’s debt relief was also missing from the conversation at the last FOCAC summit. Waiving off interest-free loans is not enough as such loans are only a small fraction of Africa’s overall debt burden. China’s continued preference for ad-hoc treatments of debt relief by focusing on case-by-case basis rather than conforming to a generic approach creates difficulties for African nations.

The writer is Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA). Views expressed are personal