2025 – Looking Forward

Samir Saran’s recent column in the Indian Express claims great power shifts will alter Indian foreign policy. True. Yet, the battleground that a transitioning world order finds today is Asia. The region witnesses intense militarization, political fragmentation, and bitter geopolitical disputes. EAM Dr S Jaishankar recently mentioned an “over the horizon” grand strategy for India’s external outlook. Yet 2024 threw up many “known unknowns” – Bangladeshi regime displacement, Nepal joining the BRI, and India-China disengagement amid a colourful year. The after-effects - still unfolding - remain “unknown unknowns”. Vajpayee was right when he said we could not choose our neighbours - the "first concentric circle" in Dr Jaishankar's worldview. Yet, what we can choose is the degree of engagement. There is no question that India must engage with the world – her responsibilities, capabilities, and interests have grown far too many to only strive for a regional order. She must aim to be a responsible stakeholder in the international system that fulfils her three targets of citizen prosperity, modernity, and security. At the risk of being fatally deterministic, this article attempts to analyze what 2025 looks like for how we engage with the subcontinent. The piece uses a lens of history to predict the future since history repeats itself.

No foreign policy – including India’s - is solely Pavlovian, i.e., outside stimuli induce behavioural change. Strategy makes power fungible – from capabilities to outcomes and differs from planning in that it is interactive. India, therefore, must begin by conceptually clarifying its neighbourhood goals. Shyam Saran notes how the subcontinent is marked by Indian asymmetry. Porous borders and cross-cutting ethnicities intertwine the subcontinent as a geopolitical unit. In a globalized world, economic interdependence has not led to political harmony. Instead, it has produced forces that fragment and divide. Economic cooperation is positive-sum. Dr S Jaishankar notes the rise of “economic diplomacy” in the last 10 years that stresses “advancing national development”. This ensures an external environment receptive to India’s transformation, a corollary of Indian foreign policy ambitions. Thus, economic integration is and should be an overriding priority of the subcontinent. However, 2024 gave us a reality check. Financial integration, though desirable, faces regional hurdles. Pakistan’s “terror factory” continues its state-backed terrorism unabated. India-China disengagement is only a nudge forward, not a new modus vivendi. Bangladeshi regime change and Arakan army gains prove change is the only surety. Here, theory must meet praxis.

Will we see a Pakistan policy reversal? Most likely not. Dialogue on terrorism and ‘cricket diplomacy’ seems to be the way forward for some. Yet, people-to-people ties and softened borders flourish only when security is guaranteed, not state-backed terrorism – a dealbreaker. The consistent and predictable cycle of what Shyam Saran calls ‘dialogue-disruption-dialogue’ makes finding the incentives for dialogue hard. Besides, it’s hard to imagine a productive conversation on terrorism, especially when it is state-backed. The ability to turn off the terror tap lies in Pakistan’s court, more specifically, an unimaginative army that has captured a self-imploding polity.

India’s China challenge is its main strategic preoccupation, not Pakistan, since the foreign policy rebooting under Narasimha Rao. India-China disengagement is only the first step of a complete process that Brahma Chellaney describes: disengagement, de-induction, and de-escalation. The last two seem unlikely, as the Pentagon confirmed recently. India-China relations have been peaceful coexistence at best and combative at worst. Lack of trust prevails – the modus vivendi suited both and is accurately called a “live and let live relationship” by Shivshankar Menon. Yet, 2020 tore up all previous arrangements. Healing festering historical wounds will not yield fruit if China continues playing spoilt sport in what Kanti Bajpai calls the 4 P’s: Power, Perimeter, Partnerships and Perception. India-China relations are in for a ride this year – economic interdependencies exist amid political disagreements. China’s ‘stormy’ and assertive foreign outlook due to US “containment” exacerbates its poly-crisis. An ageing demography, decelerating economy, environmental complications, and uneven development all result in what Samuel Huntington calls a "performance legitimacy" crisis for the Party-State. Deft Indian diplomacy is required, along with comprehensive capacity building to reduce asymmetry. Frequent bilateral meetings will help manage mutual perceptions and promise a détente in this globally consequential relationship. Another step India can take is to join RCEP since burying your head in the sand is not a prudent policy. Engaging in RCEP will improve Indian goods' competitiveness abroad.

Developments in Bangladesh and Nepal shocked most Indians this year. Yunus is not the same as Hasina. A note verbale to India over Hasina’s extradition must be read with 2,200 incidents of Hindu minority persecution – something the foreign secretary himself addressed in his visit. Rohingya influx, Turkish drones monitoring Indian borders, and Bangladesh’s cosiness to Pakistan seem a new chapter is being written, not in India’s favour. Managing the ‘new’ relationship in 2025 will be a considerable task for India. On the other hand, Nepal joining the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is frightening given that BRI’s terms are opaque and is an extension of Chinese geostrategy. Nepal, like a smaller neighbour, seems to be walking a diplomatic tightrope by balancing India and China. However, India’s closeness with Nepal makes a fusion of Track 1 and Track 2 dialogue feasible for direct conversations on national interests – something the BRI does not represent for Nepal. If India is to offer a credible alternative through BIMSTEC, it is now or never before all neighbours ‘pivot’ to the dark side.

Dr S Jaishankar also spoke of “friends to the maximum”. This exact calibration is required in Myanmar – a region where a mosaic of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) are fighting the Tatmadaw. Recent reports of 60% territorial control of the Arakan Army post-Operation 1027 (2.0) suggest eroding sovereignty. India must be prepared for all eventualities and engage with the necessary stakeholders. A maximum friends approach means making friends by cutting ethnic lines. Additionally, the beginning of a dialogue with the Taliban by the MEA Joint Secretary is also a welcome move: it puts behind historical baggage, accepts reality, and gives hope for better relations in 2025. Moreover, the Maldives row, which unfolded early in 2024, seems to have settled due to potent diplomacy. 2025 offers a new opportunity to rekindle the relationship and put the petty dispute in the museum it belongs to. Dissanayake from Sri Lanka seems to be making steps in the right direction – how long that will hold depends on China’s deep presence on the island nation.

If Asia can serve as a microcosm for extracting broader lessons on India’s grand strategy, it is this. Firstly, India’s historical independence of choice in preserving national interests is the way forward. The label does not matter – strategic autonomy, multi-alignment, multi-vector – but the Indian right to what Henry Kissinger calls ‘freedom of manoeuvring’ must remain the same. This approach is not sitting on the fence, but actively making peaceful and positive improvements to the global order in India’s favour — targeted mini-laterals on cross-cutting transnational problems like anti-piracy and climate change foster trust and goodwill. Secondly, amid what Dr.Jaishankar calls “re-globalization” due to “supply chain reformulation”, de-risking is advisable. Economic globalization has ensured decoupling is a pyrrhic victory. Thirdly, INSTC, IMEC, and the Trilateral Highway offer resilient infrastructure and positive-sum gains in one of the least interconnected subcontinents globally. The idea of India being a “first responder” that Dr Jaishankar proposes is intriguing. Is this enforcement of a ‘net security provider’ in a regional order or simply a blue-water navy having a global presence to nip threats in the bud? Whatever the case, this is more of what Jaishankar calls “next-generational strategy” rather than mirroring present capabilities. India’s opportunities are like the ocean – limitless.

Dr Jaishankar is astute in saying “We cannot not rise”. 2025 symbolizes a very different world and requires an amalgam of choices. Lord Palmerston was right when he said there are only permanent interests of countries. This is why transactional relationships seem on the up-tick, particularly under Trump 2.0. Does this become the normal post-2025? Only time will tell. Delhi’s axiomatic path is Asian economic integration, “freedom of manoeuvre,” and pragmatic diplomacy to better tackle 2025.

Views expressed are personal