Unanswered Questions Remain
The resignation of Allahabad High Court judge Yashwant Varma has drawn a contentious episode to a formal close, but it leaves behind deeper institutional questions that cannot be so easily resolved. By stepping down, Justice Varma has rendered the ongoing impeachment proceedings infructuous, effectively ending Parliament’s role in adjudicating the matter. While resignation is within his constitutional right, the timing raises a critical concern: does such an exit allow the system to avoid a definitive conclusion? In a democracy governed by the rule of law, accountability is not merely procedural—it must also be visible. When serious allegations against a sitting judge culminate not in a verdict but in a resignation, the system risks appearing incomplete, if not evasive. The issue, therefore, is not just about one individual, but about whether the existing framework for judicial accountability is adequate to inspire public confidence.
The facts of the case have already unsettled that confidence. The recovery of burnt currency notes from the judge’s official residence following a fire in March 2025, the subsequent inquiry by an in-house panel, and the eventual move towards impeachment created an extraordinary situation for the judiciary. The Supreme Court’s decision to upload elements of the inquiry report, including visual evidence, marked a rare step towards transparency, signalling the seriousness with which the allegations were being treated. Yet, even as the process unfolded—from internal scrutiny to parliamentary action—it exposed the structural limitations of the current system. India’s Constitution makes the removal of judges deliberately difficult, requiring a rigorous impeachment process to safeguard judicial independence. But that very design, while essential, also renders the system slow and susceptible to disruption, as seen in this case.
Judicial independence is rightly regarded as a cornerstone of democracy. Judges must be insulated from political pressure to ensure they can uphold the Constitution without fear or favour. However, independence cannot be conflated with immunity. The Varma episode underscores the tension between these two principles. The in-house mechanism, though useful, lacks statutory backing and enforceability. Its findings, however serious, do not carry the force of law unless followed by impeachment—a process that is not only complex but also political in nature. When a judge resigns before the process reaches its conclusion, the system is left in a grey zone: there is neither a formal exoneration nor a conclusive finding of misconduct in the public domain. This ambiguity weakens the very trust that judicial independence seeks to protect.
This is not an isolated occurrence. India’s judicial history has seen similar instances where impeachment proceedings faltered or were rendered irrelevant due to resignation. From Justice V. Ramaswami to Justice Soumitra Sen, the pattern suggests that the current framework, while robust in theory, struggles in practice. It allows for accountability in principle but often fails to deliver closure in reality. This raises the need for systemic reform. One possible approach is to formalise the in-house inquiry mechanism through legislation, giving it clearer authority, defined timelines, and enforceable outcomes. Another is to revisit the idea of a judicial oversight body that operates independently of both the executive and the legislature, ensuring that complaints against judges are addressed in a credible and time-bound manner. Such reforms must be carefully designed to avoid undermining judicial autonomy, but the absence of reform carries its own risks.
Ultimately, the resignation of Justice Varma should not be seen as the end of a controversy, but as the beginning of a necessary institutional introspection. The judiciary derives its authority not only from constitutional provisions but also from public trust—a trust that depends on both independence and accountability. When proceedings end without resolution, that trust is inevitably tested. India’s democracy has matured to a point where it can no longer rely solely on convention and discretion to uphold institutional integrity. It requires transparent, predictable, and credible mechanisms that ensure justice is both done and seen to be done. The challenge, therefore, is not to choose between independence and accountability, but to strengthen both in tandem. Only then can the judiciary retain the moral authority that is essential to its role in a constitutional democracy.
