Shared Maritime Future
Over the past decade, India’s maritime outlook has undergone a quiet but consequential transformation. What began as a regional doctrine centred on the Indian Ocean has expanded into a broader strategic vision that reflects the country’s growing economic weight, naval capability, and geopolitical ambition. The evolution from SAGAR — Security and Growth for All in the Region — to the more expansive MAHASAGAR framework signals that New Delhi no longer views the seas merely as protective buffers or trade routes, but as arenas where influence, stability, and partnerships are actively shaped. In an era defined by contested waters, fragile supply chains, and climate-linked vulnerabilities, India’s maritime turn is less a choice than a necessity.
When Prime Minister Narendra Modi articulated SAGAR in 2015 during his visit to Mauritius, the doctrine responded to immediate regional realities. Piracy in the western Indian Ocean, illegal fishing, maritime terrorism, and the vulnerability of small island states demanded cooperative security. SAGAR framed India as a “net security provider” in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), offering patrol assistance, hydrographic surveys, training, and humanitarian aid. Over time, this approach translated into concrete mechanisms: the Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region enabled real-time maritime domain awareness; coordinated patrols with littoral states enhanced surveillance; and India’s swift humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions — from cyclone responses in Mozambique to water crises in the Maldives — built trust that hard power alone cannot buy. SAGAR’s success lay in its blend of reassurance and capability, positioning India as a partner rather than a patron.
Yet the strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific has changed dramatically since 2015. Intensifying great-power rivalry, expanding naval deployments, and the growing centrality of sea lanes to global supply chains have blurred the lines between regional and global maritime security. China’s expanding naval footprint in the Indian Ocean, the proliferation of dual-use ports, and rising competition over undersea resources have underscored the limits of a purely regional framework. Simultaneously, climate change has emerged as a maritime security issue in its own right, threatening island nations with rising seas and extreme weather. In this context, MAHASAGAR — Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions — unveiled in 2025, represents a strategic widening of India’s maritime lens. It retains SAGAR’s cooperative ethos but integrates economic connectivity, technological collaboration, environmental resilience, and engagement with Southeast Asia, Africa, and the wider Global South.
The shift from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR is not merely semantic; it reflects India’s recognition that maritime influence today is exercised through networks rather than dominance. Port development partnerships in countries such as Seychelles and Mauritius, coastal radar systems across the Indian Ocean, and logistics agreements with multiple navies demonstrate a strategy built on interoperability and shared capacity. India’s expanding naval exercises — from bilateral drills with Australia, France, and Indonesia to multilateral engagements — reinforce a rules-based maritime order without overt bloc politics. This balancing act is central to India’s diplomatic identity: it seeks to deter coercion while avoiding the perception of alignment. MAHASAGAR’s emphasis on the blue economy, sustainable fisheries, and clean energy corridors also signals that maritime diplomacy is no longer confined to warships; it now encompasses development, technology, and ecological stewardship.
Exercise Milan 2026 in Visakhapatnam offers a vivid illustration of this evolving doctrine in practice. What began in the 1990s as a modest gathering of friendly navies has grown into one of the Indo-Pacific’s most significant multilateral maritime engagements. The scale of participation underscores India’s convening power, but the deeper significance lies in the agenda: complex interoperability drills, discussions on maritime law, blue economy cooperation, and coordinated humanitarian responses. Milan embodies the MAHASAGAR ethos — a platform where tactical exercises coexist with strategic dialogue, and where smaller navies find space alongside major powers. In doing so, India positions itself not as a hegemon but as a facilitator of maritime cooperation. This distinction matters in a region wary of domination yet anxious about instability.
Ultimately, the journey from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR marks a decade of strategic maturation. India is moving from a reactive maritime posture to a proactive role in shaping norms, partnerships, and governance across the Indo-Pacific. The challenge ahead will be sustaining credibility: ensuring that capacity keeps pace with ambition, that partnerships remain inclusive, and that maritime initiatives deliver tangible benefits to smaller states. Sea power in the twenty-first century is measured not only by fleets but by trust, connectivity, and resilience. If India can align its naval capabilities with its cooperative philosophy, it may well emerge as a stabilising force in turbulent waters — not by dominating the seas, but by helping ensure they remain open, secure, and shared.
