Deterrence Through Dialogue
The repeated airspace violations reported by Estonia and Poland in recent weeks underline how fragile Europe’s eastern security architecture has become. Three Russian fighter jets entering Estonian airspace and twenty drones straying into Poland in September may not sound like full-scale aggression, but they are deliberate provocations intended to test NATO’s resolve. Moscow’s denials are predictable, yet they fool no one in Brussels. The decision by Estonia to invoke Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty — the second time in two weeks that a member has done so — demonstrates the gravity with which such incidents are viewed. Article 4 consultations do not mean automatic retaliation, but they put urgent security matters on the alliance’s table, forcing a collective conversation that itself acts as a deterrent. For small states like Estonia and Poland, which share historical anxieties about Russian expansionism, such formal consultations are not merely bureaucratic rituals but essential steps to ensure that their concerns are heard and that NATO maintains a united front.
The invocation of Article 4 must also be understood in its broader political and strategic context. Since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO’s eastern flank has remained the most vulnerable pressure point in Europe. The use of drones, fighter jets, or unmarked operatives to violate borders reflects a pattern of hybrid aggression designed to destabilise without crossing the clear red line of outright invasion. By seeking consultations under Article 4, countries like Estonia and Poland ensure that such incursions are not normalised or ignored. It is telling that Article 4, used only nine times since 1949, has now been invoked twice within a fortnight. This reflects the rising tempo of Russian provocations and NATO’s recognition that deterrence is not just about tanks and missiles but about political solidarity. Eastern Sentry, the operation launched to reinforce NATO’s presence after the drone incident, illustrates how Article 4 can translate into tangible military measures, even if it stops short of the alliance’s collective defence guarantee under Article 5.
Still, NATO must tread carefully. Article 4 is not a prelude to Article 5, nor should it be interpreted as an automatic escalation ladder. Article 5 has been invoked only once in the alliance’s history, after the 9/11 attacks, and remains the bedrock of NATO’s credibility. To use it rashly would be to risk a confrontation with Russia, which no member state seeks. Yet failing to respond decisively to repeated airspace violations risks emboldening Moscow. The real challenge for NATO lies in calibrating its deterrence: demonstrating resolve without sleepwalking into a wider conflict. That requires not only reinforcing defences along the eastern flank but also building public resilience across member states, ensuring that Russia’s tactics of intimidation, disinformation, and provocation do not fracture allied unity. Article 4, therefore, should be seen not as a sign of weakness or hesitation, but as a mechanism that allows allies to deliberate, coordinate, and prepare before crises spiral. In the months ahead, with war grinding on in Ukraine and tensions unlikely to subside, Article 4 will remain NATO’s first line of defence — a reminder that vigilance and solidarity are as critical as firepower in keeping the peace.
