Calibrated Normalisation
The latest assessment by the United States Department of War on China’s military and strategic behaviour offers an interesting, though incomplete, lens through which to view the evolving India–China relationship. The report suggests that Beijing is seeking to leverage the recent de-escalation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to stabilise ties with New Delhi and, in doing so, prevent a further tightening of India’s partnership with Washington. There is a degree of plausibility in this reading. China has long shown a preference for managing tensions with neighbours when it perceives strategic costs elsewhere. However, the temptation to reduce India’s choices to a binary of alignment or avoidance risks underestimates India’s strategic autonomy. New Delhi’s engagement with China since the Ladakh disengagement has been cautious, calibrated and transactional. The reopening of visas, resumption of flights, and revival of people-to-people exchanges signal a willingness to restore functional normalcy, not an eagerness to reset the relationship wholesale. India’s approach reflects a hard-learned lesson from recent years: engagement and vigilance must proceed in parallel, not as alternatives.
The disengagement in eastern Ladakh, announced in October last year and followed by a meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit, undoubtedly lowered the immediate risk of military escalation. Monthly diplomatic and military-level talks since then have helped reopen channels that were frozen during the four-year standoff. For India, this de-escalation was necessary but not sufficient. The absence of active confrontation does not erase the deeper trust deficit created by China’s actions since 2020, nor does it resolve the underlying boundary dispute. While Beijing may see stabilisation as a means to refocus on larger strategic contests, New Delhi views it primarily as a means of risk management. India’s consent to incremental normalisation has been shaped by domestic political expectations, economic considerations and regional responsibilities. The reopening of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and direct flights caters to public sentiment and economic logic, but it does not signal a dilution of India’s core concerns on territorial integrity. Normalisation, from India’s perspective, remains conditional and reversible.
The report’s broader framing of China’s national strategy—centred on “rejuvenation” by 2049 and the defence of expanding “core interests”—deserves close scrutiny in India. Beijing’s willingness to label Arunachal Pradesh as part of its core interests underscores why Indian scepticism remains justified. The expansion of this concept to include contested territories suggests that China views sovereignty claims not as matters for compromise but as instruments of long-term pressure. For India, this reality necessitates a dual strategy: maintaining dialogue to prevent miscalculation while strengthening deterrence and border infrastructure to ensure that peace is not merely dependent on Chinese restraint. At the same time, India cannot afford to let its China policy be shaped primarily by third-party interpretations, whether American or otherwise. The US assessment reflects Washington’s global priorities, particularly its desire to manage competition with China without open confrontation. India’s priorities are more immediate and territorial, rooted in geography rather than ideology.
Equally noteworthy is the report’s assertion that US–China relations have improved under President Donald Trump, accompanied by an emphasis on military-to-military communication and strategic stability. For India, this evolving dynamic carries both reassurance and risk. On one hand, reduced US–China hostility could lower pressures on the Indo-Pacific and reduce the likelihood of regional crises. On the other hand, it reinforces the need for India to hedge against uncertainty, recognising that great-power equations are fluid and interest-driven. India’s deepening ties with the US are not aimed at containing China but at enhancing India’s own capabilities, resilience and options. Strategic partnerships, whether with Washington, Tokyo or others, are tools of capacity-building rather than substitutes for independent judgment. The challenge for New Delhi lies in sustaining engagement with Beijing without compromising deterrence, while simultaneously strengthening partnerships without becoming entangled in external rivalries. The path ahead is narrow but navigable. Stability along the LAC is welcome, but it must be anchored in verifiable actions and long-term behavioural change, not assumptions about intent. India’s response, therefore, must remain steady, sceptical where necessary, and firmly rooted in its own national interest.
