Anatomy of Power
Israel’s targeted strikes on Iran’s top leadership mark one of the most dramatic escalations in West Asia in recent decades, raising a fundamental question: can a state be destabilised—or even dismantled—by decapitating its leadership? The killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, followed by the elimination of key figures such as Ali Larijani and several senior military and political leaders, signals a strategic shift from conventional warfare to leadership-centric disruption. At one level, the strikes appear to have achieved their immediate objective—disorienting Iran’s command structure. But beneath the headlines lies a more complex reality. States, particularly those built on ideological foundations like the Islamic Republic of Iran, are rarely as fragile as they appear. The assumption that removing top leaders will automatically trigger collapse often underestimates the depth and resilience of institutional structures that sustain such regimes.
The swift elevation of Mojtaba Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader reflects both continuity and uncertainty. Unlike his father, Mojtaba lacks a formal political track record and the clerical legitimacy that Ayatollah Khamenei had accumulated over decades. His close ties with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) may provide him with a power base, but they also underscore a shift in the balance of authority—from clerical dominance to military influence. His absence from public view following the strikes, coupled with reports of personal loss and possible injury, has only deepened speculation about his ability to consolidate control. Israeli claims that Iran’s leadership is in disarray may not be entirely unfounded in the immediate aftermath. Yet, history cautions against equating temporary disruption with systemic breakdown. Power vacuums in such systems are rarely left unfilled for long.
Indeed, if there is one institution that appears poised to benefit from the current flux, it is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Long regarded as the second pillar of power after the Supreme Leader, the IRGC has steadily expanded its influence across military, political, and economic domains. In the present context, it may well have become the central node of authority. Analysts suggesting that “the Revolutionary Guard is the state” capture a reality that has been evolving over the years, but is now being accelerated by the crisis. The Guard’s control over strategic assets, its command of proxy networks across the region, and its ideological commitment to the regime position it as the ultimate guarantor of continuity. In effect, Iran may be transitioning—gradually but decisively—from a clerically anchored theocracy to a more securitised, military-driven state.
At the same time, the notion that Iran’s military and governance systems are collapsing under pressure is far from settled. Statements by Iranian officials indicating that military units are operating with a degree of autonomy suggest decentralisation rather than disintegration. This is not necessarily a sign of weakness; rather, it may reflect pre-existing contingency planning for precisely such scenarios. The Islamic Republic has, over decades, prepared for external aggression by developing layered command structures and redundancies. The idea that eliminating a handful—or even dozens—of senior leaders would paralyse the system overlooks this institutional depth. As some analysts point out, Iran is not a loosely organised militant network but a state with bureaucratic continuity, ideological cohesion, and a capacity to regenerate leadership from within.
The larger lesson from this unfolding crisis lies in the limits of leadership decapitation as a strategy. While it can create shock and disrupt decision-making in the short term, it does not necessarily dismantle the underlying architecture of power. In some cases, it may even harden regimes, pushing them towards greater centralisation and militarisation. For the region, this raises troubling prospects. A weakened but not collapsed Iran could become more unpredictable, its actions driven less by calibrated policy and more by fragmented or radicalised centres of power. For the wider world, the episode underscores the need for a more nuanced understanding of state resilience in the face of external pressure. Wars may be fought with precision strikes and intelligence-led operations, but their outcomes are ultimately shaped by deeper political and institutional realities—realities that cannot be erased as easily as individual leaders.
