Who Owns the Hills?

For decades, North-East India, comprising seven states – the ‘seven sisters’ – has been plagued with racial conflicts between indigenous tribes and non-tribal settlers. Conflicts among different tribes are also common. But vote bank politics has added a communal dimension to the existing conflicts and transformed the North-East Indian states into a simmering cauldron of communal violence between the indigenous tribes and the Bangladeshi immigrants who have migrated into Indian territory. The recent conflict between Karbi tribes and non-tribal settlers (mostly Bengali and Bihari), over land rights in the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Region governed by the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council (KAAC) in Assam, is the latest addition to the long list of racial and communal conflicts in the North-Eastern states, which share crucial land borders with China, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan.

In December, members of the indigenous Karbi community had been on an indefinite hunger strike at Phelangpi, situated in the West Karbi Anglong district of Assam, to demand the eviction of settlers whom they accused of occupying their land. Tension escalated sharply on December 22 when the authorities moved in to clear the protesters. Many people were injured in clashes between protesters and the police. Two were killed, one allegedly in police firing and the other during arson. The situation worsened, after which the authorities deployed more security personnel, ordered a curfew, and snapped the internet in Karbi Anglong, reports NDTV.

Genesis of the conflict

The Karbi community members have been alleging encroachment by non-tribal communities such as Bihari, Nepali, and Bengali, of over 7,184 acres of protected land. They demanded the eviction of settlers whom they accused of occupying their land, namely village grazing reserve (VGR) and professional grazing reserve (PGR), which are protected under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution that safeguards tribal land rights. They also voiced their anger against Tuliram Ronghang, the Chief Executive Member of the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council, who is known to be a close aide of Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma. On December 22, the protestors torched his ancestral residence for Ronghang’s alleged failure to evict “outsiders”.

Protests started in 2024 after a Bihari Nonia community organisation – the Rachnatmak Nonia Sanyukta Sangh (RNSS) – submitted a memorandum to the President of India on January 17, 2024, seeking legalisation (de-reservation) of settlements established before 2011 on VGR/PGR lands in Karbi Anglong. Karbi communities perceived this as a dilution of Sixth Schedule protections and a threat to tribal land security. The memorandum intensified existing land disputes, leading to protests, clashes between Karbis and settlers, and subsequent eviction notices by the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council (KAAC) in 2020.

Village grazing reserve (VGR) and professional grazing reserve (PGR) lands are traditionally reserved for livestock grazing, dating back to British colonial land policies, and are crucial for tribal livelihoods. The PGR was announced by the British government in 1933, and its boundary was demarcated in 1946. The KAAC said that the decision was in line with a Supreme Court order and the Karbi Anglong (Land & Revenue) Act of 1953.

The root of the present conflict lies in the complex political history of the region. The term Karbi Anglong literally means “Karbi Hills”. Karbi is the name of the indigenous tribe living in and around the region. Anglong is a homonym in the Karbi language for hills and mountains. The Karbis or Mikir are a Tibeto-Burman ethnic group in Northeast India. They are mostly concentrated in the hill districts of Karbi Anglong and West Karbi Anglong of Assam. Before the British invasion, the major hill tribes of the present North-Eastern states lived without much outside interference. They were not a part of any properly established external government or kingdom.

Under British rule, with the Frontier Regulation Act of 1884, the Mikir Hills tract was made a part of the administrative district of Nowgong. Till then, there was no administrative boundary of the erstwhile Mikir Hills or the present-day districts of Karbi Anglong and West Karbi Anglong. Essentially, the tribes governed themselves via their traditional systems, except for being asked to participate in imperial interests such as taxation and road-building.

Importance of the 6th Schedule to the indigenous tribes of North-East

During the formulation of the Constitution of India, the Sixth Schedule was devised to continue with their traditional system of governance, providing the tribes autonomy and allowing them to continue their own traditional systems of self-governance. The tribal areas in other parts of India were covered by a parallel Fifth Schedule with somewhat weaker forms of autonomy. The difference was justified by B. R. Ambedkar in the following words: “The tribal people in areas other than Assam are more or less Hinduised, more or less assimilated with the civilisation and culture of the majority of the people in whose midst they live. About the tribals in Assam, that is not the case. Their roots are still in their own civilisation and their own culture. I think that is the main distinction which influenced us to have a different sort of scheme for Assam from the one we have provided for other territories.”

Between 1951 and 2003, a total of ten autonomous district councils were formed in the North-Eastern states. The Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council (KAAC) in Assam was formed in 1952. A few other indigenous tribes of North-East – Maran, Motok, and Kalita communities – are also demanding separate councils under the 6th Schedule. The Karbi issue may trigger long-term violence as observed in Manipur, where ethnic violence since May 2023 has displaced over 70,000 people and claimed more than 300 lives. Some Kuki leaders, backed by militant groups, have repeatedly called for a “separate administration,” arguing they can no longer coexist peacefully amid perceived bias, violence, and threats to their identity. Kukis migrated from neighbouring Burma (now Myanmar) over centuries, with significant settlements occurring in the 19th century. Furthermore, after Manipur’s merger with India in 1949, there were instances of Kuki refugees entering the state amid regional instability.

Political analysts observe that the chilling slogan amid escalating protests, “Karbi Chinese, go back,” allegedly shouted by non-tribal residents during clashes in the Kheroni region, represents one of the most unfortunate and heartbreaking developments in the ongoing struggle for indigenous rights. Many fear tomorrow, it could echo in Bodoland, Dima Hasao, or other Sixth Schedule areas where tribal communities face migration pressures.

Engineering jingoism using selective racial slurs

Research suggests that slurs are a fundamental and highly effective form of hate speech, serving as a powerful tool in the propagation of xenophobic attitudes both in online environments and real-world interactions. A group levying a slur hopes to inflict psychological damage on the targeted group, minimising or eradicating competition and potentially boosting the self-image of the group inflicting the slur.

During the recent unrest in Karbi Anglong, it is reported that a section of non-tribal people has used racist slurs like “Karbi Chinese go back” during the unrest. It may be recalled that during the COVID-19 pandemic, terms like “Chinese Virus” were used by political figures to fuel anti-Asian xenophobia and portray them as a national security threat, affecting migrants from the North-East. Many of them, who were already used to the racial slurs “chinki”, “momo”, or “Chinese”, then became “corona”. Anjel Chakma, a 24-year-old MBA student from Tripura, died after being brutally attacked in Dehradun, Uttarakhand, for objecting to racial slurs related to his Northeast Indian appearance. The attackers allegedly used derogatory terms like “Chinese”, “Chinki”, and “momo”. “I am not Chinese... I am an Indian,” were his last words when a violent racist mob attacked him on December 9, 2025.

“Rohingya” and “Bangladeshi” are two additional slurs that are primarily used against Bengali-speaking citizens to engineer xenophobia against Bangladesh and to whip Islamophobia among Indians. The “Bangladeshi” slur – a toxic narrative – is stalking Bengalis everywhere. Even in Kolkata, a space that should have been safe, the toxic “Bangladeshi” slur has gained a foothold.

Chairman of the West Bengal Migrant Workers Welfare Board and Member of Parliament, Rajya Sabha, Samirul Islam, while addressing a press conference on December 29, 2025, alleged that “the Board has received 1,143 complaints of harassment against Bengali-speaking migrants in the past 10 months. Around 95 people were detained for speaking in Bengali in BJP-ruled states under suspicion of being Bangladeshis, but everyone among them turned out to be Indians,” Islam said. Juyel Rana (19), who had gone to Odisha for work, was allegedly attacked by a group of people and killed. Earlier, Sunali Khatun (25), a pregnant woman who, along with two of her family members and others, was pushed into Bangladesh in June 2025 on suspicion of being an illegal immigrant, returned to India on December 6 with her eight-year-old son following the Supreme Court’s intervention.

The selective racial slurs used against people of West Bengal and North-Eastern states reveal a well-planned pattern to engineer xenophobia among Indians against China and Bangladesh at a time when defence analysts fear a new power axis between China and Bangladesh is being developed against India. On December 11, Bangladesh foreign affairs adviser Md Touhid Hossain said it is “strategically possible” for Dhaka to join a regional grouping with Pakistan that excludes India, amid signals from Islamabad about forming a new trilateral initiative with China and Bangladesh.

Bangladesh-Myanmar: India’s new soft adversaries

Contrary to Bangladesh’s expectations, China will not jeopardise its deep economic relations with India. Despite unresolved border disputes, China is India’s largest source of imports and India’s exports largely depend on Chinese inputs. In 2025, India’s inbound shipments from China are estimated at $123.5 billion, resulting in a projected rise of trade deficit to $106 billion from $64.7 billion in 2021. China will not sacrifice this expanding Indian market for Bangladesh. With Pakistan, China’s relationship is both economic and strategic due to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Apparently, after the last war in May, where Pakistan received enormous military support from China, India has also been cautious of its historic animosity with Pakistan. Suggestively, India’s exports to Pakistan crossed Rs 1,037 crore in the last six months (June–November), while imports from Pakistan remained below Rs 1 crore. Lately, the Chinese Foreign Minister claimed that China had mediated between India and Pakistan for a ceasefire in May 2025. Earlier, the US President Trump made a similar assertion, on multiple occasions in various forums across several countries, that he personally intervened to halt Operation Sindoor on May 10, 2025.

Bangladesh is facing a serious political crisis before the scheduled election in February. Another neighbouring country, Myanmar, has also been devastated by a prolonged civil war for the last five years. Though its pro-China military regime has held elections last week, the anti-junta rebels are not satisfied with the election process. Myanmar’s rebels are not satisfied with the country’s election that began on December 28, said representatives of multiple rebel groups from Karen and Arakan (Rakhine) states on Monday (December 29, 2025). Speaking at an event at the Centre for Policy Research (CPR), Delhi, representatives of Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), Anti-Sham Election Campaign Committee and All Arakan Students’ and Youths’ Congress of Burma (AASYC) expressed hope that India, the U.K., and the EU would not recognise the outcome of the poll by the junta and accused the Chinese government of encouraging the military regime.

Added to these developments in Bangladesh and Myanmar, the Revision (SIR) conducted by the Election Commission of India (ECI) in West Bengal has created panic and political unrest in this Indian state, which shares the largest land border with Bangladesh. Apparently, India’s political establishment now wants to shift the war zone away from its major business and political centres at Delhi, Chandigarh, Mumbai, and Ahmedabad bordering Pakistan to the peripheries bordering Bangladesh and Myanmar. A war-like condition with these politically fragile neighbours will immensely benefit the ruling Hindu nationalist party in the upcoming assembly elections in West Bengal and Assam. It may also help to control rebel ethnic groups in the North-Eastern states.

As the Burmese people are also linguistically related to Tibetans and Chinese as part of the vast Sino-Tibetan language family, racist slurs like “Bangladeshi”, “Rohingya”, “Kangladesh” and “Chinese” suit these xenophobic narratives aimed at the softer adversaries.