Fragments beyond Repair?

On May 14, 2025, Baloch leader Mir Yar Baloch declared Baluchistan’s independence, citing decades of oppression and abandonment by the Pakistani state. The announcement was made alongside a plea for recognition and support from international countries like India and global institutions such as the United Nations. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has stepped up operations, which marked a fresh drive for sovereignty. The Pakistani state has dismissed the declaration as illegal and a menace to national cohesion. Military campaigns have been stepped up in the area to crush the secessionist movement.

Balochistan is one of the key provinces of Pakistan which comprises four provinces Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, Islamabad Capital Territory, and two disputed territories—Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Gilgit–Baltistan.

Though Urdu is the national language and the lingua franca sharing official status with English, Punjabi is the dominant language of Pakistan. As per 2023 census, the major languages of Pakistan (spoken by over 2 per cent of population) are: Punjabi (36.98 per cent), Pashto (18.15 per cent), Sindhi (14.31 per cent), Saraiki (12 per cent), Urdu (9.25 per cent), Balochi (3.38 per cent) and Hindko (2.32 per cent). Bengalis were a 50 per cent-plus majority till 1971.

When the Constitution of Pakistan was promulgated in 1956, Iskander Ali Mirza became the country’s first president from 1956 to 1958. The coalition of the Awami League, the Muslim League, and the Republican Party endorsed his presidency. On October 8, 1958, President Mirza announced via national radio that he was introducing a new constitution that would be “more suited to the genius of the Pakistan nation” and imposed martial law in Pakistan. He appointed the then-Army Commander of the Pakistan Army, General Ayub Khan, as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). Within three weeks, Ayub dispatched the military unit to enter the presidential palace on the midnight of October 26–27, 1958, and placed president Ali Mirza in an airplane to be exiled to England. Ali Mirza died in London and was buried in Iran in 1969.

Significantly, Iskandar Ali Mirza was a descendant of Mir Jafar who served as the commander of the Bengali army under Siraj ud-Daulah (Nawab of Bengal), but betrayed him during the Battle of Plassey and ascended to the throne after the British victory in 1757. Many political analysts believe that Ali Mirza was responsible for weakening democracy and causing political instability in the country.

Internal Colonialism in Pakistan

Political commentators argue that though the social fabric of Pakistan is complex and multifaceted, woven from diverse ethnicities, languages, and cultures, the Punjabi community holds a distinctive position, often perceived as the dominant ethnic group within the country’s socio-political landscape. This dominance has given rise to what many describe as a Punjabi superiority complex, a phenomenon that significantly influences inter-ethnic relations and perpetuates racial discrimination. Punjab, the most populous province of Pakistan, has historically been the centre of political power and economic activity. The British colonial administration favoured Punjabis for recruitment into the military and civil services, laying the foundation for their dominant role in the post-independence era. After 1947, Punjabis continued to wield significant influence over Pakistan’s military, bureaucracy, and political institutions. According to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Punjabis make up approximately 44 per cent of the country’s population, but their representation in key state apparatuses far exceeds this demographic proportion. The perceived influence and deemed superiority of Punjabis manifests in various forms, ranging from cultural hegemony to economic advantages and political dominance.

Punjab has long been the crucial component that has sustained military hegemony. Majority of the military rank-and-file and top brass have been recruited from Punjab. Establishment of hegemony has been based on a dominant ideology that has privileged Islam and Urdu whilst criminalising national assertion by Bengali, Baloch, Pakhtun, Sindhi and other ethnic groups. Alongside questions of identi­ty, the oppression of non-Punjabi peripheries has pivoted on the allocation of economic resources and control over the state apparatus, observes Dawn.

Colonialism never left South Asia. It only transformed itself into internal colonialism after independence. This is true for both India (D Dey, 2019) and Pakistan (Q Abbas, 2025). Pakistan’s ruling elites have carved out a unique system to govern and thrive, which has been instrumental in sustaining their power and control during the last seven decades. The postcolonial history of Pakistan narrates dynamics of internal colonialism where a new kind of operational mechanism was introduced to maintain the colonial structure, allowing for a heavy control by the Centre to rule the peripheral areas. An unholy alliance of the landed aristocracy, army and bureaucracy emerged to colonise weaker provinces and communities, their economies, cultures, and languages, writes Qaisar Abbas.

The first province that came out of this colonial hegemonic structure of Pakistan was East Pakistan (East Bengal till 1955). Bangladesh emerged as an independent nation-state through the Liberation War of 1971, when it officially separated from Pakistan. Cultural resistance through Bengali poetry and songs gave an impetus to the armed resistance for national liberation against the ‘internal colonisation’ of Pakistan. Within two or three years of the creation of Pakistan, a severe food crisis occurred in certain areas of East Bengal as the newly created state failed to bring about any significant socio-economic changes to its people’s lives. Increasingly, the people of East Bengal faced economic, political and cultural oppression under the internal colonial rule of West Pakistan. Against this backdrop, and in response to the imposition of Urdu as the only state language of Pakistan, the Bangla Language Movement reached its climax on February 21, 1952, culminating in a nationalist movement seeking national liberation. Denial of Bengali participation in the decision making process, economic disparity, cultural subjugation and repressive measures gave rise to the politics of regionalism in East Pakistan, writes Khan, RH (2024).

Political Unrest in Provinces

Pakistan has failed to keep its provinces and territories united. The Baluch’s are living as a minority on their own land and continue to face persecution at the hands of the Pakistan Army and spy agencies. The discontents against Pakistan government are also spreading to other two provinces—Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Several pro-independence organisations like Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM), World Sindhi Congress, and Jeay Sindh Freedom Movement have gained a wider support base within Sindh and international platform. The Pashtuns, like the rest of disenchanted Pakistan citizens, have lost faith in the government.

Baluch: Historically, the legal status of Kalat (as most of Balochistan was then called) was different from that of other 560 odd princely states of the subcontinent. Under an 1876 treaty between Kalat and British rulers, the British Empire committed to recognise and respect Kalat’s independence. At a round table conference held in Delhi on August 4, 1947—attended by Lord Mountbatten, the Khan of Kalat, chief minister of Kalat and Mohd Ali Jinnah—it was decided that “Kalat State will be independent on August 5, 1947, enjoying the same status as it originally held in 1838, having friendly relations with its neighbours.” Based on these agreements, the Khan issued a formal proclamation on August 12, 1947, effective from August 15, declaring the independence of Kalat. Despite all this, on March 27, 1948, the Pakistan Army invaded Kalat. The Khan surrendered, was taken to Karachi and forced to sign the instrument of accession. This was accepted by Pakistan on March 30, 1948. So ended the 227 days’ independence of the Kalat confederacy. Balochistan province in Pakistan was officially established on July 1, 1970 after the dissolution of the West Pakistan province and the end of the “One Unit” system.

Since India launched Operation Sindoor on May 7, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has intensified its demand for independence. Baluchistan’s provincial capital, Quetta, has seen a series of attacks. Recently, two strikes by BLA rebels resulted in the death of 14 Pakistani soldiers. Before this upsurge, the hijacking of the Jaffar Express had made global headlines where at least 64 people, including 18 soldiers and 33 attackers, were killed, and 38 others were injured. Recently, a strategically important gas pipeline was blown up by the rebels.

In a press release dated May 13, BLA has claimed responsibility for seven coordinated attacks across several districts in Pakistan. The rebel group stated that these attacks were part of a campaign named ‘Operation Herof 2.0’, which involved a total of 78 operations conducted at 58 locations. A statement called the operations as a continuation of their resistance aimed to end what they describe as the “occupation” of Balochistan by Pakistan. According to the statement, BLA fighters reportedly took control of the highway at Ornach Cross in the Khuzdar district for over two hours on Saturday (May 10) night. During this time, they carried out vehicle checks and intercepted vehicles with natural resources from the region.

Sindh: On April 1, 1936, Sindh was separated from the Bombay Presidency and given the status of a province, with Karachi as the provincial capital. In August 1947, Sindh became part of Pakistan. In 1948, Karachi city separated from Sind to form the Federal Capital Territory of Pakistan. Sindh was merged into the new province of West Pakistan on October 14, 1955. Until 1959, Karachi was the capital of Pakistan when the military president, Ayub Khan, decided to build a new capital, Islamabad, in the north of Pakistan. The province of Sindh was established in 1970. It is alleged that the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs, who migrated from India after the Partition, have become the most persecuted and abandoned minority. What began as political marginalisation has evolved into a state-sponsored campaign of violence, exclusion, and erasure. The military-police crackdown during the infamous 1992 ‘Operation Clean-Up’ left thousands dead and millions terrified. Cities like Karachi and Hyderabad were effectively turned into open-air prisons for an entire ethnic community.

On Wednesday (May 21), violent protests erupted in Sindh over controversial canal construction projects on the Indus river, leaving at least two dead and several injured. Protesters set fire to the house of Sindh Home Minister Ziaul Hassan Lanjar on Tuesday (May 20) during a demonstration. The unrest was led by the Sindhi Saba Nationalist Party, which has accused Islamabad of ignoring Sindh’s water rights and trying to divert resources under the guise of development. The government is increasingly seen by its provinces as extractive and indifferent to regional grievances.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: The name “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa” was brought into effect for the North-West Frontier Province in April 2010. The province was created in 1901 during British rule when it was separated from a Punjab province of the British India Empire. A referendum was held in the North West Frontier Province on July 2, 1947. The majority of voters wanted to join Pakistan, with only a very small number voting to join with India. The province became a part of Pakistan, because of this referendum.

Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province has witnessed 284 terrorist incidents so far in 2025. This north western province remained one of the hardest hit in the country by militancy. A report by the Counter-Terrorism Department of Pakistan said that 148 terrorists have been killed across the province so far this year, with the highest number, 67, reported in Dera Ismail Khan, the home district of Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur. In 2024, 732 attacks were reported in the province, up from 651 in 2023. This marked the highest number of attacks since 2009 and 2010, reports Deccan Herald.

Integrating Peripheries through CPEC

It is argued that the CPEC aims to integrate Pakistan’s peripheral provinces into the core economic system through infrastructure development, energy projects, industrialisation, and improved connectivity. Reportedly, amid India-Pakistan tensions, China is building the world’s fifth highest dam in Pakistan’s north western Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. At present, it assumes considerable significance, given the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty. In this river system, India is the upper riparian state (from where the water flows), while Pakistan is the lower riparian state.

On the other hand, CPEC offers China substantial strategic and economic gains, primarily by providing a route to the Arabian Sea, bypassing the Malacca Strait, and boosting trade with Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Both China and Pakistan now want to extend CPEC to Afghanistan. On May 21, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to expand the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan during a trilateral meeting in Beijing, reported Reuters.

Significantly, China wants to integrate CPEC with the Wakhan Corridor—the chicken neck of Afghanistan. Just 13 kilometres wide at its narrowest, Wakhan Corridor—a 330-kilometre-long corridor—is one of the most remote areas on Earth and connects Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province to China’s Xinjiang region. It also separates Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region to the north from Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir’s Gilgit Baltistan region to the south. China’s Xinjiang region, which is central to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is vital for China’s broader strategic goals. China is concerned about cross-border Islamist militant activities that could spill over into Xinjiang. The Wakhan Corridor provides a critical buffer zone. Through its engagement in infrastructure and trade projects, China seeks to expand its influence in Central and South Asia.

The northern highlands of Pakistan’s Chitral region (in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) offer a strategic trade route linking Pakistan with Afghanistan and the Central Asian states via the Wakhan Corridor. It presents an underexplored yet highly promising gateway for trans regional trade and integration.

A 2016 conference organised by the Chitral Chamber of Commerce and wIndustry urged the federal government to construct a CPEC route through the district. Advocates argue that this path not only enhances security and reduces distance to Central Asia but also promises socio economic upliftment for the remote region. The proposed alternate route envisions connecting Pakistan’s northern highland to Afghanistan and further into Central Asia. Originating from Gwadar, the route would traverse through key cities across Pakistan, eventually reaching Chitral. From there, it would extend through the historic Broghol Pass into Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor and link further into Central Asian states. This pathway offers a strategic conduit for trade and economic exchange, transforming Chitral into a pivotal economic hub, observes Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research, Pakistan. In its efforts to uplift the remote region, the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) initiated the development of Chitral Economic Zone (CEZ) in Pakistan’s northernmost region of Chitral.

Observations

Political disintegration of Pakistan at this stage looks a remote possibility, as extension of CPEC to Afghanistan and its amalgamation with Waghan Corridor, which connects Xinjiang with the Arabian sea at Gwadar port, is vital for China’s broader strategic goals. China will extend all possible help to Pakistan to ensure smooth implementation of CPEC and its extension. China’s support to Myanmar’s repressive military junta, to safeguard the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), is a case in point.

The writer is a professor of Business Administration who primarily writes on political economy, global trade, and sustainable development Views expressed are personal