Perilous Convergence

The Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP), an affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has over time become one of the most lethal terrorist organisations in South and Central Asia since its establishment in 2015. Operating across both sides of the Durand Line in Afghanistan and Pakistan, ISKP has expanded its influence, posing a serious threat to regional stability. Initially viewed with suspicion by Pakistan’s security establishment, the group has gradually been courted by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to serve Pakistan’s strategic objectives. This convergence has reshaped terrorism in South Asia and introduced new threats to India and neighbouring countries.

ISKP emerged when emissaries of the Islamic State reached out to defectors from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Afghan Taliban, and other militant outfits to form a Khorasan branch dedicated to advancing a global Caliphate. The region—covering parts of modern Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asia—was chosen for its symbolic significance and strategic location.

ISKP made swift territorial gains in its early years, notably in Nangarhar province, before being pushed back by the Afghan Taliban. Unlike al-Qaeda, which cooperated with the Taliban, ISKP has remained locked in rivalry with it—competing for recruits, resources, and legitimacy as the leading jihadist force in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s ISI has long used militant groups as tools of foreign policy—to secure strategic depth in Afghanistan and wage asymmetric warfare against India. The Taliban’s return to power in 2021 presented a dilemma for Islamabad. Once a dependent ally, the Taliban began asserting autonomy and rejecting Pakistani interference. To retain leverage, ISI turned to ISKP as a proxy instrument to counter both the Taliban and the TTP.

Cultivating ISKP served several purposes for Pakistan. It acted as a counterweight to the Taliban, deterred the TTP from turning its guns too forcefully on the Pakistani state, and provided a deniable channel for anti-India operations. This tactical convergence reflects the adaptability of Pakistan’s proxy-war model, even as it fuels instability across the region.

Evidence of ISI-ISKP cooperation has grown. Many early ISKP leaders, including its first four Emirs, were Pakistani nationals. In 2024, Dr Naseem Baloch, Chairman of the Baloch National Movement, told the United Nations that Pakistani officials were training and supervising international terror groups, including ISKP, in Balochistan. His statement reinforced suspicions of Islamabad’s covert sponsorship.

Further corroboration came from former TTP spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan, who revealed that ISI’s coordination with ISKP was formalised under the “Dabori Agreement,” named after Orakzai district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—the birthplace of ISKP’s first Emir, Hafiz Saeed Khan Orakzai. The deal facilitated operational cooperation and sanctuary for ISKP within Pakistan. Notably, Islamabad has never mounted a serious military campaign against ISKP, despite its growing footprint.

One of the most alarming developments is ISKP’s outreach to India. The group claimed responsibility for the March 2020 attack on a Sikh Gurdwara in Kabul—one assailant was from Kerala. In 2022, its English-language propaganda magazine Voice of Khorasan claimed connections with suspects in the Coimbatore and Mangalore blasts. Such attempts to recruit Indian nationals and radicalise youth through online propaganda signal a worrying new front in cross-border terrorism.

Pakistan, meanwhile, tries to deflect allegations by highlighting ISKP attacks inside its territory—such as the 2023 Bajaur bombing and strikes in Balochistan. Yet these incidents are minor, and ISKP has never targeted Pakistan’s military or intelligence infrastructure. This selective restraint strengthens the argument that ISKP operates under Islamabad’s tolerance, if not protection.

The duplicity of Pakistan’s strategy echoes the warning once given by former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: “You can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbours.” By nurturing ISKP as a proxy, Pakistan risks being consumed by the very forces it seeks to manipulate.

ISKP’s threat extends beyond South Asia. Its capacity for transnational operations was demonstrated in March 2024, when it attacked a concert hall in Krasnogorsk, Russia, killing scores of civilians. The incident underscored both its operational reach and its aspiration to project itself as a global terrorist movement.

For the international community, the ISI–ISKP nexus complicates counter-terrorism efforts. Pakistan’s persistent use of militant proxies undermines global security and risks creating safe havens for extremists capable of destabilising Central Asia, Russia, and even Europe. The longer the world overlooks Islamabad’s duplicity, the stronger and more entrenched ISKP becomes.

The ISKP–ISI relationship is a textbook example of Pakistan’s reliance on militancy to achieve geopolitical goals, regardless of collateral damage. By providing sanctuary, financing, and training, ISI has strengthened ISKP and weaponised it against the Taliban, the TTP, and India. This alliance has already produced devastating consequences and, if unchecked, could yield even graver outcomes.

The world must recognise Pakistan’s role in strengthening ISKP and hold it accountable. A coordinated global response is essential—dismantling ISKP’s safe havens, choking its finances, and countering its online recruitment networks. Failure to act decisively will embolden both ISKP and its patrons.

These concerns are compounded by Pakistan’s increasingly belligerent rhetoric under Chief of Army Staff General Asim Munir. In April 2025, in Islamabad, he invoked the “two-nation theory” and described Kashmir as the “jugular vein.” During a speech in Tampa, Florida, that August, he went further, threatening to use nuclear weapons and declaring, “We are a nuclear nation; if we think we are going down, we will take half the world down with us.” Such statements reflect a volatile mindset in Pakistan’s military establishment, already emboldened by its covert networks of terror.

Against this backdrop, the ISKP–ISI nexus compounds regional dangers. It calls for heightened vigilance on the part of India and the international community. As the tragic Pahalgam terror attack of April 22 remains fresh in memory, it is clear that Pakistan’s dangerous gamble—feeding extremism to project power—continues to threaten peace not only in South Asia but across the world.

Views expressed are personal. The writer is a retired IPS officer, Adviser NatStrat and a former National Security Advisor in Mauritius