Europe’s Strategic China Crossroads

French President Emmanuel Macron’s fourth state visit to China (Dec 3-5, 2025) mixed symbolism with hard economic bargaining. There was a special focus on nuclear energy cooperation and a high‑profile joint (protocol-breaking) trip with Xi Jinping to Chengdu - China’s defence, aerospace and panda-research hub.

Macron arrived in Beijing with a large delegation of ministers and nearly 40 CEOs, signalling an intent to deepen economic ties while addressing Europe’s trade deficit and market‑access concerns. A rare protocol gesture followed talks with Xi in Beijing: Xi personally accompanied Macron to Chengdu, where they visited the Dujiangyan irrigation project and a panda facility, underscoring France’s special status within Europe in China’s diplomacy.

Politically, Macron reiterated France’s one‑China policy and framed the trip as part of Europe’s pursuit of “strategic autonomy” – engaging China on trade, climate and Ukraine while trying to reduce over‑dependence and assert distinct European positions from Washington. Ukraine, Middle East crises and global governance featured in the strategic dialogue, with France pressing Beijing to play a more constructive role without securing any major policy shift.

Key outcomes

* Numerous cooperation agreements were signed, covering civil nuclear energy, ageing populations, agriculture, education, environment and panda conservation.

* In nuclear energy, France and China agreed to “pragmatic cooperation” including work on small modular reactors, digitalisation and automation of nuclear operations, and non‑electric uses (e.g. industrial heat and hydrogen), leveraging EDF–CGN ties and long‑standing EPR collaboration. (EDF is the French state‑backed electric utility and major nuclear operator. CGN is China’s main civil nuclear company. EPR is a large pressurised water reactor jointly developed by EDF and partners, and already deployed in Franco‑Chinese projects.)

* On trade and investment, China showed openness to more French imports and pledged to import more high‑quality French goods. It welcomed French investment in sectors such as aerospace, green and digital industries, AI and biomedicine. It asked Paris to provide a fair environment for Chinese firms. France pushed for better EU market access and fair competition in EVs, steel, and green tech.

* High‑profile but softer deliverables included renewed panda diplomacy with conservation commitments in Chengdu, and signals of continued Airbus–China engagement even though a mega‑order for 500 jets did not materialise during this trip.

Future outlook: China–EU

At the EU level, the structural trajectory remains “partner–competitor–systemic rival” (the EU’s official China strategy, first set in 2019, and repeatedly reaffirmed since). It acknowledges China as a vital partner (e.g., for trade, climate), an economic competitor, and a systemic rival (due to differing political systems and values). It involves more trade defence instruments and the screening of Chinese investment. This translates to anti‑subsidy probes (e.g. Chinese EVs), tariffs or duties, public procurement restrictions, and tighter FDI screening and export controls in sensitive sectors like 5G, semiconductors and critical raw materials. The EU’s strategy also involves resumed parliamentary dialogue and sectoral cooperation in green and digital transitions. So even when individual leaders like Macron pursue big deals, the EU collectively is hard‑wiring a more defensive, de‑risking stance toward China.

Macron’s Chengdu optics show Beijing’s strategy of courting key capitals (Paris, Berlin, Budapest) to dilute a hard collective EU line.

Future China–EU relations will likely oscillate between targeted industrial deals and growing regulatory pushback on security and economic grounds.

For France, expect incremental but real deepening in civil nuclear, green industry and aviation, with Paris trying to leverage this channel to moderate wider EU–China tensions while still backing anti‑subsidy probes and de‑risking in sensitive tech. Other major EU states (Germany, Italy, Spain) are likely to pursue similar selective engagement: competing with China in EVs, solar, batteries and digital infrastructure while cooperating in climate, nuclear safety, finance and some high‑end manufacturing.

From a geopolitical lens, three aspects stand out:

* European strategic autonomy signalling: Macron used Beijing and Chengdu to project Europe as an independent pole, not a mere adjunct to Washington in U.S.-China rivalry. Beijing welcomes this as it seeks to peel Europe away from full alignment with the U.S.

* Ukraine and war‑termination politics: Paris could be probing whether China can exert leverage on Moscow or at least constrain escalation, positioning France as a diplomatic broker even as EU–NATO support to Kyiv continues; this keeps a China channel open on European security architecture.

* Intra‑European differentiation and China’s wedge strategy: High‑visibility Chengdu optics and nuclear/industrial deals help China cultivate France (and Germany, Hungary, etc.) as “special partners” inside the EU, potentially diluting a hard‑line Brussels consensus on issues like subsidies, human‑rights sanctions and tech controls.

This makes Macron’s trip important not only bilaterally, but as a test of how far China can exploit national interests within Europe, while the EU apparatus tightens its systemic‑rival toolbox.

In the France-China relationship, where do Indian interests converge; where do they collide?

Indian interests both converge with and collide against elements of the emerging France–China dynamic; the net effect is mixed, but manageable if Delhi works the India–France track smartly.

India benefits from a France that remains militarily present in the Indo‑Pacific and politically semi‑autonomous from Washington, as this opens room for flexible trilaterals (India–France–UAE, India–France–Japan, etc.) and hedging against both China and an uncertain U.S.

The risk is not a “France tilting to China” but a France trying to play all sides, which could slow coordinated Western responses to Chinese coercion, that India might want at moments of crisis (e.g. Galwan‑type episodes, maritime brinkmanship).

Delhi should deepen high‑end defence, space and Indo‑Pacific operational cooperation with Paris so that, in any France–China equation, the opportunity cost of jeopardising ties with India remains strategically prohibitive for the Élysée.

Views expressed are personal.The writer is a Former Security Advisor, Ministry of Home Affairs, GoI