Triangle of Interests

When UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan landed in New Delhi on January 19, 2026, for a tightly choreographed three-hour visit, accompanied by a high-level delegation that included members of the royal families of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the brevity of the trip did not diminish its strategic importance. The visit signalled consolidation — a sharpening of a strategic understanding that now links the UAE, India and Israel in ways that are increasingly visible, practical and grounded in hard interests.

This is not a formal alliance. It is a convergence of interests born of a shifting Middle Eastern order, especially in the Gulf. It is no secret that the relationship between Abu Dhabi and Jerusalem existed in quieter form well before the Abraham Accords.

Long before 2020, the UAE and Israel maintained discreet but functional ties — particularly in cybersecurity, surveillance technology, intelligence exchanges and shared assessments of regional threats. These links were not ideological; they were transactional and strategic. The Abraham Accords simply brought into the open a relationship built on converging threat perceptions and technological complementarities.

The broader backdrop to this emerging triangle is a changing Gulf order. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, once tightly aligned, now show signs of competition — over oil policy, regional influence and long-term economic positioning. The recent war of words between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi reflects more than rhetorical friction; it signals diverging visions of regional leadership.

For the UAE, diversification is insurance. Deepening ties with India and Israel reduce overdependence on any single regional axis. It embeds Abu Dhabi in multiple power networks — Washington, New Delhi and Jerusalem — expanding its strategic manoeuvring room.

For India, engagement with the UAE and Israel strengthens its western flank without forcing it into Gulf rivalries. For Israel, it expands partnerships beyond its immediate neighbourhood into Asia’s rising power centre.

That convergence is most visible at sea.

The Arabian Sea, the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are no longer passive trade corridors. They are contested spaces vulnerable to drones, proxy attacks and geopolitical signalling. India’s expanding naval footprint, the UAE’s control of logistics hubs, and Israel’s intelligence and surveillance capabilities create clear synergies.

Technology forms the second pillar of this alignment. Israel supplies advanced defence systems and cyber capabilities. India offers scale, market depth and an expanding manufacturing base. The UAE brings capital, speed and an ambition to become the region’s technological hub. Joint ventures and co-development arrangements are not symbolic; they are strategic multipliers.

The I2U2 Group — comprising India, Israel, the UAE and the United States — embodies this approach. Marketed as an economic initiative focused on infrastructure, food security and clean energy, it also functions as a vehicle for strategic trust-building. Economics here operates as geopolitics by other means.

Critics point to India joining over 100 countries and international organisations in condemning Israel’s unilateral measures in the occupied West Bank. Does that contradict the notion of convergence?

India’s position reflects its longstanding support for a two-state solution and its broader diplomatic posture in the Global South. Yet that stance has not disrupted defence cooperation or high-level political engagement. The Indian Prime Minister’s proposed visit to Israel remains unaffected.

New Delhi separates normative diplomacy from strategic necessity. Israel understands that major powers hedge rhetorically while safeguarding core interests. The UAE has long practised this balancing act — maintaining commercial ties with rivals while advancing its own security partnerships.

In a multipolar world, resilience lies in the ability to disagree without disengaging. The India–Israel–UAE triangle is not NATO in the desert. It is not an anti-Saudi bloc. It is not a formal anti-Iran coalition. It is a flexible alignment shaped by shared vulnerabilities and shared ambition. Mohamed bin Zayed’s brief but symbolically loaded January 19 visit underscored a simple reality: this triangle is moving from quiet coordination to consolidated strategy.

In an era where power is diffused and alliances are fluid, geometry matters. The lines connecting Abu Dhabi, New Delhi and Jerusalem are growing thicker — not because of ideology, but because of calculation. This geometry may yet expand. As supply chains realign and energy transitions accelerate, the triangle offers a platform for coordinating standards in green hydrogen, digital infrastructure and resilient logistics. Ports, data corridors and renewable energy grids could become the new connective tissue binding these partners. None of this eliminates friction; each capital will continue to hedge and recalibrate. Yet the direction of travel is clear: functional cooperation over formal commitments, shared projects over grand declarations. In a world wary of rigid blocs, such flexible alignments may prove more durable — not by proclaiming unity, but by quietly producing it through sustained, mutually beneficial action.

Views expressed are personal. The writer has worked in senior editorial positions for many renowned international publications