One-Man Nuclear Command?

Pakistan recently centralised its nuclear command and broader military authority in the hands of Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) Asim Munir through the 27th Constitutional Amendment and related legal changes. These changes weaken earlier, more distributed civilian–military oversight arrangements and formalise the Army’s primacy over nuclear weapons policy and operations.

What exactly has changed

Historically, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was overseen by the National Command Authority (NCA), chaired by the PM, with service chiefs, key ministers, and the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) forming a collective decision‑making body. The SPD acted as the NCA’s secretariat, managing day‑to‑day nuclear planning, security, and operations under a structure that (at least nominally) mixed civilian and military voices.

The new 27th Amendment and associated defence reforms do this:

* Create a constitutionally empowered post of Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), held by the Army Chief Asim Munir, and abolish the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, removing a previous collegiate check on the army chief.

* Establish a National Strategic (Command) head for nuclear forces, effectively subordinating nuclear research, development and deployment to the Army and the CDF, with the post reserved for an army officer.

* Replace or overshadow the earlier NCA model by vesting effective control of strategic assets in the CDF/Army Chief, including practical control over the SPD and appointments to its leadership, thus diluting the prime minister’s prior casting‑vote authority.

* Munir was already elevated to a five‑star rank with legal immunity; now his tenure is extended to around 2030, locking in his long‑term control over the military and nuclear establishment.

Functionally, the “reforms” move Pakistan from a formally “collective” nuclear command structure, with some civilian and multi‑service input, to one in which real authority is highly personalised and concentrated in a single, army‑centric chain of command.

Impact on India

For India, the core nuclear balance in warhead numbers, delivery systems and doctrines (Pakistan’s full‑spectrum deterrence vs India’s NFU‑leaning posture) remains broadly unchanged in the near term. However, the way decisions are taken in a crisis may become more opaque and potentially more volatile, because there are fewer institutional veto points and more dependence on the judgment and incentives of one leader and his immediate circle.

Specific implications for India:

* Crisis stability: With authority concentrated in the army chief/CDF, escalation decisions could be faster, more tightly controlled by the military, and less subject to civilian political restraint, complicating India’s crisis management calculus and any expectations of back‑channel diplomacy with civilian leadership.

* Deterrence signalling: Pakistan’s established “full spectrum deterrence” posture, including tactical nuclear weapons to offset Indian conventional advantages, may be pursued even more assertively under a military‑dominated command, heightening pressure on India’s conventional war planning and counter‑force/ counter‑value debates.

* Intelligence and targeting: The increased personalisation of nuclear command around Munir and a small cadre may alter Indian targeting priorities and intelligence focus, as leadership survivability, continuity‑of‑government and decapitation/resilience issues become more central in Indian planning and wargaming.

Overall, India faces greater uncertainty over how and when Pakistan might escalate in a future crisis, even if the basic deterrent balance does not fundamentally change.

Impact on the World

Three main effects stand out.

First, many external observers see the centralisation of nuclear authority in one powerful army chief with extended tenure and legal immunity as increasing concerns about civil–military imbalance and the risk that domestic political struggles could intersect more directly with nuclear decision‑making.

Second, this concentration of power in a nuclear‑armed state already facing economic stress, internal militancy and political instability reinforces long‑standing worries in Western and regional capitals about command‑and‑control robustness, succession crises, and insider threats.

Third, the reforms may complicate global non‑proliferation and arms‑control diplomacy. Pakistan is already outside the NPT and uses its nuclear programme as a central pillar of its security strategy, and the new structure may make Islamabad even less inclined to accept transparency or constraint measures perceived as limiting the Army’s freedom of action. This also feeds into debates in Washington, Beijing, and other capitals about risk management in South Asia and the potential knock‑on effects for China–India–Pakistan nuclear dynamics.

International Reactions

Have so far been officially cautious and mostly framed in terms of “internal constitutional changes,” with major powers avoiding direct public criticism of the changes. However, media, think tanks and expert commentary in the US, Europe, India and elsewhere has highlighted the dangers of moving towards a more personalised, North Korea–like model of nuclear decision‑making, and has called for closer monitoring of Pakistan’s civil–military balance and nuclear safety.

China has maintained a low‑key public line, focusing instead on its strategic relationship and economic projects in Pakistan, while Western analysts expect quiet engagement with the Pakistani military on nuclear security and command‑and‑control procedures rather than overt pressure.

Multilateral non‑proliferation forums have not yet formally addressed these structural changes, but the reforms are likely to inform future risk assessments and crisis‑management planning by international organisations and regional partners.

Views expressed are personal. The writer is a Former Security Advisor, Ministry of Home Affairs, GoI