Change from the top

The loss of lives of 22 trained soldiers in the atrociously planned operation on April 3 in Chhattisgarh had exposed the woeful lack of leadership abilities of the IPS officers. Several security experts have rightly been critical of how the particular operation was planned and, in general, the lack of initiative displayed in the overall security management. Several IPS officers had attempted to shift the blame on tactical level leaders. They refuse to concede that the tactical level commanders being presented with fait accompli were left with hardly any flexibility. This refusal to draw lessons from the setback is symptomatic of reluctance to own up to the mistakes. The ad hominin response by Abhinav Kumar to the criticism of IPS leadership of CRPF in a piece titled "The recent Chhattisgarh ambush has triggered a fresh round of finger-pointing" in The Indian Express on April 21 was one such anxious attempt to defend the indefensible.

Besides woeful leadership, the operation had also exposed the weakness of policy in dealing with the Maoist problem. A holistic long-term approach has to be adopted to resolve the festering issue, instead of treating it as a mere security concern. The role of security forces has to be limited to bringing down the levels of violence to enable follow up process. Even if the CRPF had succeeded in capturing Madvi Hidma, the Maoist leader, on that fateful day, what long-term gains would it have helped achieve?

The leadership of CRPF and other security forces deployed in anti-Maoist operation too must take long-term measures instead of a statistical approach to project success by capturing one odd militant leader or getting a few of them to surrender. The failed operation on April 3 was symbolic of this statistical approach.

That the IPS leadership of these forces has failed to conceive of a long-term security plan for the area is a sad reflection of their inexperience in dealing with such adversaries. Rational leaders would have, in two decades of deployment, expanded the area of influence of security forces to the interiors of the so-called "liberated zone" and thereby imposed restrictions on the free movement of Maoists. The leadership also has failed to create an intelligence network resulting in repeated setbacks that tantamount to the total capitulation of state's might in front of Maoist insurgents. It is an irony that the CRPF leadership has found it fit to pronounce the operation a success!

The IPS officers, trained only in the matters relating to Policing, are ill-equipped to appreciate the likely scenarios and consequences in a fast-developing operation. The common thread of failure of leadership and intelligence is discernible in several setbacks of security forces — whether in central India or other parts of the country — be it the ambush at Sukma on April 6, 2010, or the Pulwama bombing on Feb 14, 2019.

Besides the inapt handling of operations, the inability of IPS officers to lead the Central Armed Forces is increasingly apparent in their management of personnel and administrative matters of these forces. Almost 47,000 personnel of these forces have either gone on voluntary retirement or resigned from service in the five years between 2016 to 2020, as per a reply submitted to parliament by the MOS Home. A plethora of litigation in these forces by troops is also a sad reflection on their personnel management abilities. This emanates from the fact that the lien of IPS officers with these forces is temporary and that precludes them from taking a long-term perspective. Finding themselves out of depth to manage these large professional forces and unfamiliar with the core responsibilities, they focus on non-core activities. For example, while ITBP and BSF were grappling with the situation in Galwan and tackling trans-border firing respectively, their chief was focusing on organising long route marches and other peripheral activities. Even, as recent as in March when almost one-third of the BSF was withdrawn from the eastern borders for election duties, the leaders of the force deemed it fit to indulge in organising superfluous events like 'Maitrei cycle safari' and 'Maitrei football match' to celebrate 50 years of independence of Bangladesh, thus putting an even heavier burden on remaining troops.

Apart from the CAPF, the IPS leadership appears to be falling short of the expectations of the general public and their own constabulary. This is apparent from the comments made by some courts for their acts of omission during the 2020 riots in Delhi and earlier incidents at Jamia Millia University and JNU. Lack of empathy, indiscipline and incompetence of beat police personnel emanates from the adverse living and working conditions besides lack of training — all of which are within the capabilities and resources available to the police leadership. However, most IPS officers fail to lead from the front and resolve these issues because of their vested interests and bend backwards to the dictates of their political masters.

It is therefore extremely important to undertake Police leadership reforms that will automatically lead to Police reforms. One of the most important aspects of these reforms is to hand over the leadership of the Central Armed Forces to the matured and experienced cadre of these forces. The cadre, being well-versed in the operational ethos of these forces, is eminently suitable to lead them.

The Central Armed forces have a very important role in the security matrix of India to address the festering issues of these forces including the issue of leadership.

The writer is a Retired Additional Director General of Border Security Force and security analyst. Views expressed are personal