A Risky Trilateral

Asim Munir, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), continues to be on a jingoistic spree by forging new military alliances. In September last year, at Munir’s behest, Pakistan struck a military alliance with Saudi Arabia. The main highlight of the deal is that any military aggression against one of these countries will be treated as an attack on that country. Munir’s long association with, and stay in, Saudi Arabia is well known, and Saudi Arabia itself appeared increasingly isolated due to the rapidly changing geopolitical scene, particularly after President Trump assumed office.

Significantly, however, a new development has now come into focus, with Turkey believed to be the third party in this trilateral defence arrangement and more than willing to join. The emerging security partnership appears to be a response to ongoing ambiguity in an era of declining alliance certainty. Saudi Arabia seeks to diversify its security partnerships, while Turkey aims to expand its Middle Eastern role—signified by its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) membership and pursuit of strategic autonomy. Pakistan, for its part, seeks to enlarge its Middle Eastern footprint and look beyond the Gulf to draw multiple benefits from this strategic engagement. All three states are constrained by different priorities, which do not make them natural allies or partners. Saudi Arabia prioritises its Vision 2030 agenda, its flagship Neom City project close to the Yemeni border, the diplomatic and military containment of Iran, and, above all, regime security.

Over the past two years, geopolitics in the Middle East has been volatile, unpredictable, and explosive. The war in Gaza acted as a catalyst, followed by Israel’s 12-day war with Iran, a combustible situation in Yemen, a fragile peace plan for Gaza, the reintroduction of the Abraham Accords, Pakistan’s defence deal with Saudi Arabia, uncertainty over the formation of an international peace force in Gaza, and, most importantly, the current uprising in Iran. According to defence and security analysts, amid the remilitarisation of regional politics, not only Middle Eastern states but also Iranian-aligned non-state actors in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria find themselves on the threshold of an escalating security situation. In this fluid and uncertain environment, the role of external powers is clearly shaped by their regional and global preferences.

Shahid Javed Burki, former caretaker Finance Minister of Pakistan and ex–Vice President of the World Bank, wrote in a recent column in Pakistan’s Express Tribune that, though not the head of the state, Asim Munir is now in the driving seat. One of his initiatives has been to conclude agreements with a number of predominantly Muslim states in the region. The first move in this direction was the defence pact with Saudi Arabia, by far the richest Muslim state. Since the conclusion of this agreement, Pakistan has been visited by several political leaders from the Muslim world, with each visit ending in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), if not a full-fledged agreement. These understandings are not limited to the Arab world alone. Turkey has now also expressed interest in aligning with Islamabad. Among the many flashpoints in the Muslim world is the ongoing unrest in Iran.

As far as Turkey’s entry into this trilateral arrangement is concerned, it could potentially pave the way for a new security alignment that may shift the balance of power in the Middle East and beyond. The expanded alliance may make strategic sense, as Turkey’s interests increasingly overlap with those of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in South Asia, the Middle East, and even Africa, according to experts. Turkey also views the pact as a way to strengthen security and deterrence at a time when questions are being raised about the reliability of the United States, which maintains strong military ties with all three countries. Furthermore, Riyadh’s financial clout and Islamabad’s nuclear capability, ballistic missiles, and manpower—combined with Turkey’s military expertise and advanced defence industry—could make the alliance more formidable, according to Nihat Ali Özcan, a strategist with the Ankara-based think tank TEPAV.

Turkey’s joining the alliance would also underscore a new era in its relations with Saudi Arabia. After turning the page on years of rancour, the two countries are working to develop economic and defence cooperation. They recently held their first-ever naval meeting in Ankara. Turkey is already sharing drone technology with both countries and now wants them to join its KAAN fifth-generation fighter jet programme.

It may be recalled that with Turkey, defence cooperation has become a key pillar of bilateral relations. According to the 2023 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report, Turkey is Pakistan’s second-largest arms supplier, accounting for 11 per cent of its total arms imports. The defence partnership has grown significantly, with joint projects such as the Milgem warships, aircraft modernisation, and drone acquisitions deepening military collaboration. Consequently, Turkey’s joining the Saudi Arabia–Pakistan nexus is being seen by some as the emergence of another “Islamic NATO”.

As regards India, experts reckon that Turkey is seeking to accede to the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) concluded by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in September 2025. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are currently experiencing a rough patch in their relations, particularly over developments in Yemen. The UAE is also a member of the I2U2 grouping with India, Israel, and the United States, and has normalised relations with Tel Aviv under the Abraham Accords. The potential area of operations of this new entity could be as large as NATO’s, if not larger. NATO’s conception of the North Atlantic is expansive, encompassing Europe, North America, and even parts of northern Africa. An “Islamic NATO”, however, would have no such geographic constraints and could expand rapidly, as any Sunni Muslim country may be eligible for membership. While Turkey is seeking to join a bilateral arrangement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remains a staunch advocate of pan-Islamism, aligning with his vision of reviving a modern version of the Ottoman legacy, as noted by an Indian think tank.

However, Saudi–Turkish competition for leadership of the Sunni world may not be the glue that binds this grouping. The supposed icing on the cake—Pakistan’s obsession with India—may also prove to be wishful thinking. As noted by D. Shyam Babu of the Centre for Policy Research, the grouping could well turn out to be a house divided. Nevertheless, the trilateral defence arrangement merits close scrutiny by Indian strategists. Munir appears to be on an expansionist trajectory, with India as an implicit target. He is seemingly attempting to draw in as many Islamic countries with monetary and technological influence as possible to deter India and to signal belligerence under the guise of a trilateral agreement.

India, therefore, must plan a long-term strategy to counter any Pakistani military adventurism. Although Saudi Arabia maintains warm relations with India and has substantial investments in the country, New Delhi needs to remain cautious and alert in light of the emergence of this new alliance.

Views expressed are personal. The writer is a retired IPS officer, Adviser NatStrat, and a former National Security Advisor in Mauritius