The long-delayed elections in Bangladesh have finally begun, but the circumstances surrounding them underline how fragile the country’s democratic restoration remains. Reports of vote theft, intimidation and sporadic violence have accompanied polling day, reminding observers that elections alone do not automatically confer legitimacy. Since the ouster of Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh has been governed by an interim administration under Muhammad Yunus, whose tenure has coincided with a sharp deterioration in relations with India. New Delhi’s publicly stated position has remained consistent: democracy must be restored through a credible electoral process. Yet the deeper concern for India is not merely procedural democracy, but whether the post-election political order in Dhaka will be stable, sovereign in decision-making, and regionally responsible. The elections, therefore, represent not just a domestic political milestone for Bangladesh, but a strategic inflexion point for South Asia, where uncertainty in one capital often reverberates across borders.
India’s stakes in Bangladesh’s political stability are unusually high, shaped by geography, history and hard security realities. The two countries share a nearly 4,000-kilometre land boundary, India’s longest with any neighbour, much of it densely populated and partially unfenced. Periods of political weakness in Dhaka have historically translated into increased challenges along this frontier, including illegal migration, cattle smuggling, narcotics trafficking and the circulation of counterfeit currency. More critically, instability creates permissive conditions for extremist networks to revive and reorganise. Over the past decade, counter-terrorism cooperation between India and Bangladesh under Hasina’s government was one of the quiet successes of regional security management, sharply reducing the operational space for insurgent groups targeting India’s northeast. The erosion of that cooperation under the interim dispensation has alarmed Indian security planners. For New Delhi, a strong, democratically elected government in Dhaka is not a matter of preference but necessity, ensuring that border management and intelligence coordination return to institutionalised, predictable channels.
The geopolitical orientation of Bangladesh’s interim leadership has further complicated matters. Under Yunus, Dhaka’s diplomatic posture has tilted perceptibly towards Islamabad and Beijing, unsettling a balance that India had carefully cultivated. Allegations that Pakistan’s intelligence establishment, particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence, has regained influence within Bangladesh’s security ecosystem have intensified Indian anxieties. The reported release of radical elements during this period has reinforced fears of Bangladesh once again becoming a rear base for anti-India activities. This shift stands in stark contrast to the preceding decade, when India and Bangladesh demonstrated that pragmatic cooperation could override ideological differences. The current moment, therefore, tests whether Bangladesh’s political class can reassert autonomy in foreign policy and resist becoming a theatre for proxy rivalries. For India, the return of a government with a clear electoral mandate is seen as the first step towards restoring rational diplomacy, where disagreements are negotiated rather than amplified through external alignments.
Economic considerations add another layer to India’s concern. Bangladesh is not only a neighbour but an important trade and connectivity partner, central to India’s Act East Policy. Over the past decade, bilateral trade expanded significantly, alongside cooperation in power transmission, energy exports and regional infrastructure. Indian electricity exports to Bangladesh, cross-border rail links, and transit arrangements through Bangladeshi territory have all strengthened India’s engagement with Southeast Asia. Political instability in Dhaka threatens to derail these gains. Infrastructure projects stall, investor confidence weakens, and regional connectivity becomes hostage to domestic turbulence. For Bangladesh too, sustained growth depends on stable relations with its largest neighbour and most immediate economic partner. Elections, therefore, are not merely about political succession but about preserving the developmental momentum built painstakingly over years of cooperation.
The electoral contest itself presents India with difficult but unavoidable choices. New Delhi has maintained channels with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, widely viewed as a frontrunner, and has indicated readiness to reset ties based on the electoral outcome. While India has worked in the past with governments involving the Jamaat-e-Islami, the current configuration poses new challenges. Jamaat’s ideological proximity to Pakistan, its hardline rhetoric, and its internal radical elements make engagement more complex in today’s security environment. At the same time, diplomatic realism dictates that India cannot afford a posture of exclusion. Any government in Dhaka will have to recognise the inescapable logic of geography and interdependence. For India, the immediate priority is that the elections conclude with sufficient credibility to produce a functioning government. Only then can the task of rebuilding trust, stabilising security cooperation, and insulating bilateral ties from external manipulation truly begin.