Somalia’s long war against al-Shabab appears to be entering a consequential phase. US-backed airstrikes, expanded aerial surveillance and renewed ground offensives have shifted momentum, allowing Somali forces to reclaim pockets of territory long held by the al-Qaida-linked militant group. The government in Mogadishu has framed these gains as evidence that a more self-reliant security architecture is taking shape just as African Union peacekeeping forces draw down. Yet history counsels caution. Somalia has witnessed cycles of tactical victories followed by militant resurgence when governance, services and security failed to take root. The current campaign may be altering the battlefield, but whether it alters the political reality will depend on what follows the bombs and bullets: administration, legitimacy and sustained state presence.
Al-Shabab’s durability stems from its ability to adapt. Emerging in the mid-2000s from the Islamic Courts Union’s militant wing, the group once controlled vast swathes of southern and central Somalia, including parts of Mogadishu. When African Union troops pushed it out of the capital in 2011, it pivoted to guerrilla warfare, suicide bombings and targeted assassinations. Its financial resilience — built on taxation, extortion and illicit trade — has allowed it to function less like a ragtag insurgency and more like a shadow state. This adaptability explains why territorial losses, while symbolically significant, have rarely translated into strategic defeat. The group has shown a capacity to melt into rural landscapes, exploit clan grievances and re-infiltrate areas where state authority remains thin. The lesson from past offensives is clear: clearing territory is easier than holding it.
What distinguishes the current phase is the expanded use of airpower and intelligence integration. Persistent drone surveillance has exposed supply routes, weapons caches and underground hideouts that once gave al-Shabab tactical advantage. Precision strikes on bomb-making facilities and explosive-laden vehicles have disrupted the group’s operational tempo, reducing its capacity to stage large-scale attacks in urban centres. Airpower has also served as a force multiplier for Somali ground troops, enabling advances into areas that were previously too risky to approach. Yet reliance on external aerial support carries its own dilemmas. Civilian casualties, even when unintended, can erode local trust and provide militants with propaganda. Moreover, a security model heavily dependent on foreign intelligence and strike capabilities risks creating a capability gap if international priorities shift. Somalia’s challenge is to internalise these gains — building its own surveillance, air and intelligence capacities rather than outsourcing them indefinitely.
The drawdown of African Union forces adds urgency to this transition. For nearly two decades, the AU mission formed the backbone of Somalia’s security architecture, providing manpower, logistics and operational coordination. As Somali forces assume greater responsibility, they inherit not only territory but also the burden of governance in fragile environments. Retaken towns in Lower Shabelle, Hiiraan, Middle Shabelle and Jubbaland will test the state’s ability to deliver services, administer justice and mediate clan disputes. Where government presence remains predatory, corrupt or absent, al-Shabab has historically reinserted itself as an alternative authority — harsh, but predictable. Stability, therefore, hinges less on battlefield success than on whether citizens perceive the state as more legitimate than the insurgents it seeks to replace.
Compounding these challenges are overlapping crises that stretch Somalia’s institutional capacity. Climate-driven droughts have displaced communities and intensified competition over scarce resources. Political tensions between federal and regional authorities complicate coordinated security operations, while funding shortfalls threaten both military sustainability and humanitarian response. In such an environment, security gains can quickly unravel. Counterinsurgency is not merely a military endeavour; it is a governance project. Roads, schools, water access and dispute resolution mechanisms are as critical as checkpoints and patrols. Without them, reclaimed territory risks becoming contested ground once more, vulnerable to infiltration by militants who thrive in administrative vacuums.
The role of the United States and other international partners will remain pivotal, but it must evolve. Airstrikes and advisory support can buy time and create operational advantages, yet they cannot substitute for political reconciliation and institutional reform. Somalia’s leadership must use this window to strengthen civil-military coordination, professionalise security forces and ensure accountability in areas liberated from militant control. Equally important is financial transparency to prevent security assistance from fuelling corruption — a grievance that insurgents have historically exploited. International partners, for their part, must balance counterterrorism objectives with long-term state-building, recognising that a purely kinetic approach risks perpetuating the very instability it seeks to eliminate.
Al-Shabab remains one of Africa’s most resilient militant organisations precisely because it understands Somalia’s fractures — clan rivalries, economic marginalisation and distrust of central authority. Defeating such a movement requires more than battlefield victories; it demands a political compact that integrates peripheral regions into a functioning national framework. The government’s plans to rebuild homes and deliver aid in retaken areas are steps in the right direction, but implementation will determine credibility. If reconstruction falters or aid is captured by elites, the narrative of liberation will ring hollow.
Somalia stands at a delicate inflection point. The combination of renewed offensives, international air support and the gradual handover from African Union forces offers an opportunity to reshape the conflict’s trajectory. Yet opportunity is not outcome. The true measure of success will be whether markets reopen, children return to school and local leaders resolve disputes without fear of reprisal. Security must become a lived experience, not a temporary condition enforced at gunpoint.
The war against al-Shabab has always been as much about legitimacy as territory. Airpower may clear the skies of immediate threats, but only governance can clear the ground of insurgent appeal. As Somalia assumes greater responsibility for its own security, the world will watch whether tactical gains mature into durable peace — or whether, once again, victory proves fleeting in a land where the state’s reach has too often stopped at the city’s edge.