Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s three-nation tour of Jordan, Ethiopia and Oman between December 15 and 18, 2025, comes at a moment when West Asia and its extended neighbourhood are undergoing a profound structural reordering. A fragile ceasefire in Gaza, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and the emergence of a Saudi–Pakistan–US security alignment have unsettled long-standing assumptions about power, influence and strategic autonomy in the region. For India, this is not routine diplomacy but a moment demanding sharper choices and wider hedging. The most consequential shift from New Delhi’s perspective is the “Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement” signed by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in September 2025, which effectively re-hyphenates South Asian and Gulf security dynamics—an outcome Indian diplomacy has sought to prevent for decades. This was reinforced by the Saudi–US Strategic Defence Agreement in November, granting Riyadh “Major Non-NATO Ally” status and further integrating the Kingdom into the American security system. Together, these developments are rewiring the Gulf’s balance of power, consolidating a security bloc in which India has little formal voice and narrowing the space for autonomous manoeuvre. Modi’s first stop, Jordan, reflects a deliberate effort to strengthen India’s position in the Levant through a partner seen as stable, moderate and diplomatically credible. As custodian of Jerusalem’s Islamic holy sites, including Al Aqsa, Jordan occupies a central role in discussions over Gaza’s future and any tentative revival of a two-state framework. Its emphasis on dialogue, gradualism and political restraint aligns closely with India’s own preferences, as does its role in containing extremism and preventing regional spillover violence. With the revival of the “Trump Peace Plan” placing renewed emphasis on Gaza’s reconstruction, India—having already committed $4 million—seeks to position itself as a development partner without becoming entangled in regional rivalries. Jordan also carries clear economic significance, particularly as a key supplier of phosphates and phosphoric acid vital to India’s fertiliser sector, with imports crossing the $1-billion mark in FY 2024–25. Discussions in Amman are expected to focus on long-term fertiliser contracts, upgrades to Aqaba’s port infrastructure, and enhanced connectivity under the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, in which Jordan functions as a crucial land bridge to the Mediterranean.
If Jordan anchors India’s interests in the Levant, Ethiopia represents New Delhi’s longer-term strategic investment in Africa. Home to the African Union and now a member of BRICS, Ethiopia sits at the heart of continental diplomacy and emerging multipolar platforms, making it indispensable to any serious African strategy. A prime ministerial visit signals India’s intent to deepen South–South cooperation and to offer African partners an alternative to China’s debt-heavy infrastructure model, emphasising capacity-building, institutional partnerships and digital public goods. It also allows India to shape BRICS engagement from within Africa, countering perceptions of the grouping as overly Asia-centric. India–Africa economic ties are already expanding rapidly: Indian investments on the continent exceed $75 billion, while bilateral trade reached around $103 billion in FY 2025, with New Delhi targeting $150 billion by 2030. Ethiopia provides momentum for the next India–Africa Forum Summit, which India hopes to elevate in political weight and strategic coherence. The Addis Ababa leg thus blends immediate diplomatic engagement with a broader effort to embed India more deeply in African economic, governance and multilateral networks, reinforcing its claim to leadership among developing economies at a time when global institutions are under strain.
The final leg of the tour, Oman, is arguably the most strategically sensitive. Often described as the “sentinel of the Strait”, Oman sits astride maritime spaces critical to India’s security, particularly near the Strait of Hormuz through which a significant share of India’s energy imports flow. The visit is expected to culminate in the long-awaited India–Oman Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, aimed at pushing trade beyond the current $10.6 billion, addressing labour challenges linked to “Omanisation”, and securing preferential access for key Omani exports such as petrochemicals. Yet the strategic core of the Oman visit lies in the Port of Duqm. With IMEC stalled by regional instability and Gulf states advancing their own “Arab–European” rail initiatives—most notably the Doha–Riyadh line—India faces the risk of marginalisation in emerging connectivity frameworks. Enhanced Indian naval access to Duqm offers a critical hedge: a logistics hub outside the Hormuz chokepoint, greater protection for India’s energy lifelines, and a stronger, more autonomous maritime posture in the western Indian Ocean. Taken together, the three stops signal a shift in India’s external strategy from narrow bilateralism to a broader arc of strategic insurance. The Saudi–Pakistan defence pact introduces a renewed nuclear dimension into India’s extended neighbourhood, while Saudi–US alignment consolidates a Gulf security order that limits India’s direct influence. New Delhi’s response is to diversify—strengthening Jordan as a continental stabiliser, Ethiopia as an African anchor, and Oman as a maritime bastion. This emerging Indo-littoral strategy is designed to ensure that India’s political and economic access to a volatile region remains secure, sovereign and resilient. Modi’s tour, therefore, is not an isolated diplomatic exercise but a statement of India’s evolving self-conception in a multipolar world: not merely as a balancer of great powers, but as a state seeking to shape regional alignments while preserving its freedom of manoeuvre.