India’s uncertainty over the Chabahar port is not about a single infrastructure project; it is about how a rising power navigates a world that is increasingly intolerant of the middle ground. Chabahar was conceived as a long-term strategic answer to an old problem—how India reaches Afghanistan, Central Asia and beyond without being hostage to geography or hostile borders. Over the years, it has acquired deeper meaning: a counter to China’s growing footprint in the region, a stake in Iran’s economic future, and a practical expression of India’s belief that connectivity, not coercion, shapes stability. That vision is now under strain. The threat of fresh American tariffs on countries engaging with Iran, coupled with the impending expiry of the US sanctions waiver, has forced New Delhi into an uncomfortable pause. It is a pause born not of indecision, but of the recognition that global politics has become less forgiving of nuance.
Washington’s pressure leaves India walking a narrow ridge. On one side lies a relationship with the United States that has grown into one of India’s most consequential partnerships, spanning defence, technology, trade and shared concerns over China’s assertiveness. On the other lies Iran, a neighbour across the sea with whom India has shared civilisational ties, energy interests and strategic understanding for decades. Chabahar sits precisely at this intersection. The port was always an exception carved out of sanctions regimes because of its stabilising role in Afghanistan and its potential to integrate regional trade. But exceptions are fragile things. They survive on goodwill and shifting political priorities, and the current moment offers little of either. The message from Washington is unmistakable: economic engagement with Tehran will carry a price. India’s engagement with US officials reflects not defiance but realism—an attempt to prevent one strategic commitment from undermining a much larger relationship.
The steps India is reportedly considering—transferring committed funds, reducing direct exposure, exploring new institutional structures—suggest a familiar Indian instinct: adapt without abandoning. This is not an exit, but a recalibration. India has learned, often the hard way, that strategic projects in volatile regions require patience, flexibility and an ability to absorb political shocks. Chabahar has already survived sanctions, diplomatic freeze-ups and delays that would have sunk a less purposeful venture. Yet there is a risk in excessive caution. Distance on paper does not always translate into distance in perception. Any continued involvement will still be read internationally as India making a choice, however carefully hedged. But the alternative—stepping back entirely—would weaken India’s credibility as a long-term partner and leave space for others to shape the region’s connectivity on their own terms. Iran, for its part, sees Chabahar as more than a port; it is an economic lifeline for a marginalised province and a symbol of strategic autonomy in a world closing ranks against it.
The internal turmoil in Iran only sharpens the complexity. A collapsing currency, widespread protests, and a heavy-handed security response point to deep structural stress. India’s advisories to its citizens and efforts to facilitate departures reflect prudence and responsibility, not panic. But instability in Iran is not a distant concern. It affects shipping routes, energy markets, regional security and the viability of projects like Chabahar and the International North–South Transport Corridor. India has traditionally resisted the temptation to comment on Iran’s domestic politics, preferring quiet diplomacy and continuity. That restraint has served it well. Yet restraint should not be mistaken for passivity. The larger question is whether India allows short-term turbulence—however severe—to derail a long-term strategic vision that was built precisely to withstand uncertainty.
What this moment calls for is neither bravado nor retreat, but clarity. India does not need to frame its choices as loyalty to one power at the expense of another. Strategic autonomy has always been about preserving room to manoeuvre, not making dramatic gestures. A calibrated approach—limiting sovereign exposure, embedding Chabahar within broader multilateral frameworks, and keeping lines open with all sides—offers the most credible path forward. Connectivity projects do not announce their success overnight. They demand faith in geography, patience with politics, and the willingness to absorb pressure without losing direction. Chabahar is such a project. How India handles it will signal not just its stance on Iran or the United States, but its confidence in pursuing long-term interests in an increasingly unforgiving world.