The NDA government’s proposed Viksit Bharat–Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin), or the VB-G Ram G Bill, 2025, marks a consequential overhaul of India’s rural employment guarantee framework since the enactment of MGNREGA two decades ago. On the surface, the promise is politically and socially attractive: an expansion of assured wage employment from 100 days to 125 days per rural household in a year. In a countryside still grappling with uneven farm incomes, climate shocks and limited non-farm opportunities, the symbolic value of a higher guarantee is undeniable. Yet legislation of this nature cannot be judged by its headline provision alone. The architecture of the Bill reveals a deeper shift in philosophy — from an open-ended, demand-driven rights-based programme to a more fiscally bounded, administratively managed scheme that seeks to balance rural welfare with macroeconomic prudence and agricultural priorities. Whether this recalibration strengthens or weakens the rural safety net will depend not on intent, but on how its design choices play out on the ground.
The increase in guaranteed workdays needs to be seen in the context of how MGNREGA has functioned in practice. Although the Act speaks of “not less than 100 days” of employment, bureaucratic and technological constraints have turned that floor into a ceiling for most households. Additional days have been permitted only in narrowly defined circumstances — for tribal households in forest areas or during officially declared disasters. By codifying 125 days as a statutory entitlement, the new Bill appears to correct this anomaly. However, the introduction of a cost-sharing model fundamentally alters the incentive structure. Under MGNREGA, the Centre’s assumption of unskilled wage costs was crucial in ensuring that states did not ration employment due to fiscal stress. By requiring states to bear 40 per cent of wage costs in most cases, the Bill risks reintroducing precisely that constraint. For fiscally weaker states — often those with the highest demand for rural employment — the expanded guarantee could remain theoretical, with actual provision curtailed by budgetary capacity. What is presented as an enhancement of worker entitlements may, in effect, become a variable benefit contingent on state finances.
This concern is amplified by the Bill’s shift from a demand-based labour budget to a system of “normative allocation.” Under MGNREGA, states project demand for work and receive funds accordingly, reinforcing the Act’s rights-based character. The proposed model reverses this logic by allowing the Centre to fix state-wise allocations in advance, with any excess expenditure to be borne by states themselves. This change may improve fiscal predictability for the Union government, but it dilutes the legal guarantee at the heart of the programme. Rural employment, by its very nature, is counter-cyclical — demand rises during droughts, crop failures or economic slowdowns. A capped allocation risks forcing states to either deny work or shoulder unsustainable costs precisely when rural distress is highest. In parallel, the provision allowing suspension of work for up to 60 days during peak agricultural seasons reflects a long-standing critique that employment schemes compete with farm labour. While the intent — ensuring labour availability during sowing and harvesting — is understandable, the practical outcome is more complex. For landless households and marginal farmers, the timing of employment is as critical as the quantum. A guaranteed 125 days loses much of its meaning if a significant portion of the year is administratively blocked off, compressing the window in which workers can actually claim their entitlement.
The Bill’s emphasis on weekly wage payments is perhaps its most worker-friendly feature, addressing one of MGNREGA’s chronic failures: delayed wages. Faster payments can significantly enhance the scheme’s credibility and utility for households that rely on it for subsistence. Retaining compensation for delayed payments is also an important continuity, signalling that worker rights have not been entirely subordinated to administrative convenience. Yet here too, the absence of greater clarity on enforcement raises questions. Under MGNREGA, delay compensation exists on paper but is inconsistently paid, often requiring workers to navigate complex grievance mechanisms. Without explicit strengthening of accountability and transparency systems, tighter timelines may remain aspirational. Taken together, the VB-G Ram G Bill reflects a government attempting to reconcile competing imperatives: expanding social protection, managing fiscal exposure, supporting agriculture, and imposing administrative discipline. The risk is that in seeking balance, the Bill blunts the transformative edge of a rights-based guarantee. Rural employment schemes work best when they are simple, predictable and responsive to need. If the new framework shifts too far towards conditionality and ceilings, it may deliver neither robust welfare nor fiscal comfort. The challenge for Parliament is not merely to pass the Bill, but to refine it so that the promise of “Viksit Bharat” is built on a foundation of genuine rural security rather than carefully rationed assurance.