Peace Effort v/s Old Faultlines
As Afghanistan and Pakistan return to talks in Turkey, mistrust, accusations and shifting alliances threaten to derail yet another attempt at stabilising the region;
An uneasy calm continues between Afghanistan and Pakistan despite efforts to usher in peace between the two warring neighbours. Afghan and Pakistani negotiators were set to resume ceasefire talks in Turkey on November 6 to prevent a return to hostilities following their violent clashes in the recent past. It is well known that relations between these neighbours have plummeted in recent years, with Islamabad accusing Kabul of harbouring militant groups that carry out attacks in Pakistan, claims that the Taliban denies. The latest conflict erupted on October 9 following explosions in Kabul, and the Taliban government blamed Pakistan, prompting a retaliatory border military offensive. The ensuing fighting killed more than 70 people, including civilians, and injured hundreds more. The two countries, which were former allies and share a 2,600-kilometre frontier, had agreed on October 19 to a ceasefire mediated by Turkey and Qatar, although its details have not been finalised. Host Turkey had said at the end of last week’s talks that the parties had agreed to establish a “monitoring and verification mechanism” to maintain peace.
Negotiators are now expected to hammer out the details of that mechanism and other issues concerning the implementation of the ceasefire. Amid growing mistrust, both sides have accused the other of not acting in good faith and warned of a resumption of fighting should the truce collapse. Pakistani officials have also described Kabul as acting like a proxy of India, which has forged close ties with the Afghan Taliban since it returned to power in 2021. It may be recalled that soon after the US withdrawal in August 2021, Pakistan zealously reached out to Afghanistan, mainly to wean it away from its growing warmth towards India. However, possibly due to Pakistan’s immature diplomatic policy, half-hearted approach and underestimating Afghanistan, their relationship is now at its lowest.
Earlier on November 1, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif accused the Taliban government of “treacherous and barbaric patronisation of Indian-sponsored terrorism”. Islamabad alleges that Kabul must stop providing sanctuary to the Pakistani Taliban and other militant groups that use Afghan territory to plan and launch cross-border attacks. Afghan officials reject those accusations and accuse Pakistan of routinely violating Afghanistan’s sovereignty with airstrikes. The border between the two countries has been closed for weeks, causing significant economic losses to traders on both sides.
According to Asadullah Nadeem, a political analyst, this “deal” could be the final one, either to confirm or reject the framework of an agreement previously outlined between the delegations. The Amir of Qatar, in a meeting with Pakistan’s President, also expressed hope that Pakistan and Afghanistan would now be able to resolve current issues and overcome recent challenges. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, has also voiced similar hope that the two countries can reach an agreement to strengthen bilateral cooperation. Now, all eyes are set on the outcome of the third round of talks and what it will mean for the future of Afghanistan–Pakistan relations.
Here, it is not impertinent to state that on October 28, after negotiators from Pakistan and Afghanistan were deadlocked in talks to extend their fragile ceasefire, Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif blamed India. In a television interview, Asif claimed that India had “penetrated” the Afghan Taliban leadership. He insisted that it was the reason for the escalation in tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He complimented the Taliban leadership at the talks in Istanbul but alleged that people in Kabul were pulling the strings, staging the puppet show, and are being controlled by Delhi. Asif further charged that India wants to engage in a low-intensity war with Pakistan and, to achieve this, they are using Kabul. The Defence Minister, however, presented no evidence to back his claim that India was abetting the Taliban to challenge Pakistan. But his comments represent a growing attempt by Pakistan to portray its tensions with Afghanistan as due to increasing friendship between the Taliban and India. The Taliban leadership, on its part, has rejected the accusation that India has had any role in the crisis between Pakistan and Afghanistan and has denied any responsibility for the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP’s) repeated attacks on Pakistani soil. Still, analysts said, the decision by Pakistani leaders like Asif to invoke India as an alleged shadowy villain pulling the strings of the Taliban underscores the deep unease in Islamabad over growing ties between New Delhi and Kabul.
For Pakistan, wedged between Afghanistan to the west and India to the east, New Delhi’s expanding footprint in Kabul is a source of deep suspicion. When a magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck northern Afghanistan on November 3, one of the first countries to offer aid was India. The Indian External Affairs Minister had phoned his Taliban counterpart, Amir Khan Muttaqi, and New Delhi shipped 15 tonnes of food to quake-hit Balkh and Samangan provinces. Earlier, the recent visit of the Afghan Foreign Minister to Delhi also underscored a wider re-engagement between India and the Taliban in recent years, as did India’s decision to reopen its embassy in Kabul.
According to columnist Abid Hussain, writing for Al Jazeera, for years Pakistan had been the Taliban’s primary patron. India, for its part, long regarded the Taliban as a Pakistani proxy. It accused the group and its allies of repeatedly targeting Indian diplomatic posts in Kabul, Jalalabad, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif from 2001 onwards when the Taliban was out of power and was fighting US forces and the Afghan governments that Western troops supported. Islamabad’s longstanding doctrine of “strategic depth” is rooted in the military’s desire to wield leverage in Afghanistan and blunt India’s influence in South Asia. Since 2021, however, the Taliban’s stance has been more conciliatory towards India.
Yet some analysts argued Pakistan’s concerns reflect longstanding strategic anxieties rather than recent developments with Afghanistan. Amina Khan of the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad reckons that Pakistan had expected the Taliban not to create “space or vacuum” for India, an expectation that has not been met. Khan further noted that the recent visit by Muttaqi to India led to strong statements that were issued by the Afghan government, raising Pakistani apprehensions.
In the backdrop of the developments as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, it would appear that the chances of a patch-up between Pakistan and Afghanistan remain bleak. The attempts to bring in peace may continue by the facilitators, yet the Durand Line and the areas in its proximity would remain fraught with uncertainties and a possible flashpoint. By the time this piece appears in the press, we will know exactly the outcome of the deal, if any.
Views expressed are personal. The writer is a retired IPS officer, Adviser NatStrat and a former National Security Advisor in Mauritius