Cost of Walking Away

When the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018, it did not merely abandon a controversial agreement. It weakened one of the most significant diplomatic frameworks of the 21st century and signalled that even verified compliance might not guarantee continuity in American commitments. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was never presented as a grand reconciliation between Washington and Tehran. It was narrow by design. Its purpose was singular: to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Under the agreement, Iran capped uranium enrichment at 3.67 per cent, reduced its enriched uranium stockpile by roughly 97 per cent, dismantled thousands of centrifuges, and allowed continuous monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The inspections were intrusive. Facilities were monitored in real time. For several years, the IAEA repeatedly verified that Iran was complying with its obligations.

Whatever one thought of the deal’s limitations, its sunset clauses, its failure to address Iran’s ballistic missile program, or its regional activities, the core objective was being met, Iran’s nuclear breakout time had been significantly extended, and the program was under international surveillance. Then, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement, calling it “the worst deal ever negotiated.” In its place came the “maximum pressure” campaign sweeping sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports, banking networks, and foreign trade. The administration argued that harsher economic isolation would force Tehran back to the negotiating table for a broader, tougher agreement. That assumption proved deeply flawed. Sanctions without a credible diplomatic off-ramp are not negotiation. They are coercion without resolution. And coercion without resolution often leads not to capitulation but to recalibration.

Beginning in 2019, Iran gradually reduced its compliance with the JCPOA. Enrichment levels rose beyond the agreed 3.67 per cent cap. Stockpiles increased. Advanced centrifuges were reintroduced. By 2021, enrichment had reached 60 per cent, far beyond the limits of the 2015 agreement, though still short of weapons-grade material. The sequence matters. Iran’s escalation followed the U.S. withdrawal; it did not precede it.

This is not Tehran’s intention or policy. Iran’s regional posture remains deeply contentious. But the nuclear deal had created a functioning, verifiable restraint mechanism. When Washington exited despite confirmed Iranian compliance, it eroded the incentives underpinning that restraint. The consequences extended beyond the nuclear file.

Inside Iran, factions sceptical of engagement with the West were strengthened. The argument that the United States cannot be trusted gained credibility. European allies struggled to preserve the deal without U.S. participation, attempting limited workarounds that ultimately failed to offset American sanctions. The diplomatic coalition that had made the JCPOA possible fractured. More importantly, the withdrawal sent a signal globally: multilateral agreements negotiated across administrations may not survive domestic political change. Foreign policy credibility is not built solely on military strength. It rests on consistency. When a state abides by an agreement, and sanctions are reimposed years later, the logic of reciprocity, the foundation of arms control, weakens.

Consider the broader implications. If compliance does not secure durable relief, why would future adversaries accept intrusive inspections? Why would they invest political capital in negotiating constraints if those constraints can be reversed with an election cycle?

Supporters of the withdrawal argued that the JCPOA was insufficient because it addressed only nuclear issues while leaving other disputes unresolved. That critique may hold weight. But dismantling a functioning nuclear restraint mechanism without securing an immediate replacement did not create leverage. It created a vacuum. Diplomacy with adversaries is rarely comprehensive. It proceeds incrementally, through bounded agreements that manage specific risks. The Iran deal was precisely that: bounded, focused, verifiable. Its collapse has left the region more volatile. Nuclear tensions have increased rather than decreased. Trust between Washington and Tehran has deteriorated further. And the global non-proliferation regime has been weakened at a time when restraint is more necessary than ever.

For countries like India, which maintain economic and strategic ties across West Asia, the stakes are not abstract. Energy security, diaspora safety, and regional stability all depend on reducing escalatory cycles between the United States and Iran. Diplomatic breakdowns in the Gulf ripple outward into global markets and geopolitical alignments. The lesson of the past decade is clear. Diplomacy is fragile. It requires continuity beyond politics. Agreements that survive only as long as the administration that signed them remains in office cannot anchor international stability.

The JCPOA was imperfect. Most diplomatic agreements are. But it was functioning. Its abandonment did not produce a better deal. It produced greater uncertainty. The central question today is not whether the original deal solved every problem between Washington and Tehran. It did not. The real question is whether discarding verified nuclear constraints in pursuit of maximalist objectives has made the world safer. The evidence suggests that it has not.

Views expressed are personal.

THE WRITER WRITES ABOUT POLITICS, MATERIAL CULTURE, AND ECONOMIC HISTORY