Beyond Galwan’s Shadow

After Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to China in seven years, where he attended the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and held a sideline meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping, there is a buzz of normalisation in India–China relations. This meeting followed a series of recent bilateral engagements to normalise relations, including Wang Yi’s visit to India, the special representative-level talks, the defence ministers’ meeting, and Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s visit to China.

The thaw in bilateral relations happened after several localised and command-level dialogues to restore the status quo prior to the Galwan clashes, in which 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers lost their lives. The status quo is yet to be established, as per several commentators, and the new terms of border management are not yet entirely clear.

One cursory look at the readouts of the Xi–Modi bilateral meeting showcases what is wrong with it and what is holding it back. It is visible and clear that India and China’s expectations from one another are not on the same level. Prime Minister Modi’s statement “underlined the importance of peace and tranquillity on the border areas for continued development of bilateral relations.” In a way, India was telling China that what happens on the border cannot be seen separately from the overall bilateral relations, and peace is a precondition for progress in other areas of the relationship. In a way, this justifies India’s actions in the aftermath of the Galwan crisis.

On the other hand, Xi Jinping’s statement highlighted that “the two sides should view and handle the relationship from a strategic and long-term perspective,” which implies that India should not let the border incidents come in the way of overall bilateral relations. It also implies that India needs to move on from the memories of 2020. This is similar to China’s view of 1962.

The reason why there is a difference in approach between their languages is the power asymmetry and the gap between their mutual expectations. China’s economy is more than five times that of India, and despite recent slowdowns, China remains central to the global economy’s new drivers like climate change, new energy vehicles, and artificial intelligence. China is using its rise to compel India to accept its primacy and centrality in Asia, whereas India’s approach is based on deterring China. Strategically, China sees India as being a part of the United States’ plan to contain China, and that is why there are limitations on the extent to which India–China relations may “normalise.” One can see that China’s coercive approach towards India began in the aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis and the concomitant Chinese self-perception of rise. China’s first act was to stake a claim on the entire Arunachal Pradesh and to issue stapled visas to Indian citizens from the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 2009. Since then, the power asymmetry has only increased.

It is also hard to imagine that China will invest in India in ways that help India become competitive and create a challenge to China in the future. Most of the efforts to balance mutual economic relations have not progressed as anticipated, and it is hard to imagine that changing in the short run. While China wants greater access to Indian consumer markets, it will not part with its technological knowledge, and therefore, economic relations may remain largely transactional, with the trade imbalance adding to the lack of bilateral trust. A new litmus test could be whether Indian companies find it easy to do business in China now, as China’s relations with the West fluctuate. However, the recent telephonic call between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump indicates that the US is willing to negotiate with China, and this will impact how China perceives India as well.

Lastly, the two sides are yet to announce a new schedule for direct flight connectivity, which was halted because of the Covid-19 pandemic and was never restored due to tense bilateral relations. For close to six months, the media has been reporting that the resumption of direct flights is imminent. However, there is no clarity from the governments as yet. This adds to the fact that the social relations between the two remain their weakest link. Despite growing international travel by Indian travellers, China was not on their tourist map in general. The two societies’ vastly different food preferences contribute to their limited social interaction. Here, governments need to put in serious efforts to socialise the two societies with one another once again.

India–China relations remain cyclical and prone to being dictated by external pressures and drivers. Growing power asymmetry and distrust don’t help much, and thus, the future may not hold great promises as of now.

Views expressed are personal