The Supreme Court’s opinion on the limits of judicial intervention in the functioning of governors and the president has reopened an old but increasingly urgent debate on federalism, legislative paralysis and the delicate balance of constitutional roles in India’s democracy. By holding that the court cannot impose timelines on constitutional authorities for granting assent to bills passed by state legislatures, the court has effectively retained the status quo in which elected governments remain vulnerable to indefinite delays. Even though the bench clarified that governors cannot sit on bills for perpetuity and that such delays may invite limited judicial scrutiny, the practical consequence is that state governments must continue navigating an opaque and inconsistent process, one in which the pace of legislative assent is shaped more by political equations than procedural clarity. This ambiguity becomes particularly significant when seen against the numbers. Across the country, at least 33 bills in four Opposition-ruled states are awaiting assent either from governors or the president. Tamil Nadu may have escaped the current uncertainty because ten of its bills received deemed assent earlier this year under Article 142 and have since been notified as law, but the situation in other states reveals a troubling pattern of stalled governance. Nineteen bills from West Bengal, ten from Karnataka, three from Telangana and at least one from Kerala remain in limbo, underscoring a widening gap between legislative intent and executive approval. Such delays do not merely inconvenience governments; they disrupt policy implementation, dilute legislative authority and ultimately affect citizens who depend on timely decisions. A bill crafted, debated and passed for public benefit loses momentum and relevance when trapped in procedural stagnation. The absence of predictable timelines, even after the Court’s opinion, reinforces concerns that constitutional processes are being slowed to a point where their democratic purpose risks being undermined.
This tension between state governments and constitutional offices is hardly new, but its expansion in recent years is notable both in scale and consequence. In West Bengal, the pendency of nineteen bills points to a broader standoff between the elected government and the Raj Bhavan. Legislation covering key administrative areas are awaiting assent, prompting Speaker Biman Banerjee to publicly underline the erosion of legislative efficacy when bills stagnate without clarity. Karnataka faces a different bottleneck: ten bills, none pending with the governor but all awaiting presidential assent, including a significant amendment meant to provide four per cent reservation for Muslims in civil works contract allocations. Telangana too finds itself slowed by gubernatorial inaction, particularly on the politically sensitive proposal to raise reservations for Backwards Classes to 42 per cent in education, employment and local bodies—an election promise central to the ruling Congress. Here, the governor has yet to advance the matter to the Union government for presidential assent. The situation extends beyond reservations. Even the proposed nomination of former cricketer Mohammad Azharuddin to the Legislative Council under the governor’s quota remains pending, despite his recent swearing-in as a minister. These procedural delays create a governance imbalance and fuel perceptions that constitutional offices are no longer acting as neutral checks but are becoming active sites of political friction. Kerala’s experience with pending university law amendments further illustrates how gubernatorial delays can spill into core administrative issues. Bills concerning the appointment of vice chancellors, faculty recruitment and the restructuring of university governance have been held up, some for more than a year, continuing a long-running confrontation between the state government and former governor Arif Mohammed Khan. The amendments were intended to resolve a crisis in university administration, yet the absence of approval has prolonged institutional drift and kept critical reforms from taking effect. In all these states, the pattern is unmistakable: constitutional silence on timelines has become a procedural instrument, leaving democratically enacted legislation stranded and weakening the spirit of cooperative federalism.
The Supreme Court’s recent opinion attempts to draw a boundary without fundamentally shifting the existing framework. It clarifies that governors cannot delay bills indefinitely and that such conduct may be subject to judicial scrutiny, yet the refusal to endorse strict timelines preserves a grey zone. The Court’s assertion that deemed assent cannot be invoked through Article 142 further limits the judiciary’s ability to step in when political deadlock threatens governance. The Tamil Nadu government has argued that the Court’s view is only an opinion and not binding, but the practical implications extend nationwide, especially in Opposition-ruled states where friction with governors has become frequent. The broader question is not merely constitutional but political: how can an elected state government function effectively if crucial legislation remains suspended for months, in some cases over a year, due to unresolved assent processes? The framers entrusted governors and the president with important oversight roles, but those roles were never meant to dilute democratic mandates or obstruct governance. Today’s impasse reveals how constitutional provisions, when strained by political tension, can slow the machinery of democracy itself. India’s federal structure depends on trust as much as on law, and when trust falters, delays harden into confrontation. As the country navigates increasingly complex governance challenges—from public procurement reforms to reservation policies and university restructuring—the efficiency of the assent mechanism becomes more than a procedural matter; it becomes central to democratic functioning. The Supreme Court’s reluctance to set timelines is understandable from a separation-of-powers standpoint, but unless political actors exercise constitutional restraint and uphold cooperative norms, the problem will continue to erode institutional credibility. The rising number of pending bills is not just a statistic; it is a symptom of a deeper friction in India’s federal architecture. Without a renewed commitment to dialogue, transparency and a timely constitutional process, this bottleneck risks becoming a structural impediment to governance itself.