The humanitarian crisis in Gaza continues to spiral, and with each passing week, the prospect of a full-fledged famine becomes alarmingly real. Malnutrition-related deaths are on the rise, and yet, ironically, truckloads of aid lie unused at border crossings—trapped in a vortex of logistical bottlenecks, bureaucratic paralysis, and security risks. What emerges from this situation is not merely a supply issue but a deeper failure of systems and cooperation. The international community, particularly those engaged in relief operations, is caught in a no-win situation where aid exists, but the channels to deliver it remain either blocked or dangerously unstable. At the heart of this logjam is the dispute between the Israeli authorities and UN agencies over responsibility and access. Israel asserts that it has facilitated the entry of around 4,500 trucks since May—an average of 70 per day. This is far below the estimated daily requirement of several hundred trucks needed to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. Israeli officials maintain that the aid is available and ready for collection at the Kerem Shalom crossing, but that UN agencies have not acted efficiently to retrieve or distribute it. On the surface, this seems like a plausible argument. But the ground reality in Gaza presents a far more complex and troubling picture. The UN and humanitarian agencies are operating in a near-impossible environment. Routes to collect aid often pass through combat zones, collapsed infrastructure, or areas controlled by criminal gangs. With Gaza’s internal law enforcement structures—primarily the Hamas-run police—having disintegrated under sustained military bombardment, there is a vacuum in maintaining order. This makes aid convoys especially vulnerable to looting, and even worse, puts humanitarian workers at constant risk. Reports of trucks being swarmed by desperate crowds, and of Israeli troops firing on civilians attempting to access supplies, highlight the dangers that accompany every aid mission.
The argument that UN convoys should simply collect and distribute the aid ignores these very real obstacles. Coordination with the Israeli military is a prerequisite for movement, and yet data shows that more than half of the UN’s movement requests in recent months were either delayed or denied. Even when approved, the routes assigned by the Israeli military are often logistically unviable—through impassable roads, high-risk zones, or dense civilian areas. Alternative routes, when requested, are reportedly met with few or no viable options. Delays in communication and last-minute denials leave convoys stranded, wasting precious time and resources. Israel claims that it has made efforts to assess road conditions and facilitate access. But such statements ring hollow when measured against the scale of need on the ground. Even with the best intentions, 70 trucks a day is far from adequate to feed and supply a population of over two million, more than half of whom are displaced. The argument that the bottleneck lies solely with the UN does not stand scrutiny, particularly when aid groups have repeatedly cited movement restrictions, safety concerns, and lack of facilitation as core challenges. There is also a fundamental misunderstanding in how security is being addressed. Israel has offered military escorts for aid convoys, but many humanitarian groups have declined such assistance, arguing that association with military forces only heightens the risk to civilians. In Gaza’s volatile environment, where military presence often precedes or provokes attacks, being seen as aligned with combatants can endanger both the aid workers and the people they are trying to help. The UN insists that the best form of protection is consistent aid delivery—if the community knows that food and essentials will come regularly, chaos and looting will naturally diminish. Sporadic and inadequate supplies only fuel desperation.
The situation is compounded by the absence of clear command and control within Gaza itself. With the collapse of civil institutions, particularly those run by Hamas, there is no reliable local authority to coordinate logistics or maintain public order. This vacuum has led to the rise of armed gangs and further diminished the capacity of international agencies to function safely. The result is a state of near-anarchy in which both the suppliers and the recipients of aid are trapped. In the end, the Gaza aid crisis is a stark example of how humanitarian efforts can be rendered ineffective not by a lack of resources, but by the inability—or unwillingness—of parties to work together toward a practical solution. It is not enough for aid to exist; it must be made accessible, safely and efficiently. That requires a serious reassessment of the current protocols, including greater flexibility and responsiveness from the Israeli military, and renewed efforts by international bodies to establish neutral and secure corridors of delivery. Until then, no amount of aid at the borders will change the grim reality inside Gaza. What is needed is not just trucks and supplies, but political will, logistical innovation, and above all, recognition of the basic humanitarian principle—that food, water, and medicine must reach those in need, regardless of the political conflict that surrounds them. Anything less will only prolong suffering and bring the region closer to a catastrophe that was entirely preventable.