Marriage and pursuance of a particular religion are two decisions that must entirely rest on individual choice. However, marriage has perennially been under society's supervision, and religion draws persistent interference from the State. The Supreme Court's recent observation regarding a plea seeking directions against 'forced' religious conversions takes the control further away from the individual. The Supreme Court bench comprising Justices MR Shah and CT Ravikumar rejected the objections to the maintainability of a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) against forced religious conversion. The PIL was filed by Advocate Ashwini Upadhyay, who is also a BJP leader. The petition apparently contained allegations of conversion through allurement and conversion in the name of charity. The presiding judge, Justice MR Shah, noted that "allurement is very dangerous" and "against the basic structure of our Constitution". His assertion that "everyone who stays in India, will have to act as per the culture of India" carries a tone of imposition. The court's observation is problematic on more than one ground. Firstly, it treats Indian citizens as passive subjects who can easily be allured and deceived. This treatment is problematic. People operate in a democracy as active stakeholders who can behave rationally — deciding what is wrong and what is right for them. This active nature of citizenry lays the ground for entitlement to a range of rights. While safeguarding people against deceitful action is necessary, some degree of trust has to be placed in them. Furthermore, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta also brought forth the case of Gujarat where the High Court had already stayed certain sections of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, 2003, amended in 2021. The amended law requires prior permission from the District Magistrate for any conversion. The mandate of disclosing the intent behind the conversion is contrary to the sacrosanct concept of the right to religious freedom. How can the idea of freedom be conceived under such strict vigilance? More threatening is the basis of that vigilance. There could be no explanation for the argument that marriage between two individuals of separate religious identities should evoke a such level of State suspicion. Has the State become so fragile that it can be impaired by the personal decisions its citizens would make? Society and the State must loosen their grip on the institutions of marriage and religion, leaving them to individual preferences. The actions of certain state governments and the judiciary, however, present an altogether different picture. The tide appears to be running in the opposite direction. The recent observation made by the Supreme Court, for instance, can lead to the proliferation of demands for anti-conversion laws across the country. This is threatening, as certain states — driven by a particular political agenda — are already pushing for anti-conversion laws that can have a dampening effect on the progressive practice of inter-faith marriages. In a polarizing situation where a balance had to be maintained, the apex court's interpretation appears to have tilted the balance in a particular direction. The court's overwhelming emphasis on 'intent' appears misplaced. The bench noted that intent is the "first thing that needs to be considered." There is no reason why conversion can't just be a matter of preference. Why does it have to be looked at through the prism of intent? Intent, at times, can be a very subjective thing. How fair would it be to leave the adjudication and interpretation of this intent to a state official? A more important question could be, how strong is the urgency for such adjudication, in concrete terms? In this light, the argument made by Senior Advocate CU Singh merits consideration. He asserted that the petition is a plea based on hyperbole and exaggeration, and lacks material to show any alarming situation. As the court hears the petition again on December 12, it should genuinely consider the reservations raised against the PIL.