It appears that the world has turned upside-down. In its first-ever National Security Policy, Pakistan has surprisingly left room open for reconciliation with New Delhi, especially on matters of trade. More importantly, the resolution of the Kashmir issue may not even be a prerequisite so long as there is some headway in bilateral talks between the two nations. This policy, approved both by the Cabinet and the all-powerful military, was formally unveiled by PM Imran Khan last week. The overall theme of the 100-page or so policy is peace and economic diplomacy with Pakistan's immediate neighbours. Of course, India is obviously a part of this group. News reports have quoted anonymous Pakistan government officials as saying that Islamabad is not seeking any hostility with India within the next 100 years. As may be known, ties between the two rival nations are nearly at a historic low since the Pathankot terror attack in 2016. Since then, subsequent events such as the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019 have only served to further widen the already gaping chasm. Trade has been affected, normal diplomatic outreach efforts have ground to a halt and the two sides are often seen trading allegations on the international stage. Even matters of common concern such as the fate of neighbouring Afghanistan are seemingly not enough to bring the two sides to any level of mutual understanding. So, what is all this talk of peace? Well, as many experts have pointed out, Pakistan is in a bit of a pickle at the moment. Years of mismanagement and corruption have left the country with an economy that is as stable as a leaky boat and requires regular infusions of foreign aid, further driving up Pakistan's already insurmountable debt. The former head of Pakistan's Federal Board of Revenue, Syed Shabbar Zaidi, recently opined that Pakistan's current debt levels have reached a point that the country cannot ever realistically recover from. Its various lenders and 'well-wishers' such as Saudi Arabia and China no longer appear willing to be quite as helpful as they were before. Of course, with the exit of America and the end of the forever war, the financial support Pakistan received from the world's foremost military power is also gone. At the same time, the threat of being black-listed by the FATF for terror financing always looms on the horizon for Pakistan. And speaking of the war on terror, it would appear that even Pakistan's carefully played out strategy in Afghanistan over the last few decades of playing all sides may be coming loose. A section of US leadership appears intent on holding Pakistan to task for double-dealing. Regional allies like China appear impatient that Pakistan has not managed to bring stability to the region so that economic activity may follow. And even the Taliban itself, the so-called Islamic Emirate, is not exactly happy with Pakistan at the moment. Points of contention include Pakistan's continuing failure to compel the global community to accept the legitimacy of the Taliban, and contentions over the Durand Line. The Taliban, which has never accepted the imaginary border drawn up by the British, took to forceful confrontations recently with its ally and sponsor Pakistan over the latter's attempt to put up fences along the Durand Line. And this is before one considers the more localised problem of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) that continues to be a source of tension between the Taliban and Pakistan. Islamabad expects the Taliban to keep its offshoot in Pakistan under control but the Taliban leadership itself seems reluctant to act against the TTP for its offensive actions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Much of this comes down to the fact that even with the Taliban, friendship towards Islamabad is not a given, with a certain section of the leadership displaying considerable antipathy towards Pakistan and its role in the region. All this briefly sums up just a small fraction of problems and existential crises faced by Pakistan at this moment. Given all this, it is not altogether surprising to note that Pakistan is at least attempting to create a scenario of peace with its neighbours. Hostility with India has not been profitable for Pakistan, and the new security policy raises the future possibility that the two sides may move towards a more significant rapprochement that would be profitable for everyone involved. But there are so many factors in the way of this ideal view of the future. For one, there is little clarity from Pakistan on what exactly would be a reasonable amount of headway in negotiations over Kashmir that would convince Islamabad to pursue a broader improvement of relations with India? Will India even accept the conditions that Pakistan puts forth to establish friendly relations? Finally, is Pakistan actually sincere with what it is claiming in its new security policy? This remains somewhat doubtful given that Pakistan absolutely has an incentive to try and improve its global image any way it can at the moment and this new 'friendly' policy may just be a way to signal to the world that Pakistan is done with its old double-dealing, terror-financing ways. As usual, all India can do is pragmatically watch on, and respond as the situation requires.