The Group of Seven (G7) countries — comprising the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan — along with Australia, agreed on USD 60 per barrel price cap on Russian seaborne crude oil. The deal was reached after the reluctant members of the European Union — a "non-enumerated" G7 member — had their reservations addressed. While the prime aim of the price cap is to reduce Russia's income from selling oil, it also seeks to "stabilise global energy prices, benefiting emerging economies around the world". Prospects of success on both these fronts, however, remain elusive. In fact, the chair of the Russian lower house's foreign affairs committee said that with the introduction of the price cap, the European Union was jeopardising its own energy security. It may be pertinent here to look at the reservations put forth by Poland before it eventually agreed to the proposal. Poland rooted for a proposal that would cap the price "as low as possible" and, at the same time, squeeze the revenues of Russia. Notably, the initial G7 proposal had backed a price cap of USD 65-70 per barrel, and that too without any adjustment mechanism. That the final proposal came down to as low as USD 60 per barrel — significantly below what the Russian oil was trading — the sustainability of the whole idea appears bleak. The price cap reflects an opportune stance by G7 where the member nations want to continue the fuel dependence on Russia but also want to hit its revenues. With the finalisation of the agreement, they have carved out a very narrow path for themselves, faltering from which will mean a disaster for Europe that is so heavily dependent on Russia for oil and gas. The deal forbids the coalition countries from buying oil from Russia unless the prices come down to the cap level, which is very unlikely. Non-coalition countries can still buy Russian oil but they won't be allowed access to services provided by the coalition countries, including insurance, currency payment, facilitation and vessel clearances for their shipments. In its response, Russia has not shied away from sending a clear-cut warning, stating that if its interests are hampered, it won't at all supply its oil, particularly to the countries that have imposed the cap. A narrower market for an essential commodity like oil would mean that despite logistical limitations, Russia can still manage to sell its oil at prices higher than the cap. This, contrary to G7's stated goal of price stabilisation, will push the prices upward. The proposal, which is being touted as beneficial for emerging economies, can spell disaster for the same. The price cap will likely increase uncertainty in a world already grappling with multiple crises. Warning against the cap, the Russian president had earlier said that the country will "stop supplies of gas, oil, coal, heating oil... leaving European countries to freeze." As far as the intention of curtailing Russian revenues — which go into financing the war — is concerned, time has proved that none of the sanctions imposed to date have deterred Russian aggression. Show of might and supremacy in a situation where dialogue is needed will serve no purpose. Imposition of price cap on seaborne Russian oil will hurt Russia slightly but, at the same time, it will hit the energy prospects of many emerging nations. As far as India is concerned, it has been consistently reluctant in supporting sanctions against Russia. It appears unlikely at this point of time that India will budge from its position of buying Russian oil. India's oil import from Russia has increased exorbitantly over the past 10 months. The country appears clear in its stand of prioritising national interest over moral duty. Overall, the scope of price cap imposition doesn't appear promising.