The cordiality of yesteryears

In the light of colonialist historiography in the Indian, especially the medieval period (700 – 1800 CE), Indians became accustomed to viewing their medieval past in communal colours increasingly from the second half of the 19th Century. This colonialist view of Indian history found its way into both the nationalist and communal historiography which flourished in India during the first half of the 20th Century – a period characterised by the rise of mass anti-imperialist nationalism and popular inter-communal conflict.

The emergence of the two-nation theory and the Partition in 1947 strengthened religious nationalism in India and Pakistan and expanded the intellectual space for the portrayal of Indian history as a contest between separate civilisations of 'Hindu' and 'Muslim'. The writing of political and military history, thus, became enmeshed with communal ideology in popular memory, conditioned as it was by the communal spin put on Indian history by so-called historians on both sides of the border.

In Pakistan, history first became a glorious story of Islam in the Indian subcontinent followed by the complaint of a minority oppressed by the Hindu majority in the colonial period. In India, the myth of 'Muslim Rule' and Hindu slavery to the Muslims in the period 1192-1857 was propagated by the religious revivalists and communal writers since the 19th Century.

Both communal camps deliberately overlooked the syncretic character of the Indian civilisation noticed by almost all foreign travellers in medieval India. The European observers, in particular, were impressed by the socio-religious sufferance they saw in India in the 17th and 18th century. However, in recent times, especially since 2014 in India, the Hindu communal view of Indian history has gripped the popular imagination stoking majoritarianism into the raging political inferno of our times. We must note that communal historians on all sides are essentially political historians who select and distort information available in the primary historical sources to suit their communal objectives.

Ironically, a critical reading of the sources sometimes used literally by the communal historians reveals information which flies in the face of their assertions. The sources compel us to reconsider the attractions of the 'clash of civilisations' theses made popular by the hallucinations of ultranationalism in recent times. In the case of medieval India, the corrections begin, tellingly, with the military policies of none other than Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna (Mahmud Gazni, reigned 998-1030 CE) who is infamous in India for the sac of the wealthy Somnath temple more than anything else. But Sultan Mahmud was not only a raider. He also laid down the foundations of future 'Muslim' rule in South Asia. This, he did by recruiting his commanders and administrators from a variety of ethnic groups.

Contemporary sources refer to a number of Hindu commanders who served Sultan Mahmud in numerous capacities. The Sultan warred incessantly against the Muslim rulers of Sistan, Khurasan, Persia, and Central Asia, capturing thousands of slaves who formed his Ghulam corps. Of particular significance were the Turkish slaves who made good soldiers. He also employed Arab and Kurd soldiers. This tradition continued among the Ghurids and finally, the Ilbari Turkish slaves founded the Delhi Sultanate under Qutubuddin Aibak in 1192. Hindu slave troops or perhaps even mercenaries formed an important component of the multi-ethnic armed forces of Sultan Mahmud.

Not only did the Hindu chiefs serve as the Sipahsalars (chief commanders) of the Hindu units called the Fauj-e-Hinduan but some of them ended up playing significant imperial roles in the court politics of the Sultanate. According to a well-researched paper by G.S.L. Devra and Shashi Arora, "One Prince Sewand Rai attained such a high status in the royal court that he played a significant role in the succession dispute after the death of Sultan Mahmud."

Another "prominent Hindu commander" was Bijji Rai who is said to have served the Sultan quite well. And, finally, who can forget the well-known Tilak, the Kashmiri Hindu administrator turned commander, of whom much is narrated in the work of Baihaqi. It is said that Tilak finally converted to Islam after serving the Sultan for many years as a pagan. Sultan Mahmud raided and conquered territories inhabited by multi-ethnic tribes, many of whom had converted to Islam but retained their ethnic loyalties which often became stumbling blocks in the process of empire-building initiated by the Ghaznavids, and later the Ghurids. Military force was the basis of such empires and military efficiency was often achieved by maintaining a competitive counterpoise of different ethnic fighters recruited for their martial capabilities.

In this context, the Hindu units of the Sultan must be viewed as a corps of reliable slave-mercenaries which he ruthlessly deployed against rebellions launched by non-Hindus. Not only did the Hindus, like the role played by the Christian Convert Slaves, the Janissaries, in the Ottoman Empire, balance the Turks and Afghans recruited by the Sultan but they were crucial in crushing the Muslim and Christian resistance in the Zarang region in 1003 CE.

The deployment of pagans against the Muslims must have put off some contemporary Muslim observers! The Bahamani, Adil Shahi, Nizamshahi and Mughal practice of employing Hindu commanders and Hindu contingents is too well to be repeated here. None can forget that Malik Ambar, the 17th Century Abyssinian General of Nizamshahi Ahmadnagar, was instrumental in recruiting Maratha troopers (bargis) and commanders on a substantial scale to begin with. Maloji Bhonsale, Shivaji's grandfather was a general in the Nizamshahi Army of Ahmadnagar. And the history of Shahaji Bhonsale, an Adil Shahi General of the Bijapur Sultanate is also well known.

In fact, Maloji, the Raja of Verul, was a follower of the Sufi Peer Shah Sharif and, therefore, named his sons Shahaji and Sharifji. Muslim rulers across India continued to recruit Hindu commanders and their contingents well into the 18th Century as witnessed by the military adventurism of the Hindu Ascetic Gossain Warriors employed by the Nawabs of Awadh. Hindu rulers, in turn, employed Muslim commanders and their contingents regularly. Hindus and Muslims often formed military coalitions against common enemies; see the case of Hasan Khan Mewati who died fighting Babur on the battlefield of Khanua in 1527 alongside thousands of Mewari Rajputs led by Rana Sanga or the Afghan commander Hakim Khan Sur who led Rana Pratap's van at the famous Haldighati Battle (1576).

Speaking of Rajputs, we must revisit the massacre of hundreds of Marathas in Jaipur by the Rajputs in January 1751. This event was a result of the rising popular resentment in Marwar against Maratha political intervention and financial imposts. In the 1750s, the Marwari rulers also corresponded with Ahmad Shah Abdali who wanted to form a grand north Indian alliance against the Maratha intruders. His vakils were also entertained by the rulers of Marwar.

It is known that many admirals and commanders of Shivaji were Muslims and the Maratha association with Muslim soldiers continued in the 18th Century. The example of Ibrahim Khan 'Gardi', a loyal friend of Sadashiv Rao 'Bhau' is well known. He was the Durrani artillery and infantry commander of the French-trained Telinga corps who fought the hardest at Panipat (1761), spurning lucrative offers made by Ahmad Shah who was also a Durrani. In the battle, Ibrahim's close relatives died fighting and he was severely wounded, imprisoned and executed.

The Peshwas recruited Afghan and Arab troops who always played a conspicuous role in the battle. In fact, most of the fighting for the Peshwa Baji Rao II at Koregaon, 1818, was done by the Arab cavalrymen who almost got the better of the Company troops. The sources, including Vishnubhatt Godse's Majha Pravas, also highlight the discipline and loyalty of Lakshmibai's Afghan contingent at Jhansi in 1857 – a fact portrayed, in typical Bollywood fashion, in the film Manikarnika released recently.

Thus, Indian military history which is supposed to be a site of communal conflict proves problematic to say the least. In contrast to the baseless communal assertions, it proves that when it came to politics and military service in medieval India religious identity did not matter as much as political acumen, tactical merit and sharp swords. From this history, we can conclude that the precolonial past was a different place where people did things differently. It is, of course, a different matter that this past is distorted for political purposes in postcolonial India, Pakistan and other places. Critical historians must do their best to rescue their subject from the bigotries of the present at all times.

(The author is Associate Professor, Department of History, Faculty of Social Science, University of Delhi. The views are strictly personal)