Delhi durbar: So near yet still so far for BJP
10 Dec 2013 12:32 AM GMT
What must be particularly galling to its leadership and certainly to its supporters is the fact that the BJP polled 2 per cent votes less than it did in the 2008 assembly elections, when it won a meagre 23 seats. The underestimation of the AAP phenomenon goes beyond complacency and should be seen as the failure of mainstream parties to understand societal changes of the recent decades. This is actually not surprising since the nature of political parties, particularly the BJP, has itself changed. The result is that increasingly political parties are not in sync with the hopes, aspirations, frustrations and expectations of the citizenry.
Development and growth can no longer be seen as ‘delivered from above’, it has to be participatory. And when established parties are seen as exclusive clubs where corrupt and dubious backroom deals prevail, people feel alienated and express their anger through the ballot box. Here the AAP’s message resonated well with the electorate.
The BJP was not able to convince the voters that they were significantly different from the Congress. The maladministration in the municipal corporations, problems in ticket distribution with a mayor throwing tantrums and blackmailing the party into giving him a ticket by shifting a sitting MLA, senior leaders ‘gifting’ their seats to their sons and protégés etc, all sent a negative message, and this was clearly reflected in the results with all but one backroom candidates being rejected, and the BJP losing in its strongholds.
More than the AAP’s ability to tap into this rich vein of frustration, it was the failure of the BJP to correctly assess what were the real issues of the electorate. The AAP’s initial emphasis on rising electricity bills was nothing but proxy for continued high consumer inflation, an indictment of failed economic policies of UPA that prioritised welfare entitlement schemes while squeezing all growth impulses. MNREGA has inherent limitations in how much it addresses the needs of the poor, how much local corruption it generates and how much it actually constrains productive forces in the rural areas. Similarly, while it is acceptable that there are people who have limited access to food, is the Right to Food approach the best one? And surely the lack of nutrition should not be confused with the lack of food?
However, the principal opposition party has not articulated any alternative approach that would convince people that it would adopt policies that would promote growth in the economy, and jobs for themselves. BJP’s failure to win votes from the large numbers of highly educated, upper middle class voters of South and West Delhi (constituencies such as Greater Kailash, Malviya Nagar, Rajendra Nagar, Tilak Nagar for example) is testimony to this. Incidentally, the doubling of coal prices over the past three years is responsible for increases in electricity tariffs, itself a product of failed policy of coal nationalisation, which has not been questioned by any party.
And for someone familiar with Delhi’s power scenario, there is no way tariffs can be brought down since all power is bought from public sector generating stations directly, unless Delhi is prepared for either extensive power cuts or a Delhi government budget where resources are diverted away to hugely subsidising consumers.
Development and growth can no longer be seen as ‘delivered from above’, it has to be participatory. And when established parties are seen as exclusive clubs where corrupt and dubious backroom deals prevail, people feel alienated and express their anger through the ballot box. Here the AAP’s message resonated well with the electorate.
The BJP was not able to convince the voters that they were significantly different from the Congress. The maladministration in the municipal corporations, problems in ticket distribution with a mayor throwing tantrums and blackmailing the party into giving him a ticket by shifting a sitting MLA, senior leaders ‘gifting’ their seats to their sons and protégés etc, all sent a negative message, and this was clearly reflected in the results with all but one backroom candidates being rejected, and the BJP losing in its strongholds.
More than the AAP’s ability to tap into this rich vein of frustration, it was the failure of the BJP to correctly assess what were the real issues of the electorate. The AAP’s initial emphasis on rising electricity bills was nothing but proxy for continued high consumer inflation, an indictment of failed economic policies of UPA that prioritised welfare entitlement schemes while squeezing all growth impulses. MNREGA has inherent limitations in how much it addresses the needs of the poor, how much local corruption it generates and how much it actually constrains productive forces in the rural areas. Similarly, while it is acceptable that there are people who have limited access to food, is the Right to Food approach the best one? And surely the lack of nutrition should not be confused with the lack of food?
However, the principal opposition party has not articulated any alternative approach that would convince people that it would adopt policies that would promote growth in the economy, and jobs for themselves. BJP’s failure to win votes from the large numbers of highly educated, upper middle class voters of South and West Delhi (constituencies such as Greater Kailash, Malviya Nagar, Rajendra Nagar, Tilak Nagar for example) is testimony to this. Incidentally, the doubling of coal prices over the past three years is responsible for increases in electricity tariffs, itself a product of failed policy of coal nationalisation, which has not been questioned by any party.
And for someone familiar with Delhi’s power scenario, there is no way tariffs can be brought down since all power is bought from public sector generating stations directly, unless Delhi is prepared for either extensive power cuts or a Delhi government budget where resources are diverted away to hugely subsidising consumers.
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